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This thesis offers an alternative history of theoretical pictures of law and legal work. 
It argues that these theoretical pictures can be understood as giving primacy to either 
the explanatory paradigm of discourse on the one hand, or to the explanatory 
paradigm of tradition on the other. Broadly speaking, discourse-oriented explanations 
of law and legal work tend to focus on the nature, function and status of normative 
requirements themselves. Tradition-oriented explanations, on the other hand, tend to 
focus on the long-term acquisition and transmission, in specific contexts, of common 
ways of seeing and doing.  
 The first part of the thesis is composed of five sections. The first four are 
dedicated to revealing the basic features of the above-mentioned explanatory 
orientations, i.e., law-as-discourse (IA1), legal-work-as-discourse (IA2), law-as-
tradition (IB1), and legal-work-as-tradition (IB2). The fifth section (IC) uses these 
basic features to read five distinct works in legal theory as oscillating between the two 
explanatory paradigms.  
 The second part of the thesis argues that to the extent that we recognise that 
jurisprudential inquiries are oriented towards either the explanatory paradigm of 
discourse or that of tradition, we are on our way to recognising the incompleteness of 
theoretical pictures of law and legal work. This second part offers three further 
arguments, which are designed to encourage the adoption of an attitude that 
acknowledges the incompleteness of the results of one’s inquiries. First, it is shown 
that truth can be the aim of an inquiry, but that this is not incompatible with 
incompleteness understood from the first person post factum perspective (IIA). 
Second, it is argued that the results of one’s inquiry are not complete because an 
inquiry only ever appears complete to one when (and only when) one does not 
problematise its central terms (IIB). Third, and finally, it is argued that the highly 
intensive mode of self-reflection engaged in by theorists practicing the examined life 












The real question concerns our philosophical attitude to our own views. 
 






What is needed from now on is historical philosophising, and with it the virtue of 
modesty. 
 









This thesis argues that theoretical pictures of law and legal work can be understood as 
oriented towards either the explanatory paradigm of discourse or the explanatory 
paradigm of tradition. The basic features of the discourse-oriented explanatory 
paradigm are as follows:  
- The tendency to give explanatory priority to normative requirements, such 
as already posited rules or theoretically identified norms; 
- The tendency to represent and value the unity and rationality (e.g., 
coherence and consistency) of systems or orders of normative 
requirements; 
- The tendency to represent and value the autonomy of systems or orders of 
normative requirements; 
- The tendency to situate explanations of the role of normative requirements 
in behaviour conceptualised from the first person ex ante perspective, and 
largely self-conscious and deliberative;  
- The tendency to represent and value the ability of systems or orders of 
normative requirements to control or constrain the actions of officials; 
- The tendency to focus on the problem of the existence of normative 
requirements, and thus giving prominence to the problem of validity; 
- The tendency to emphasise the importance of a source of validity and the 
conditions under which such a source is authoritative; 
- The tendency to emphasise the importance of governance from above, and 
thus the tendency to study the imposition of social order by ruling 
authorities; 
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- The tendency to explain the emergence and maintenance of social order 
via the function that normative requirements, imposed by an authoritative 
source, play, as reasons for action, in the deliberation of the citizenry; 
- The tendency to emphasise and give explanatory priority to the alleged 
properties of language itself; 
- The tendency to understand language as capable of itself picking out 
phenomena in the world; and 
- The tendency, when explaining social life, to give priority to the mental 
representations by individuals of the mental representations of other 
individuals. 
The basic features of the tradition-oriented explanatory paradigm are as 
follows:  
- The tendency to give explanatory priority to the long-term learning of 
certain embodied skills and abilities; 
- The tendency to emphasise the importance of long-term and large-scale 
human interaction; 
- The tendency to situate explanations in certain communal contexts, such as 
institutions and associations; 
- The tendency to emphasise the spontaneity and adaptation of behaviour; 
- The tendency to represent normative requirements as afterthoughts, post 
factum justifications and explanations, and projections of experiences; 
- The tendency to focus on and value governance from below, and thus the 
tendency to study the emergence of social order from everyday interaction; 
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- The tendency to emphasise the importance of the responsiveness of 
governmental institutions, particularly with respect to the needs of the poor 
and the marginalised; and 
- The tendency to focus on the transmission of social knowledge via the 
non-discursive involvement of persons in common activities. 
In seeking to show how the basic features of these explanatory paradigms are 
expressed in works of legal theory, attention is also given to the relationship between 
explanatory tendencies and problems in theoretical pictures. For example, it is argued 
that the prioritisation of normative requirements as constitutive of social order (as in 
discourse-oriented theoretical pictures) tends to lead to the problem of how those 
normative requirements are, or can be, integrated into the life of persons and 
communities (this is sometimes referred to as the problem of motivation or the 
problem of socialisation). What is crucial to notice here is that this gap, and therefore 
also the need to bridge it, is formed by prioritising the explanatory power of 
normative requirements in the first place. Although most of the examples of the 
relationship between explanatory tendencies and problems are one-way, i.e., that 
explanatory tendencies lead to the emergence of certain problems, the thesis does not 
defend the idea that that is always the case. Rather, the thesis acknowledges that there 
are many instances of mutual influence and dependency between explanatory 
tendencies and problems. It may be that there is a case to be made for one-way causal 
traffic in this respect, but this question is left open for future investigation.  
Of course, theoretical pictures of law and legal work do not come neatly 
packaged under these two explanatory paradigms. Some theoretical pictures can be 
characterised as oriented towards one or the other paradigm, but others can be 
profitably read as relying on characteristics of both. That is why, after having 
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provided an account of the history of theoretical pictures of law and legal work on the 
basis of explanatory tendencies towards either discourse or tradition, this thesis goes 
on to show how certain works of legal theory can be profitably read as sites of tension 
between some of the basic features of these two paradigms.  
The presentation of the four theoretical pictures of law and legal work and the 
reading of the five works that are characterised as oscillating between discourse and 
tradition comprise the first part, as well as the bulk, of the thesis. Although the thesis 
sets out to offer accurate and careful readings of the selected works, its main aim is to 
reveal the basic features of the above-mentioned explanatory paradigms. The 
classification of works engaged in is, of course, necessary, as is their selection. 
Further, both classification and selection are inevitably accompanied by controversy. 
The point, however, is not to be faithful to the intentions of authors or even to the 
detailed nuances of each individual work: rather, it is to paint, with broad and 
generous brushstrokes, an alternative history of jurisprudential inquiries.  
If it is accepted that theoretical pictures of law and legal work either tend 
towards or oscillate between the explanatory paradigms of discourse and tradition, 
then we have a prima facie argument that all theoretical pictures of law and legal 
work are incomplete. In this prima facie form, theoretical pictures of law and legal 
work are incomplete because there is no meta-discourse or absolute standard, or a 
view from nowhere, against which these theoretical pictures can be evaluated: rather, 
as noted above, it is argued that they either tend towards or oscillate between 
explanatory paradigms. The second part of the thesis begins with this insight and 
transforms it into three arguments for the adoption of an attitude, from the first person 
post factum perspective, as to the incompleteness of theoretical pictures.  
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The first argument is that the attitude being encouraged is not at odds with 
theories that emphasise the importance of truth as a norm or aim of an inquiry. In 
offering an account of the history of jurisprudential inquiries, the first part of the 
thesis provided a theoretical picture. It set out to say – and, arguably, it could not have 
got going or kept up its momentum without the impetus to say – something truthful 
about these inquiries, about what these inquiries, in fact, are or have been. However, 
setting out to offer as true and adequate a picture as one can is not incompatible with 
adopting an attitude to the results of one’s own inquiries as incomplete. Making room, 
then, for the first person post factum acknowledgement of the incompleteness of 
theoretical pictures does not contradict theories that argue that the norm of truth 
regulates theoretical practice (e.g., either in the form that we do, or that we should 
use, the standard of truth to evaluate theoretical pictures) or those that argue that the 
aim of inquiry is truth. The former of these is an essentially third person account. The 
second is essentially an ex ante account. The perspective of the attitude encouraged 
here, however, is first person post factum. 
The second argument fastens onto a limitation that flows from the expression 
of theoretical pictures in language. As noted above, it is the task of the first part of the 
thesis to reveal the basic features of theoretical pictures of law and legal work 
oriented either towards or oscillating between the explanatory paradigm of discourse 
or to that of tradition. These basic features, however, are not further explained. The 
crucial point is that this is not an avoidable shortcoming. The demand for explanation 
can proceed forever. What this phenomenon of explanatory regress points to is that 
until certain concepts – taken for granted in certain theoretical pictures – are 
problematised, they are meaningful. They are meaningful precisely in use. It is not 
that the meaning of these terms is fixed by their use – at least not if by ‘fixing’ we 
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mean that we have access to that meaning by making explicit the conditions or criteria 
of use. Rather, the meaning of terms and phrases is brute – words have meaning when 
we do not problematise them. The moment we begin to problematise them is also the 
moment in which the ‘bruteness’ of these words falls out: they begin to disappear 
before our eyes. Recognising this feature of language, called here the phenomenon of 
explanatory regress, is not offered as a proof of the incompleteness of theoretical 
pictures. Rather, as above, the argument is designed as an encouragement for the 
adoption of an attitude that acknowledges the incompleteness of the results of one’s 
own theoretical pictures.  
Finally, the third argument suggests that some limitations of theoretical 
pictures may be the result of the intensively self-reflective mode of the examined life. 
More specifically, it is argued that the self-reflective mode of theoretical practice 
tends to produce a tendency to locate or find evidence of, or to try to make 
explanatory room for, the ‘freedom’ or ‘rationality’ of human beings – the point being 
that the very notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘rationality’ are modelled on and gain their 
significance from the experience of persons insofar as they lead very self-reflective 
lives. 
It is important to emphasise that the second part of the thesis does not attempt 
to provide a proof of incompleteness in general, or more specific proofs of the 
specific hallmarks of incompleteness it discusses (e.g., as above, via the phenomenon 
of explanatory regress expressed in the third argument). Rather, it discusses 
tendencies (rather than necessities) and sketches three arguments designed to 
encourage the adoption of an attitude of acknowledgement of the incompleteness of 
the results of one’s own theoretical pictures.  
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This thesis is composed of the above alternative history and the related 
encouragement of the adoption of an attitude that acknowledges that the results of 
one’s inquiries are incomplete. Ultimately, however, these are not tasks performed for 
their own sake. Although it is outside the scope of the thesis to mount an 
appropriately thorough argument, it is suggested, as a coda for future investigation, 
that the robustness of a discipline and the wellbeing of a community of scholars 
depends, at least partly, on two abilities. First, theorists need to learn to walk the line 
between the canonisation of the history of the discipline and the ignorance of past 
works. This is the task that is attempted in the first part of the thesis; it is done so by 
not relying on either the usual ways of understanding the history of the discipline of 
jurisprudence (e.g., as a debate over the seperability of law and morality) or on the 
usual labels of so-called movements or positions within legal theory (such as 
positivism, natural law, realism, and so on). The second ability is that of theorists 
learning to be open to the insights of others. Although it may amount to mere 
speculation or wishful thinking, it is suggested that the adoption of an attitude that 
acknowledges the incompleteness of the results of one’s inquiry may allow a theorist 
to be both more willing and more able to learn from the insights reached by others. It 
is the task of both parts of the thesis to contribute to this ability. The first part attempts 
to do so not only by attempting to reconstruct, as powerfully as possible, the world of 
each explanatory paradigm, but also by showing that both paradigms ought to be 
taken seriously as not only explanatory orientations but also sites of struggle over the 
ends and means of the common good (this is attempted in sections devoted to 
revealing the political life of each explanatory paradigm). The second part contributes 
to the second ability more directly by offering some arguments for the adoption of the 
above-mentioned attitude. 
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Future work can also take these abilities not only as assisting in the 
development of the robustness of a discipline and the wellbeing of a community of 
scholars, but also as capable of contributing to the manner in which theoretical 
pictures can inform policy making in the public sphere. It could be argued, for 
example, that, the incompleteness of theoretical pictures (from the first person post 
factum perspective) suggests that no scholar ought to propose, or at least propose as 
uncontroversial and indefeasible, policies on the basis of any one theoretical picture. 
In other words, it could be suggested that acknowledgement of explanatory 
paradigms, as well as phenomena such as explanatory regress and the limitations 
flowing from the intensely self-conscious form of scholarly life, should lead us to 
adopt a view of the role of theory in the public sphere as informing and revitalising 
our imagination, and thus also enabling us to be more careful and circumspect, rather 
than leading us towards any one specific course of action. The matter, however, is 
more complicated – if only by the fact that action in the public sphere requires 
confidence and consensus, and not just modesty and openness. Further, any such 
investigation would need to engage more carefully with the relationship between 
theory and practice, as well as with the literature on public reason, the common good 
and the public sphere. Needless to say, these tasks fall outside the scope of the thesis. 




I. A HISTORY OF JURISPRUDENTIAL INQUIRIES 
 
In his extraordinary reports of a tour of the USSR on the eve of its collapse, in 1989, 
Ryszard Kapuscinski tells the story of the Temple of Christ the Saviour.1 The temple 
was completed in 1883, after forty-five years of construction by three generations of 
Czars. It was built to commemorate the survival of the Napoleonic march in 1812. Its 
dimensions were exceptional: 
The Temple of Christ the Saviour is more than thirty stories tall. Its walls are 
3.2 metres thick; they were built out of forty million bricks. These walls – on 
the outside and on the inside – are covered with slabs of Altaic and Podolia 
marble as well as Finnish granite. The slabs are attached to the bricks along the 
entire surface of the temple with the help of special lead grips. The shrine is 
crowned by a gigantic copula covered with sheets of bronze that weight 176 
tons. On the summit stands a cross three stories high. The cupola is surrounded 
by four belfries in each of which hang fourteen bells with a combined weight 
of 65 tons. The main bell weighs 24 tons…. Twelve gates sculpted in bronze 
lead into the interior of the church. Their combined weight is 140 tons.2  
 
It was even more impressive inside, which included an iconostasis built with 422 
kilograms of gold. However, no visitor, including Kapuscinski in 1989, standing on 
the site in Moscow, nearby to the Kremlin, can any longer see the Temple of Christ 
the Saviour. It was demolished in four months in 1931 by Stalin, who had chosen that 
site as the locus for his Palace of the Soviets, but who had never completed the 
project, distracted as he was, says Kapuscinski, in orchestrating the murder of 
millions in the satellites of the USSR and the deportation of many more to Siberia in 
the purges that preceded and continued throughout the Second World War.  
The story exemplifies one extreme attitude to history that the forthcoming 
sections of this thesis seek to counter: disinterest, dismissiveness, and ignorance. The 
other extreme, however, is just as dangerous, just as destructive. It involves the 
                                                
1 Kapuscinski 1994. 
2 Ibid., 97. 
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idealisation, or canonisation, of history. In his Humanism and Democratic Criticism,3 
Edward Said opens with a fervent critique of Harold Bloom’s The Closing of the 
American Mind,4 which, according to Said, represents the worst of the canonisation 
impulse in American literary criticism. In his critique of Bloom’s ‘canonical 
humanism’, Said says the following: 
So far as the historical presence of the humanities is concerned, two views are 
locked in interminable combat. One view interprets the past as an essentially 
complete history; the other sees history, even the past itself, as still unresolved, 
still being made, still open to the presence and the challenges of the emergent, 
the insurgent, the unrequited, and the unexplored.5  
 
Walter Benjamin, who Said refers to as observing that ‘every document of civilisation 
is also a document of barbarism,’6 illustrated Said’s characterisation of the past 
emerging in the present, with the image of the Angel of History, facing backward to 
the past, but moving forward, and watching the rubbish heap of history pile up.7 
Others too, and in more contemporary times, have resisted the temptation to canonise, 
imprison, freeze the past. James Elkins writes a short book composed of alternative 
histories of art – ones that acknowledge the presence of already written histories that 
do not, as is all too common, proceed up to and then from the Italian Enlightenment, 
and ones that he himself has devised in order to counter the oppression of the Western 
canon.8 Susan Nieman writes what she calls ‘An Alternative History of Philosophy’, 
tracing the treatment of the concept of ‘evil’, as distinct from the problems of 
knowledge or existence that flood the pages of one history of philosophy after 
another.9 In these and other cases there is wonder and fascination with the past, but 
not such as to result in the reification of any one way of telling how the past appears 
                                                
3 Said 2004. 
4 Bloom 1988. 
5 Said 2004, 26. 
6 Ibid., 23. 
7 See, Benjamin 2002. 
8 Elkins 2002. 
9 Nieman 2002. 
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to the observer. There is also, and very significantly, a readiness to listen to the voices 
of those ignored by the stampede of ‘great turning points in history’ or other such 
grand narratives. In speaking of the ‘trash’ of history that the Angel of History sees 
pile up, Benjamin refers to the ‘minor voices’, all those left out, characterised as 
insignificant, as slipping through the thick fingers of the canon or the self-glorified 
tales of the victorious. More recently, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari continued 
Benjamin’s call for minor history with their Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature.10  
These and other precursors inform the attitude with which the forthcoming 
sections of the first part of the thesis are written. We should not ignore the past, for 
we can learn a great deal from it – in particular, about the limitations of our own 
ideas, about the particularity of our time and place – but we should not let our interest 
in the past become the passion of the engraver, the builder of monuments, such that 
we demand what Saul Bellow demanded in his introduction to Bloom’s book, i.e., 
‘Show me’, said Bellow, ‘the Zulu Proust.’11 
Before moving on, below, to consider how we can understand the traditions of 
jurisprudential inquiries – those theoretical pictures of law and legal work – to 
coalesce around two explanatory paradigms, i.e., discourse and tradition, one final 
preliminary matter must be mentioned. The forthcoming sections avoid certain well-
established terms and categories commonly used to map the principal positions or 
traditions of jurisprudential inquiries. Thus, such commonly-referred to traditions as 
‘legal positivism’ and ‘natural law’, or theses such as the ‘social thesis’ or the 
‘separation thesis,’ are used sparingly, and avoided wherever possible. This does not 
mean that the forthcoming sections shirk from examining and wrestling with difficult 
issues that occupied the efforts of current and previous generations. Nor does it mean, 
                                                
10 Deleuze and Guattari 1986.  
11 Bellow, quoted in Said 2004, 27. 
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in the case of the specific forthcoming sections, that many, if regrettably not all, of the 
authors considered to be in the canon (for one can always ask here, ‘whose canon?’), 
will be ignored, and that those considered minor or not considered at all by historians 
of jurisprudential inquiry will be examined in detail.12 
Rather, the motivation behind this avoidance of commonly used terms is in 
keeping with striking the balance referred to above, i.e., to encourage an interest in the 
history of ideas, but not such as to result in the canonisation, in the freezing, of topics, 
problems, and methods. Thus, the forthcoming chapters attempt to show, inter alia, 
that one can be creative in constructing a history of theoretical inquiries – of any kind, 
but, in this case, of jurisprudential inquiries. In so doing, the thesis wishes to pay heed 
to Bernard Williams’ view, namely that: 
Above all, historical understanding…can help with the business, which is 
quite certainly a philosophical business, of distinguishing between different 
ways in which various of our ideas can seem to be such that we cannot get 
beyond them, that there is no conceivable alternative.13  
 
It matters how legal theorists view the history of their inquiry. It might further be 
asserted that this matters because the process of coming to one’s own view, i.e., the 
process of constructing a theoretical picture of one’s own, will be heavily informed by 
how one has understood the traditions of inquiry one becomes familiar with. 
Arguably, then, if one understands the traditions of inquiry differently, or at least sees 
that the most common ways of organising that history (e.g., as a debate between legal 
positivism and natural law) are possibilities to which there are alternatives, then one 
may open up possibilities for alternative topics, problems or methods for that inquiry. 
Whether the first part of the thesis succeeds in this endeavour is for the reader to 
judge. 
                                                
12 I have attempted to encourage this engagement with ‘minor scholarship’ in previous editorial work: 
see, Leskiewicz 2005.  
13 Williams 2006b, 195. 
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It would be a mistake to think that the conception of law-as-discourse is restricted to 
the location of law in language. Even those legal theorists who emphasise the 
importance of problems of language for legal theory – such as Timothy Endicott, who 
has worked extensively on problems of vagueness – recognise that ‘law is not 
necessarily made by the use of language, and every legal system requires norms that 
are not made by the use of language.’14 Laws, Endicott says, ‘are not linguistic acts, 
or even communicative acts. They are standards of behaviour that can be 
communicated (and may be made) by using language.’15 Endicott’s point is more 
measured than others who have made the problems of language the hallmark of their 
legal theory. To provide but one example, the debate over the determinacy of the 
meaning of legal language, which has dominated contemporary American legal 
theory, tends to rest on an assumption, not necessarily often articulated, that language, 
as Brian Bix asserts in his Law, Language and Legal Determinacy, ‘is the medium 
through which law acts.’16 It follows, according to Bix, that ‘the nature of the medium 
necessarily has a pervasive effect on what purposes can be achieved through the law 
and how well those purposes can be forwarded.’17  
Despite, then, many affinities with features of language, the conception of 
law-as-discourse carries with it, or so it will be argued, characteristics that are 
somewhat independent of language (or at least embody a certain kind of 
understanding of language). Some of those characteristics are captured well by Roger 
                                                
14 Endicott 2002, 6. 
15 Id. 
16 Bix 1993, 1. 
17 Id; emphasis added. 
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Cotterrell’s definition of contemporary normative legal theory. Such a theory, as 
opposed to what he calls empirical legal theory, seeks out – though one might equally 
say, assumes that it is possible – ‘to explain the character of law solely in terms of the 
conceptual structure of legal doctrine and the relationships between rules, principles, 
concepts and values held to be presupposed or incorporated explicitly or implicitly 
within it.’18 The task of such a theory, according to Cotterrell, is to ‘fix the meaning 
of legal ideas to explain the reality of law.’19 ‘The object of specification of a concept 
of law’ for such a theory ‘is that of explaining the possibility of a logical system and 
coherence in legal doctrine; to show how the professional doctrine of the lawyer 
constitutes an integrated totality.’20 Once more, for good measure, ‘the construction of 
a professionally plausible and logically coherent concept of law as doctrine is both the 
starting point for and the final expression of knowledge of the nature of law from the 
standpoint of normative legal theory.’21  
There is a lot going on in Cotterrell’s definition. One important feature is that 
of the notion of systemacity – or, differently put, the order, or coherence or internal 
consistency as between and amongst some realm of already articulated norms. 
Another notion, intimately linked to the notion of systemacity, is that of the autonomy 
of the system – an idea in itself closely aligned with the so-called virtues of 
impartiality and neutrality. These ideas are themselves also linked not only, as 
Cotterrell notes, to the identity, and, thereby also, arguably, to the monopoly, of the 
legal profession (including, very significantly, the identity of legal scholars), but also 
to profound and deeply controversial issues concerning the separation of powers, the 
behaviour of officials, and the subjection of peoples to the governance of rules.  
                                                
18 Cotterrell 1983, 241. 




Indeed, the last of those issues – that of the subjection of peoples to the 
governance of rules – is a particularly important issue. It is one of the principal 
features of law-as-discourse that it tends to prioritise the role of abstract phenomena – 
such as already articulated rules, or norms identified as operative by the theorist – in 
explanations of social life. As will be discussed below, for those taken with the 
conception of law-as-discourse, the very point of law is the guidance of human 
conduct (referred to in the literature as the normativity of law). The aim of the 
discussion (in section IA1d) is to show how the problem of legal normativity is linked 
to the prioritisation of abstract phenomena in explanations of behaviour.  
Another feature of conceptions of law-as-discourse is their emphasis on the 
validity of laws. We ought to have clear standards, it is said, for determining when a 
law is a law, i.e., when a law is valid, for without such clear standards the very status 
of law would be undermined, i.e., it is unclear on what other foundation law could 
claim the authority or legitimacy said to be required for those who administer it to 
justifiably punish those who deviate from its requirements. One of the problems, 
however, for this emphasis on determining – or at least agreeing on – the criteria of 
legal validity is that of the problem of regression. What determines the standards of 
correctness of the criteria of validity? What is their foundation? How do they, or 
indeed can they, demand obedience or the loyalty of those under them? This has been 
a pressing problem for contemporary jurisprudence, which has sought refuge in 
concepts such as shared agency or conventions. Once again, the aim of the discussion 
(in section IA1f) is not to provide a solution to or to evaluate this problem, but rather, 
to show how that problem arises for those working under the conception of law-as-
discourse. It will also be instructive to see how attempts at finding solutions often 
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appeal to the same kind of intuitions that create the problem in the first place, i.e., to 
an explanation of behaviour based on action for reasons.   
As this section proceeds, these and other characteristics of law-as-discourse 
will become prevalent. It ought not be thought that any one theorist discussed below 
contains all the characteristics of this conception. What is found below are 
characteristics grouped under a general tendency – looked at, as it were, from afar, 
without becoming embroiled in details – of one aspect of the history of jurisprudential 
inquiries presented here. Needless to say, given space limitations, this section will not 
be able to give proper credit to the complex story of these ideas. Nevertheless, it is 




IA1a. The Political Life of Law-as-Discourse 
 
Jeremy Bentham famously defined law ‘as an assemblage of signs declarative of a 
volition conceived or adopted by the sovereign in a state, concerning the conduct to 
be observed in a certain case by a certain person or class of persons, who in the case 
in question are or are supposed to be subject to his power.’22 Although Bentham’s 
location of the source of the ‘assemblage of signs’ in ‘the sovereign in a state’ has, in 
more recent times, been much criticised, the very idea of there being a source from 
which valid laws are yielded has remained largely intact – at least for those oriented 
towards the conception of law-as-discourse. Similarly so with the political ambitions 
of this conception.  
Bentham, as is well known, was highly critical of what he saw as the 
unrestrained, unaccountable and ultimately corrupt power wielded by common law 
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judges. He sought, by reform consisting in universal codification – based, 
furthermore, on utilitarian principles – to curb, and perhaps even eradicate, that 
power. A particularly strong statement of his position is available from his response to 
a charge delivered on the 19th of November 1792, to a Middlesex Grand Jury, by Sir 
William Ashhurst, then a Puisne Judge of the King’s Bench. The title of Bentham’s 
paper, already indicative of the tone, is ‘Truth versus Ashhurst, or, law as it is 
contrasted with what it is said to be.’23 The paper is a response to a series of 
quotations from Ashhurst’s speech. The first of these is that ‘No man is so low as not 
to be within the law’s protection’, a proposition that Bentham ridicules by pointing 
out that ‘Ninety-nine men out of a hundred are thus low’, for want of the extortionate 
sums required to ‘take his chance for justice’, i.e., to access the court.24 ‘How many 
causes,’ says Bentham, ‘out of each of which Mr Justice Somebody has been getting 
in fees, while this speech of Mr Justice Ashhurst’s has been printing, more in amount 
than many a poor family has to live upon weeks!’25 And how could it be otherwise, 
asks Bentham: ‘How should the law be otherwise than dear, when those who pocket 
the money have had the setting of the price?’26 Not only is there a problem – no less 
so pronounced in contemporary times – with access to justice, but there is also a 
justice-tax imposed on citizens, upon which Bentham comments: ‘He’, referring to 
King George, ‘denies it’, meaning justice, ‘to ninety-nine men out of a hundred, and 
sells it to the hundredth.’27  
Bentham’s criticism of the treatment of the common people by law and its 
institutions was relentless. ‘The lies and nonsense’ that ‘the law is stuffed with’, he 
said, ‘form so thick a mist, that a plain man, nay, even a man of sense and learning, 
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who is not in the trade, can see neither through nor into it.’28 It is no surprise, then, 
that when Ashhurst asserts that ‘Every man has the means of knowing all the laws he 
is bound by’, that Bentham asserts to the contrary, ‘Scarce any man has the means of 
knowing a twentieth part of the law he is bound by’29 – not merely that of the 
common law ‘by its very essence’, but also that of statute law ‘by its very bulk.’30 In a 
particularly strongly-worded passage Bentham says: 
It is the judges that make the common law. Do you know how they make it? 
Just as a man makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you want 
to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the 
way to make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make law for 
you and me. They won’t tell a man beforehand what it is he should not do – 
they won’t so much as allow of his being told: they lie by till he has done 
something which they say he should not have done, and then hang him for it.31  
 
As is well known, Bentham was particularly critical of an absence of codification of 
criminal law. He complained, then, that, just as a hundred years previously (in the 17th 
century), when there was ‘no statute law to tell us what is, or what is not, theft; no 
more is there to this day: and so it is with murder and libel, and a thousand other 
things; particularly the things that are of most importance.’32 And in making this 
complaint, Bentham asserted he was but echoing ‘that great Lord Coke’, who had said 
that ‘miserable is the slavery of that people among whom the law is either unsettled or 
unknown.’33  
Bentham’s complaint with his times, linked to his pursuit of a definition of 
law along the lines quoted above, resonates with the contemporary world. There are at 
least two features of his attack that we can recognise in contemporary legal theory: 
first, that of the impact of a lack of codification on the life of the citizenry, and 
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second, that of the impact of a lack of codification on the behaviour of officials. As 
Michael Robertson put it, under the first heading, it has been argued that ‘what the 
rule of law required was that all citizens be able to know in advance what the law 
demanded of them, so that they could plan their lives to avoid legal sanctions.’34 For 
the law to do this, ‘it must not be arbitrary or uncertain or variable. It must be a clear 
and consistent system of public rules with predictable outcomes. It must be a rational 
order.’35  
The second feature has received even more – one might even say, a good deal 
more – attention in jurisprudential inquiries since Bentham. The orthodox view is that 
‘the rule of law meant that judges must not inject their own moral and political 
viewpoints into their decisions.’36 Rather, ‘they must simply apply the already 
existing rules in a neutral fashion’, which meant ‘that the law had to be a system of 
comprehensive rules which could be applied to different fact situations in a logical 
fashion which would produce a uniform result regardless of the judge deciding the 
case.’37 Again, as with the life of the citizenry under a legal system, ‘the law had to be 
a rational order.’38  
Both features have been taken up by Neil MacCormick, Tom Campbell, and 
others, arguing for the ethics of legalism, ethical positivism, or making a moralistic 
case for a-moralistic law.39 Neil MacCormick has, thus, argued that a Rule of Law 
without rules of law is impossible.40 These rules may take the ‘form of provisions in 
treaties or on constitutional texts or in acts of legislation or in judicial precedents.’41 
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Where the state is not governed ‘according to pre-announced rules that are clear and 
intelligible in themselves’ then we risk, says MacCormick, placing in jeopardy 
‘reasonable predictability in one’s life and reasonable protection from arbitrary 
interventions either by public officials or by private citizens.’42  
These views are no doubt anything but new (though to say this is not to 
suggest that they are not relevant, or even pressing, in at least certain places in 
contemporary times). Robertson writes that ‘in ancient Greece and Rome, and also in 
the medieval period in the West, there were persistent attempts to use the law to 
prevent tyranny by kings and emperors.’43 Others have provided historical 
illustrations of the rule of law as a bulwark against totalitarianism, absolutism and 
other manifestations of unbridled power.44 Given all this, then, it is somewhat ironic 
that some of those who have taken issue with such arguments, as shall be explored 
presently, have done so on the basis that the rule of law is an ideology designed to 
protect and further increase the power of the already powerful.  
Peter Goodrich is a prominent example of this critical view. Goodrich takes 
issue, in the first instance, with the understanding of language he believes underlies 
views such as Bentham’s, MacCormick’s and Campbell’s. To understand law, he 
says, we cannot remain within the ‘positivistic view that law is an internally defined 
‘system’ of notional meanings or legal values, that it is a technical language and is by 
and large, unproblematically, univocal in its application.’45 Goodrich argues that in 
both traditional linguistics and conventional jurisprudence ‘it is the abstract 
imperatives of a notional system that forms of the object of synchronic (static) 
scientific study’, which ignores ‘actual meaning, actual usage and the diachronic 
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(historical) dimension.’46 Goodrich looks back with some nostalgia to the rhetorical 
tradition. He laments that, over time, the tradition of rhetoric declined as it was made 
subordinate to logic.47 Meaning, under this logical conception of language, ‘came to 
be conceived…as given or monolithic.’48 As Michel Foucault, one of Goodrich’s 
heroes, put it, in typically poetic fashion: ‘The day dawned when truth moved over 
from the ritualised act – potent and just – of enunciation, to settle on what was 
enunciated itself: its meaning, its form, its object and its relation to what it referred 
to.’49  
Goodrich argues that this ‘analysis of law as a unitary, formal language’ is 
made in political bad faith. Not only, he says, did the view of law as a written code 
allow for the development of a ‘an elitist, revelatory or hierophantic, culture of 
interpretation’,50 to the effect, he argues, of ‘safeguarding and preserving the sanctity 
and general impenetrability of the written word as a system of social control’,51 but it 
also implied that that written word of the law emanated from ‘a source, an authority or 
singular authorship that originally sets out the meaning and whose ‘will’ may be 
analytically or exegetically recovered.’52   
To be fair, Goodrich’s target in these criticisms is Hans Kelsen. For Kelsen, as 
Goodrich cites him, ‘the law is an order, and therefore all legal problems must be set 
and solved as order problems. In this way legal theory becomes an exact structural 
analysis of positive law, free of all ethical-political value judgements.’53 Legal science 
is to study the law in its systematic context, as a grammar and hierarchy of norms, as 
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a structure, as a logical, internally defined, normative unity.54 Such a view is about as 
antithetical to Goodrich’s own as is possible. Goodrich argues that the ‘study of both 
linguistic and legal structure as systems or codes,’ which ‘carries with it the attraction 
of clarity and abstract verifiability in terms of propositional logic and presupposition’, 
is a form of ‘crude, early semiotics’, that exists to provide ‘a descriptive overview of 
linguistic and legal rationality and certainty which is not only comforting to those 
within the legal institution who have a professional interest in the belief or mythology 
of legal determinacy, but also the intuitive appeal of describing “the common sense 
position prevalent amongst most lawyers, judges and legal scholars today.”’55 
Following on from the sociolinguistics of theorists such as V.N. Volosinov, 
who emphasised the ‘functional and material concepts of language use’, what we 
ought to do, argues Goodrich, is to move the object of the study of language ‘from 
system to practice, from potential meaning to the determination and realisation of 
meaning within the concrete and hierarchical organisational forms of social 
interaction.’56 What we ought to study, says Goodrich, is the ‘appropriation and 
institutionalisation of meaning and discourse, the process of selection whereby a 
particular set of socially oriented interests and usages gain control of a discourse and 
define the social accenting and paradigm forms of meaning that are to prevail and to 
win credibility.’57 We ought to ask: ‘Who is speaking? Who has the right to speak? 
Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it their own special quality, their 
prestige, and from whom, in return, do they receive assurance, at least the 
presumption that what they say is true? What is the status of the individuals who – 
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alone – have the right sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically defined or 
spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse?’58  
There are a few things at stake in Goodrich’s critique. One is the alleged 
conservatism of legal scholarship as modelled on Kelsenian legal science: this shall be 
returned to below. Another is disagreement over the best means of constraining the 
power of officials: one view takes it that pre-articulated rules of considerable clarity 
and precision make it more difficult for officials to abuse the power granted to them 
by the task they are required to perform; the other takes that very same clarity and 
precision to be a mirage, which only creates an illusion of impartiality and neutrality, 
making it all the more difficult to criticise the exercise of power by officials, and 
serving thus only to maintain the status quo. This disagreement is indeed a neat 
illustration of the political tensions at play. On the one hand, much faith is invested in 
the autonomy of an ordered set of articulated norms or rules to constrain the power 
wielded by officials. The alternative – as described by Bentham, i.e., of unaccountable 
and corrupt judges – is seen to be the enemy. For the Goodrich-like view, on the other 
hand, the enemy is the alleged dishonesty of the orthodox view, said to consist in the 
inability or unwillingness of the proponents of the orthodox view to recognise that 
misuses of power cannot be avoided by clear and precise language alone. The 
orthodox response most commonly asserted to this is that it is true that the existence 
of such clear and precise language does not guarantee misuse of power, but that it at 
least minimises it, and is also the best method for minimising it. The rebuke to that, in 
turn, is that it ignores the role of other kinds of influences on action, much more 
powerful than language, including, perhaps primarily, self-interest. The debate, in the 
perhaps inevitable absence of any conclusive empirical evidence, continues.  
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The charge against legal science, mentioned above, ought to be understood 
against a broader historical background. As noted by Mark Van Hoecke and Francois 
Ost:  
The emergence in the 19th century of the general theory of law can be 
explained by the deep-seated crisis in the science of law in Continental Europe 
at that time. Before the major codifications, legal scholars were faced with a 
considerable scientific and creative task. The sources of law were many and 
varied unsystematic and difficult to find, consisting as they did of customary 
law which differed considerably from region to region, of a limited body of 
legislation and learned Roman law that was taught in the universities. The 
creative work consisted in development and systematisation, principally of 
customary law, with the aid of Roman law.59  
 
At play may also have been the desire, brought on in the spirit of the Enlightenment, 
to prove and reveal ‘the power of human reason to discern the basic principles 
underlying both the natural world and human societies.’60 As Hoecke and Ost note in 
that respect: 
As a theory, legal science constitutes a collection of systematically linked-up 
propositions. It involves the application of a consistent methodology and 
obtaining knowledge which is communicative and capable, if not of 
verification, at least of rational agreement. Whatever the scientific criteria 
used, scientific discourse sets out to rationalise the phenomena studied by 
reducing them, if not to uniformity, at least to order.61  
 
On a charitable view, such desire for the triumph of rationality may be said to be 
motivated by an attempt to liberate the governance of societies – particularly in 
Europe – from religion. After all, Europe had had plenty of experience of the 
intolerance of institutionalised religion. But the Goodrich arguments continue to haunt 
these kinds of explanations: was ‘Continental legal dogmatics’ influenced more by 
‘the belief in the sovereignty and rationality of the legislator’,62 and in that respect, 
was but a servant of absolute power? Or, was it more self-serving than that, for the 
belief – one could say, assumption, of the sovereignty and rationality of the legislator, 
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‘allows giving positive responses concerning the intelligibility and validity of norms 
claimed to be part of the law’63 and thus gives legal scholars (and only them) 
something important to do, guaranteeing their livelihood? 
There are contemporary voices in agreement with Goodrich. Reza Banakar, 
for example, claims that assertions concerning the securing by law of the neutrality of 
adjudication, the safeguarding of expectations by the law, the expression of ideals and 
values within the law, and other such tasks – which, says, Banakar, secure the law’s 
support of the state, which is in turn dependent on the law for its legitimacy64 – are 
qualities of the law that ‘tell us more about how the law, as a professional body, 
legitimises itself and secures its domination, than the role it plays in society in actual 
fact.’65 Here is a fuller and clearer account of Banakar’s picture: 
The strength of the law is geared to its ability…to present itself as a 
professional body, which organises itself around a rigorous code of ethics 
regulating the activities of its members, who use their expert knowledge to 
provide vital public services. To secure and enhance its professional standing, 
the law often presents itself from the vantage point of its ‘high priests’, that is, 
primarily as a formal body of rules and principles, which prescribes rights and 
duties, and which is applied with impartiality to given facts in the courtroom. 
Such a description places the law beyond the direct reach of the laity and 
strengthens its position among other disciplines and forms of knowledge. 
According to this view, the centre of gravity of the legal system rests on an 
esoteric body of knowledge, primarily of substantive character, which requires 
considerable exegetical skills of interpretation. Law becomes essentially 
concerned with interpretation of acts and case readings, expounding legal 
doctrines, and constitutes itself through textual manifestations of legal 
decisions, judgements, and opinions.66  
 
It is a view in close sympathy with Goodrich’s. It could, for example, be Goodrich 
speaking when Banakar says that ‘the unified vision of the law emerges as sections of 
the legal profession speak on their own corporate behalf to ensure its monopoly of 
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knowledge.’67 It is also a highly sceptical view, according to which nothing is as it 
seems, and where all attempts at self-regulation are but further increases in power.  
Those more positively disposed to the so-called ‘unified vision of the law’ 
have not remained silent. As MacCormick has noted, with respect to the specific 
debate over the intelligibility and appropriateness of the practice of rational 
reconstruction, the disagreement is largely about the political effects of ‘the act of 
propounding legal doctrine of the traditional or mainstream type.’68 For MacCormick, 
however, the effects that ought to be paid attention to are the effects on the treatment 
of citizens by officials. ‘The rule of law’, he says, ‘can yet make a real difference for 
the better where it hedges official action against alleged wrongdoers and judicial 
moralising over unprohibited ill-doing.’69 Legal certainty and clarity, being the 
features of the rule of law, ‘are systematic virtues which certain approaches’ to legal 
scholarship ‘can help generate.’70 ‘Reconstructions of law which are its rational 
reconstructions generate in a high degree’, says MacCormick, ‘law with these 
virtues.’71  
But MacCormick’s response, it must be said, is made in a different time, i.e., 
in the late twentieth century, when the viability of legal scholarship as rational 
reconstruction is reasonably secure. One example from another time – to which 
Goodrich and a good deal of Critical Legal Studies in the United States may be 
reacting to – is that of Christopher Columbus Langdell’s insistence on the case 
method. Langdell, says Robertson, ‘was attracted to the picture of law as a rational, 
consistent and ordered system, but he did not agree’ with Bentham ‘that this could 
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only be achieved by new statutory codes.’72 According to Robertson, ‘Langdell 
claimed that the common law already contained such a system, and it was the task of 
the legal scientist to distil from the empirical data of the reported cases the legal 
principles which revealed which decisions were correctly decided and which were 
not.’73 Langdell’s argument for rational reconstruction is very much at odds with the 
one offered by MacCormick. MacCormick argues, against the CLS charge, that the 
unified vision of law, rational reconstructed, ‘should not be presented as a 
predetermined necessity which exists wholly independently of the descriptive science. 
Perhaps even more than usually, here is indeed a science which constitutes its own 
object.’74 Langdell may well have overstated the mark. According to Wai Chee 
Dimock, in promoting the case method, Langdell wanted the law to be made ‘into a 
science – a logical enterprise, a combination of induction and deduction – laying 
claim to just that generalisability and predictability properly attributed to it. Like 
science, law was to proceed, inductively, from observable phenomena to fundamental 
principles to more observable phenomena.’75 And, crucially, what was at stake in 
claiming law as a science – in the context of an America smitten by technological 
advances – ‘was nothing less than the identity of the legal profession… Either law 
was to be a craft, reproduced through an apprentice system; or it was to be a branch of 
learning, in which case it could only be reproduced through books, reproduced at 
places where books were abundantly collected.’76 Were the status of legal scholarship 
not accepted as science – were a conception of law be adopted that did not allow for 
that status – then law would not, as Langdell hoped, be the ‘province of the 
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university.’77 And, Goodrich might add, if that were to be the case, Langdell would, 
presumably, be out of a job.  
Of course, we cannot know with what motivations – either to curb official 
power, or to selfishly maintain monopoly over legal knowledge, or indeed some 
combination of both – may explain the emergence and continued dominance of 
rational reconstruction in legal scholarship and the associated vision of law as a 
rational and consistent order of articulated rules or norms that are said to allow for 
reasonable predictability in the life of the citizenry and enable the control and 
accountability of officials. The point of the discussion was not to evaluate such 
explanations, but, rather, to point to some aspects of the political life of the 
conception of law-as-discourse.  
 
IA1b. The Autonomy of Orders or Systems of Norms 
 
We have already seen how important the idea of an order or system of norms has been 
in conceptions of law-as-discourse. The importance of this idea was due, in no small 
part, to the belief in the relative autonomy of such orders or systems. Sometimes, as in 
Bentham, much faith is placed in such autonomy, as part of attempts to constrain the 
excesses to which power-wielding officials are said to be liable. At other times, there 
are no such motivations, and the notion of the autonomy of the order or system of 
norms is made in the spirit of a sociological finding. The interest in this section is 
more in the latter, but not to the exclusion of the former.  
One context for the discussion of the autonomy of orders or systems of legal 
norms has been in the debate concerning transplantation in comparative law theory. 
The debate offers not only a fertile ground for a discussion between comparative law 
and legal theory, but also for an examination of the power and limits of the idea of 
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law-as-discourse. William Ewald divides the debate into contextualists and 
textualists.78 According to Ewald, contextualist approaches ‘insist that law is not an 
autonomous discipline, insulated from the surrounding society.’79 Ewald cites Baron 
de Montesquieu, Friedrich Carl Von Savigny, Karl Marx and Rudolf Jhering as 
contextualists – some of whom will be returned to in sections dealing with law-as-
tradition (IB). Textualists, on the other hand, whose view, says Ewald, is closer to ‘the 
point of view of legal practitioners, and to the practice of much of comparative law’, 
views ‘law as in large measure autonomous of surrounding society: It is the domain of 
professional lawyers, and it evolves by its own the internal processes, which involve a 
large degree of borrowing and piecemeal alternations to the existing corpus of laws.’80 
As he acknowledges, Ewald’s division does not add much to the already well-trodden 
distinction between ‘law in action’ and ‘law in books,’ though it must be said that the 
purpose of his distinction is more to set up his own proposal, of ‘law in minds’, rather 
than provide any close reading of those categorised under either category. It should be 
noted that the distinction does not map onto the distinction provided in this thesis (i.e., 
between discourse and tradition), not merely as the distinction pursued here is made 
on two different levels (i.e., ontological and epistemological), but more because many 
of the theories classified under so-called contextualism or ‘law in action’ accept the 
basic premise that law is to be located in a realm of authoritatively-promulgated and 
already-articulated norms, whereas the law-as-tradition is much more radical than 
that.  
One of the usual suspects in the debate concerning transplantation is Alan 
Watson, whose argument proceeds from the observation that a large of proportion of 
law in any society is a direct result of legal transplants – e.g., private law, contract 
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law, conflicts of laws – to the thesis that ‘usually legal rules are not particularly 
devised for the particular society in which they now operate and also that this is not a 
matter for great concern’81 and, more generally, that ‘law is largely autonomous and 
not shaped by societal needs.’82 As one would expect, sociologists, such as David 
Nelken, have taken issue with Watson’s observations and theses. Nelken argues that 
‘to show Watson’s claim to be accurate, more needs to be done than illustrate the 
survival of socially irrelevant legal distinctions and doctrines or provide examples of 
the contingent, the unforeseen, and the apparent “inertia” of law.’83 Others have 
criticised Watson for treating ‘law as words strung out on a paper, not a living 
process.’84 Still others have pointed out Watson’s own qualification (though never 
fully developed) of his view via the notion of legal formants, thanks to which legal 
discourse is situated within practices.85 As developed by Rodolfo Sacco, the idea of 
legal formants ‘encompasses not only rules but also implicit, taken-for-granted or 
underlying features of law in practical contexts.’86  
This section is not, however, the occasion for a careful discussion of the 
concept of autonomy of orders or systems of norms in the debate over transferability, 
or of the problems associated with comparing rules. It is important, also, not to let the 
concept of the autonomy of orders or systems of norms become too readily uniform as 
between other theories that invoke the concept. The adherents of perhaps the most 
obvious of these, systems theory or autopoiesis theory, have themselves sought to 
distance these theories from Watson’s notion of autonomy. As recounted by 
Cotterrell, Gunther Teubner criticises Watson ‘for attaching far too much importance 
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to lawyers’ professional practice… Teubner sees these practices not as, in themselves, 
the motor of law’s development, but rather as the necessary consequence of law’s 
modern character as a distinctive discourse focused specifically on producing 
decisions that define what is legal or illegal.’87 ‘What Watson sees’, continues 
Cotterrell, ‘as the autonomous law-making of legal elites, adherents of autopoiesis 
theory see as the working out of law’s independent destiny as a highly specialised, 
functionally distinctive communication system.’88  
In light of Teubner’s views, then, Watson’s notion of autonomy turns out to be 
quite restrained. For Watson, the autonomy of some realm of articulated norms (such 
as private law) will be, or at least is often, secured by the closed world of legal elite. 
The carrier of autonomy, then, remains human. It is quite a different matter for 
autopoiesis. According to Teubner himself, paraphrasing Niklas Luhmann, 
autopoiesis theory ‘separates psychic processes from social ones and perceives the 
human individual in society as a communicative artefact, as a production of self-
observation of social autopoiesis.’89 Teubner situates autopoiesis in a trifecta of 
theories – postructuralism, discussed by reference to the work of Michel Foucault; 
critical theory, represented by Jürgen Habermas; and Luhmann’s autopoiesis theory – 
all of which have in common the desire to escape the methodological individualism of 
certain previous social theories. Although all, according to Teubner, wish ‘to replace 
the autonomous individual, not with supra-individual entities, but with 
communicative processes’, they differ ‘in their identification of the new cognizing 
unit.’90 Foucault and Luhmann are ‘more radical in their disenchantment of the human 
individual’ than Habermas, for whom ‘intersubjectivity’ takes the place of the 
                                                
87 Cotterrell 2003, 145. 
88 Id. 
89 Teubner 1989, 732. 
90 Id. 
 38 
epistemic subject.’91 According to Teubner, Foucault sees ‘the human individual’ as 
‘nothing but an ephemeral construction of a historically contingent power/discourse 
constellation, which dictates the epistème of a historical epoch.’92  
For present purposes, all three share not merely or even primarily the desire to 
rid social theory of methodological individualism, but more so have in common the 
placing of such explanatory priority on artefacts in their explanation of social life, and 
further, granting those artefacts much autonomous influence over any one or more 
human beings. For Teubner, for example, the law itself ‘autonomously processes 
information, creates worlds of meaning, sets goals and purposes, produces reality 
constructions, and defines normative expectations – and all this quite apart from the 
world constructions in lawyers’ minds.’93 More simply, and even more astoundingly, 
for Teubner ‘there is no direct cognitive access to reality. There are only competing 
discourses with different constructions of reality.’94 As we shall see later, in the 
section concerned with legal-work-as-tradition, this view could not be further from 
what has become known as Cognitive Legal Studies (see IB2d).   
For Luhmann, law performs not only the functions listed above by Teubner – 
it also demarcates the scope of jurisprudential inquiry, or as he puts it, ‘the location of 
legal theory’: 95  
What are the boundaries of law? This question points to the well-known issue 
as to whether these boundaries are analytical or concrete, that is, whether they 
are defined by the observer or by the object itself. If the answer is ‘analytical’ 
(and there are some who feel, wrongly, that they are bound by the theory of 
science to answer this way), one allows each observer to decide his own 
objectivity and so ends up where one started from, that is, stating that 
interdisciplinary communication is impossible. It is for these reasons that our 
answer is ‘the boundaries are defined by the object’. This means, in fact, that 
the law itself defines what the boundaries are, and what belongs to law and 
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what does not. Answering the controversy this way shifts the questions: how 
does the law proceed in determining its own boundaries?96  
 
It pays to consider the language used by Luhmann. For, given all their attempts at 
escaping methodological individualism, it is somewhat of a surprise to see both 
Luhmann and Teubner using terms and phrases more associated with the explanation 
of the behaviour of individuals. In the quote above, for example, Luhmann asserts that 
‘law itself defines what the boundaries are’ (emphasis added). In another passage he 
states that ‘law is aware of the distinctions between norms and facts, and between 
facts and validity.’97 It is the use of these descriptions of distinctly human activities, 
such as the making of definitions, modelled on the basis of folk psychology and itself 
consisting of notions that have developed out of the embodied experience of living 
together, that may be argued (and would be argued by adherents of Cognitive Legal 
Studies) to undermine the explanatory power of autopoiesis or systems theory (or at 
least its claims with respect to the autonomy of artefacts or systems of artefacts).  
As noted above, for systems theory, law is a self-reproducing system of 
communication – or, as Cotterrell puts it, paraphrasing Luhmann, law is a self-
founded discourse that defines what is legal or illegal.98 Given the emphasis on a 
system of communication, it is unsurprising that Luhmann struggled to show how it 
was that on his view law was not identical with language. As recounted by Brian 
Tamanaha, Luhmann once noted that ‘although it may be intuitively clear that law is 
not identical with language, it takes some reflection to find the crucial point of 
difference.’99 According to Tamanaha, Luhmann tries to locate that difference in the 
development of legal institutions. ‘Prior to the differentiation of society, and the 
emergence of differentiated law’, says Luhmann, ‘there was a kind of primordial soup 
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in which law, custom, and language (among others) all served the function of 
stabilising behavioural expectations, and could not be sharply distinguished from one 
another.’100 That ‘primordial soup’ never receives a great deal of attention in 
Luhmann – it resembles, as we shall see in a later section, the social practices that are 
invoked by legal positivists to ground, say, the rule of recognition (see IA1f). 
Nevertheless, what remains distinctive, for Luhmann, about the development of legal 
institutions is their production of law as language – indeed, of law as an autonomous 
system of communication, occasionally – though significantly, for Luhmann – 
brushing up against other more or less equally autonomous systems of 
communication.  
It is important, however, to see that just as they are at pains to distance 
themselves from views that locate law in systems of legal professionals and 
organisations, so Teubner and Luhmann are keen to distance themselves from those 
‘analytical-normativist legal theories’ for whom law is, allegedly, ‘a system of 
rules.’101 Autopoiesis avoids finding law made up of either rules or decision-makers, 
arguing, instead, that law is made up ‘of legal communications, defined as the 
synthesis of three meaning selections: utterance, information and understanding.’102 
These communications, in turn, ‘are interrelated to each other in a network of 
communications that produces nothing but communications.’103 The result is the ‘self-
reproduction of a network of communicative operations by the recursive application 
of communications to the results of former communications. Law as a communicative 
network produces legal communications.’104 In a move that might by now be familiar, 
the adherents of systems or autopoiesis theory construct their own view of the 
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traditions of jurisprudential inquiry – as above, they are either sociological (focusing 
on decision-makers, on legal professionals and organisations) or analytical-
normativist (focusing on systems of rules) – thanks to which they are able to create a 
space for, and the substance of, their own theory.  
Whether or not adherents of these so-called sociological or analytical-
normativist theories of law would wish to complain of Teubner’s and Luhmann’s 
descriptions of them is another matter. Nevertheless, it would be no easy task for 
analytical-normativist legal theories to recant on the identification of law with a 
system of rules. The notion of a system has certainly had a healthy run in 
contemporary Anglo-American legal theory. It should be noticed that the metaphor of 
a system is not merely spatial – as in the number of rules, including, say, the union of 
primary and secondary rules – but also temporal, as in the number of rules valid at 
any moment of time. Although first popularised by H.L.A. Hart, the most famous 
exposition of the notion of a momentary legal system is due to Joseph Raz. According 
to Nicola Lacey, in Hart’s general jurisprudence, ‘the content of the momentary legal 
system of legal positivism – that is, all the rules of a system valid at any moment of 
time – can, other than in exceptional cases such as revolutionary situations, be 
identified independently of any reference to the non-momentary legal system – an 
entity subsisting over time and identified in terms of a complex and shifting 
combination of values and institutional arrangements.’105 As we shall see below, the 
notion of a momentary legal system, with its accompanying focus on criteria of 
validity, raises, in the absence of a more dynamic, more long-term, and ultimately 
more human carrier, the problem of an absence of a social locus for such a system, or 
                                                
105 Lacey 2006, 963; see also, Raz 1980, 34.  
 42 
of a satisfactory explanation of change, occurring over long periods of time, and not, 
for one reason or another, attributable to changes in criteria in validity (see IA1f).  
The above discussion has barely scratched the surface of the notion of the 
autonomy of the order or systems of norms. One can see various echoes of some of 
the moves made above in other theories. The reference by Luhmann, for example, to 
‘the primordial soup,’ from which law as language – and ultimately law as a network 
of communications – emerges, might bring to one’s mind the historical tale told by 
Max Weber of the emergence of modern formal rational law from less formal, less 
rational, systems of governance in more traditional societies.106 A similar historical 
argument is made by those, like Habermas, who speak of the increasing juridification 
of society.107 Once these historical moves are accepted, the debates tend to switch to 
arguments over the limits of these so-called formal-rational or highly-juridified 
systems of governance. As Weber himself put it, ‘the expectations of parties will 
often be disappointed by the results of a strictly professional legal logic.’108 Such 
conflicts, said Weber, are ‘the inevitable consequence of the incompatibility that 
exists between the intrinsic necessities of logically consistent formal legal thinking 
and the fact that the legally relevant agreements and activities of private parties are 
aimed at economic results and oriented toward economically determined 
expectations.’109 Gaps are then said to open up between formal and substantive 
justice. As Tamanaha notes, ‘as a consequence of the mismatch in expectations, there 
is a constant anti-formalist pressure on formal rational systems, reflected in the 
demands for substantive justice or equity, for purposive adjudication, for “free law” 
decisions which focus on the concrete facts of the case more so than on the legal 
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norms, and for the use of juries.’110 What all these debates presuppose, however, is the 
viability of the concept of law-as-discourse, i.e., in this case, of law as a realm of 
articulated, and most usually, State-authorised and bureaucratically administered 
norms.  
In any event, a more extensive study of the concept of a legal system has 
already been conducted, and much more elegantly than could ever be achieved in this 
section. The study in question, by Michel Van Der Kerchove and Francois Ost, sets 
out to show how legal theory has traditionally gravitated towards the value of abstract 
order, of internal consistency and coherence, of the hunt for the Holy Grail of 
exhaustive criteria for formal validity.111 As they note, ‘one hardly ever sees major 
questions concerning modern Western law…handled without recourse to’ the ‘idea of 
system and the ideal of systematisation.’112 A satisfactory definition of law, under the 
influence of this idea and this ideal, cannot, as Norberto Bobbio argued, be formulated 
from the standpoint of legal norms considered in isolation; rather, it must begin from 
the standpoint of the legal order.113 In Kelsen, as in others, the standpoint of the legal 
order is also a hierarchical one: ‘the norms of a legal order’, Kelsen argues, ‘are not a 
complex of valid norms standing co-ordinately side by side, but form a hierarchical 
structure of super- and subordinate norms.’114 As is well known, such a conception 
depends, as it does most prominently in Kelsen (and, in a different way, in Hart), on 
the presupposition of a basic norm, which, for Kelsen, must remain an unthinkable 
black hole that ensures the unity and validity of the entire set of legal norms, thereby 
also guaranteeing the identity of the legal system. Given this fascination with the 
closed world of a system of norms, and the continual dominance of Kelsen in 
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continental legal theory, it is perhaps unsurprising that Jean-Michel Berthelot, in his 
magisterial overview of the epistemology of the social sciences, chose to exclude 
legal science on the basis that, unlike ‘proper’ social sciences, it did not deal with 
human interaction.115 
Ost and Kerchove’s overview of forms of systemacity in legal theory – in the 
work, amongst others, of Kelsen, Romano, Raz, Alchouron, Bulygin, Hart, Bobbio, 
Hart, Perelman, Wroblewski, Luhmann, and Teubner – and the correlative ideas of 
static and dynamic systemacity, formal and substantive systemacity, linear and 
circular systemacity, diachronic and synchronic systemacity, doctrinal and other 
processes of systematisation, axiomisation, formalisation, consistency, completeness, 
autopoiesis, more or less relative self-organisation, organic/social/constitutional 
autonomy, tangled hierarchies, and many other ideas besides – all this demands 
careful study, if only because these theorists and ideas have preoccupied the minds of 
legal theorists for a long time. This section shall not reproduce their efforts.  
For the purposes of this section, what is significant is the emergence of these 
problems – such as, the very problem of the identity of a legal system, accompanied 
as that problem tends to be by the values of coherence, consistency, completeness, 
etc. – from the tendency to prioritise (perhaps often unreflectively so) the explanatory 
paradigm of discourse, i.e., of law as a realm, at least most prominently even if not 
exhaustively, of an order or system of articulated norms.  
One should not think, however, that these problems have no contemporary 
resonance, or that they do not receive attention from individuals and organisations 
dealing with day-to-day difficulties of managing justice. Perhaps the most prominent 
example of a contemporary discussion of the identity of a legal system – and one that 
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assumes not only the viability but also the utility of a coherent and consistent order or 
system of articulated norms – is that of the Report of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) over the alleged fragmentation of international law.116 The next 
section explores this contemporary illustration of the notion of the autonomy of the 
order or system of norms in international legal theory. 
 
IA1c. The Fragmentation of International Law 
The ILC’s interest in researching the alleged fragmentation of international law began 
on the occasion of the fifty-second session of the ILC in 2000.117 Thereafter, the work 
proceeded relatively quickly, culminating in the above-mentioned Report and adopted 
conclusions in 2006. At first entitled ‘Risks ensuing from the fragmentation of 
international law’, the title and direction was softened to ‘Fragmentation of 
international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of 
international law.’118 As will become clear, the shift in the title is but an instance of 
the increasing modesty and self-criticism that characterises the narrative of the 
Report.  
In introducing the phenomenon of fragmentation in international law, the 
Report makes a distinction between two forms of fragmentation: institutional and 
legal – the latter to be ‘found within the law itself.’119 The Report notes the growth of 
treaty activity in the past fifty years,120 and surmises that this forms part of a more 
general feature ‘of late international modernity’ in which we have witnessed ‘what 
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sociologists have called “functional differentiation”, the increasing specialisation of 
parts of society and the related autonomisation of those parts.’121 The Report 
acknowledges this to be a phenomenon found in both international and national 
domains, and calls it the ‘well-known paradox of globalisation’, namely that ‘while 
[globalisation] has led to increasing uniformalisation of social life around the world, it 
has also lead to its increasing fragmentation – that is, to the emergence of specialised 
and relatively autonomous spheres of social action and structure.’122 Irrespective of 
what we may think of such a sociology of globalisation, what is significant for the 
purposes of this section is the extension of that thesis to changes ‘within the law 
itself.’ The following passage illustrates this extension well: 
The fragmentation of the international social world has attained legal 
significance especially as it has been accompanied by the emergence of 
specialised and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule-complexes, legal 
institutions and spheres of legal practice. What once appeared to be governed 
by ‘general international law’ has become the field of operation for such 
specialist systems as ‘trade law’, ‘human rights law’, ‘environmental law’, 
‘law of the sea’, ‘European law’ and even such exotic and highly specialised 
knowledges as ‘investment law’ or ‘international refugee law’ etc. – each 
possessing their own principles and institutions. The problem, as lawyers have 
seen it, is that such specialised law-making and institution-building tends to 
take place with relative ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in 
the adjoining fields and of the general principles in practices of international 
law. The result is conflicts between rules or rule-system, deviating institutional 
practices and, possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on the law.123  
 
According to the Report, the perils cited by scholars of such an alleged loss of unity 
include ‘the erosion of general international law, emergence of conflicting 
jurisprudence, forum shopping and loss of legal security.’124 Although, even in these 
initial pages, the Report acknowledges split scholarly opinion of the phenomenon, it 
does not point to any potential benefits, but rather notes that ‘others have seen here a 
merely technical problem that has emerged naturally with the increase of international 
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legal activity that may be controlled by the use of technical streamlining and co-
ordination.’125 Shortly thereafter, the Report is more circumspect, noting that the ILC 
‘has understood the subject to have both positive and negative sides’, but it then 
restricts the positives to a statement that fragmentation ‘reflects the rapid expansion of 
international legal activity into various new fields and the diversification of its objects 
and techniques.’126 In this context, the Report cites the work of Sally Engel Merry,127 
as representative of theories of legal pluralism, which are more positively disposed to 
the phenomenon, but is quick to follow with work said to be critical of that 
movement.128  
As it proceeds, however, the Report begins to accumulate worries and 
qualifications about its approach. For example, in its introductory illustration of the 
phenomenon of fragmentation, it offers an example of the apparent applicability of 
three different ‘rule-complexes’ to what appears to be the same legal problem (in the 
case at hand, of ‘the possible environment effects of the operation of the MOX Plant 
nuclear facility at Sellafield’).129 The Report notes that in dealing with the above 
problem ‘the UNCLOS Arbitral tribunal recognised that the meaning of legal rules 
and principles is dependent on the context in which they are applied.’130 However, at 
least in this introductory outline of its method, the Report is more concerned with 
what it characterises as dangerous implications for ‘the objectives of legal certainty 
and the equality of legal subjects’,131 caused, allegedly, by ‘the splitting up of the law 
into highly specialised “boxes” that claim relative autonomy from each other and the 
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general law.’132 Similarly, although the Report acknowledges that ‘new types of 
specialised law do not emerge accidentally but seek to respond to new technical and 
functional requirements’, listing numerous examples, it goes on to argue that ‘when 
such deviations or [specialisations] become general and frequent, the unity of the law 
suffers.’133   
How is ‘unity’ characterised in these early stages of the Report? We receive a 
hint, but also, once again, an important qualification, when the Report notes that ‘In 
conditions of social complexity, it is pointless to insist on formal unity.’134 The Report 
continues by saying that ‘a law that would fail to articulate the experienced 
differences between fact-situations or between the interests or values that appear 
relevant in particular problem-areas would seem altogether unacceptable, utopian and 
authoritarian simultaneously.’135 This qualification marks the Report’s somewhat 
anxious awareness that the project it is introducing – i.e., an elaborate conceptual 
structure said to be capable of ‘dealing with tensions or conflicts between legal 
principles’136 – comes dangerously close to presupposing an ideal of formal unity. In 
other words, the Report’s anxiety is created by the tension between its recognition of 
the undesirability and impossibility of formal unity, and the formalism of its method 
for understanding legal rules that is invoked by its focus on normative conflicts. Put 
another way: the Report suffers from taking ‘the law itself’ as an object.  
The conceptual structure that the Report outlines, and then works within, 
focuses on various kinds of normative conflicts. It presents these various kinds of 
normative conflicts as techniques that ‘seek to establish meaningful relationships 
between such rules and principles so as to determine how they should be used in any 
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particular dispute or conflict.’137 The Report outlines four principal normative 
conflicts: 1) relations between special and general law; 2) relations between prior and 
subsequent law; 3) relations between laws at different hierarchical levels; and 4) 
relations of law to its ‘normative environment’ more generally.138 These conflicts may 
manifest themselves in the form of horizontal relations where one law invalidates 
another (e.g., jus cogens norms), or relative relations, where one law ‘is set aside only 
temporarily and may often be allowed to influence “from the background” the 
interpretation and application of the prioritised law.’139  
A conflict, more generally, says the Report, can be approached in two 
different ways: first, it can relate to the ‘subject-matter of the relevant rules or the 
legal subjects bound by it’;140 second, it can relate to ‘different interests or different 
policy objectives.’141 Again, having made this distinction, the Report acknowledges 
the difficulties inherent in it. To the extent, for example, that the approach dictated by 
‘subject-matters’ implies a ‘pre-existing classification scheme of different subjects’ it 
runs into the reality of there being no such classification schemes.142 Further, one can 
also not hope to pigeon-hole interests and policy objectives, for the argument as to 
which policy objective is relevant can be ‘wholly arbitrary’, leading to a ‘reductio ad 
absurdum.’143 Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, the Report says that the ‘same 
subject-matter’ can be invoked:  
The criterion of ‘same subject-matter’ seems already fulfilled if two different 
rules or sets of rules are invoked in regard to the same matter, or if, in other 
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words, as a result of interpretation, the relevant treaties seem to point to 
different directions in their application by a party.144 
 
Although the ‘pointing in different directions’ (where, for example, the different 
objectives of trade law and environmental law might ‘have an effect on how the 
relevant rules are interpreted or applied’) may not lead to ‘logical incompatibilities 
between obligations upon a single party, they may nevertheless also be relevant for 
fragmentation.’145 Logical incompatibilities are not, the Report says, its focus. To 
have such a focus, it continues, is to mischaracterise ‘legal reasoning as logical 
subsumption.’146 Instead, the Report seeks to focus on situations ‘where two rules or 
principles suggest different ways of dealing with a problem’ and in this way, to avoid 
a model of logical reasoning which deems it possible for decisions to bypass the role 
of ‘interpretation and choice between alternative rule-formulations.’147 In effect, this 
qualification is another instance of the tension referred to above. On the one hand, the 
Report seeks to identify normative conflicts between two or more sets of rules or 
principles said to relate to the same subject matter, and on the other, it acknowledges 
that the process of ‘conflict-ascertainment and conflict-resolution’ is part of the 
‘pragmatic process through which lawyers go about interpreting and applying formal 
law.’148 However, the Report’s invocation of that ‘pragmatic process’ is never 
elaborated upon, and the Report continues throughout to stress the importance of 
establishing – partly on the basis of a mix of its own reading of Hartian, 
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MacCormickian and Dworkinian insights149 – a ‘systematic relationship between the 
various decisions, rules and principles.’150 The only alternative mentioned derisively 
by the Report is to conceive of ‘the various decisions, rules and principles of which 
the law consists’ as being ‘randomly related to each other.’151 As we shall see in the 
section below dealing with legal-work-as-tradition, there are many alternatives, none 
of which need lead to so-called randomness.  
It would be unfair to the Report to end the brief summary here. For, in 
contradistinction to the aim with which the Report began – i.e., to offer an account of 
purposive harmonisation based on establishing definite relationships of priority 
between normative conflicts – the conclusion notes that ‘relevant hierarchies must 
only be established ad hoc and with a view to resolving particular problems as they 
arise.’152 It notes further that the ‘formalist agenda’ of addressing conflicts by way of 
legal techniques establishing defeasible-priorities between normative conflicts has its 
limitations.153 ‘The world’, says the conclusion, ‘is irreducibly pluralistic’ and it 
would be a mistake to think that law can ‘resolve in an abstract way any possible 
conflict that may arise’, for each area of the law, institutionally organised, ‘has its 
experts and its ethos, its priorities and preferences, its structural bias.’154 These are 
significant concessions, but it is noteworthy that the conclusion goes yet further. 
Unlike the introduction, it specifically endorses the ‘constitutive value’ of legal 
pluralism. Coherence, it says, is ‘a formal and abstract virtue’, traditionally connected 
with the aims of ‘predictability and legal security.’155 Identifying lapses of coherence, 
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it seems to suggest, points us in the direction of identifying problems of co-ordination, 
but this, it notes, is ‘counterbalanced by the contextual responsiveness and 
functionality of the emerging (moderate) pluralism.’156 Indeed, the Report 
acknowledges that there is ‘no homogenous, hierarchical meta-system’ that ‘is 
realistically available to do away with such problems.’157  
At play in these debates is a tension between the attractiveness of the 
conception of law-as-discourse, i.e., in the Report, the desire, no doubt in no small 
part driven by the very agenda of the ILC, to establish, maintain and protect the unity 
of the international legal order – of an order or system of norms – and the somewhat 
reluctant realisation that this may be a theoretical anxiety that masks the importance 
of the responsiveness of international legal institutions to the problems they are tasked 
to deal with. Responsiveness, as we shall see below, tends to be a value emphasised 
by those oriented to the law-as-tradition paradigm (see IB1f).  
 
IA1d. The Normativity of Law 
It is time now to turn to another feature of those theories of law that give explanatory 
priority to law-as-discourse. The argument here, in short, is that the prioritisation of 
abstract phenomena – i.e., norms, preferably already articulated or at least already 
identified as operative by the theorist – is used in dealing with the problem of the 
normativity of law. Both the solution to the problem and the articulation of the 
problem are linked – they are like two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, the 
problem is posed as one in which one asks how norms guide human conduct. On the 
other hand, the solution posits norms as reasons for action, assigning those reasons 
causal powers of influencing – or more strongly – determining behaviour. The 
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problem and the solution are made for each other. Both privilege first person ex ante 
perspectives from which to describe behaviour. The task, by no means easy, for 
accounts of the normativity of law conceptualised in this manner, is to come up with a 
watertight fit between the problem and the solution. The debate is underlined by the 
conception of law-as-discourse, which raises both the problem and offers resources 
for its resolution, thereby further sedimenting its influence in this tradition of 
jurisprudential inquiry. Naturally, this characterisation will not fit all cases, and, as we 
shall see, in certain theories, the problem of the normativity of law may be playing a 
function specific to that theory. 
A useful context for a discussion of these issues is a recent paper by Timothy 
Endicott. Endicott’s work has focused on the relevance and implications of certain 
problems in the philosophy of language for legal theory, and in particular, on the 
problem of vagueness.158 More recently, however, Endicott has turned to confront the 
implications of the phenomenon of vagueness for the normativity of law.159 On its 
face, the implication appears very troublesome. After all, if the very ‘point of a norm 
is to guide conduct for a purpose’, then the vagueness of a norm ‘seems repugnant to 
the very idea of making a norm.’160 For a vague norm, as Endicott continues, ‘leaves 
the persons for whom the norm is valid with no guide to their conduct in some 
cases.’161 Once more, ‘a vague norm in a system of norms does not control the 
officers or officials responsible for applying the norms or resolving disputes – and 
part of the value of a system of norms is to control the conduct of the persons to 
whom the system gives normative power.’162 In contradistinction to these worries, 
however, Endicott sets out to show that not only is vagueness ‘a central technique of 
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normative texts: it is needed in order to pursue the purposes of formulating such 
texts’, but that it is also ‘of central importance to the very idea of guiding conduct by 
norms.’163 
Characteristically, and in a move that will be much criticised by theorists in 
the part below dealing with law- and legal-work-as-tradition, Endicott states that ‘not 
all norms are vague.’164 Examples of terms that Endicott characterises as vague 
include ‘child’, ‘trade’, or, more ‘extravagantly’, ‘abandoned’, and ‘reasonable.’ 
Vagueness, on this view, is a property of certain terms and phrases. It is inherent in 
them; it is a characteristic of the nature of language. It is not that any term or phrase 
can, in certain circumstances (or, to speak somewhat artificially, ‘on certain facts’), 
become vague. Rather, and in testimony once more to the autonomy granted to orders 
or systems of norms, it contains its own properties that allow it, as it were, to propel 
itself. Endicott’s move, i.e., the demarcation of vagueness as an inherent property of 
certain terms and phrases, allows him to characterise vagueness as a technique used 
by lawmakers. Sometimes lawmakers have a choice – they can either choose what 
Endicott calls the ‘arbitrariness of precision’ (arbitrary not because it is vague, but 
because it is unclear for what other reason the voting age is, say, exactly 18, rather 
than 18.5) or the ‘arbitrariness of vagueness.’165 At other times, precision may be 
impossible – Endicott’s example is laws concerning baby-sitting – at which point the 
‘impossibility’ of precision is quickly characterised as in any event ‘undesirable’, 
such that Endicott is free to conclude that ‘because there is no precise way of setting 
precise standards that will meet the criteria for a good legal regime’ (in the case of 
baby-sitting, Endicott describes this as a matter of law not interfering too much with 
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what counts as good parenting), so ‘the purpose of the regulation itself requires vague 
standards.’166  
Recall that Endicott set out to show how vagueness is of central importance to 
the guidance of human conduct by norms. The above argument serves, at best, to 
justify some practices of lawmaking, rather than answering how vagueness is good for 
the normativity of law amongst ordinary citizens. For Endicott, to recall, as for many 
of those working under the law-as-discourse paradigm, a ‘norm is a reason for action: 
the point of a norm is to guide conduct for a purpose.’167 Endicott continues: 
The reason for making the norm is to promote or to achieve the purpose; the 
norm itself is treated as a reason, or it is not treated as a norm at all. It is a 
consequence of this understanding of a norm, that a normative text is a text 
formulated and communicated to express a reason for action. Normative texts 
have the general purpose (whatever other purposes they may have in particular 
instances) of guiding conduct.168  
 
Having set out the requirement of legal normativity that way, Endicott struggles to 
provide an example of where a norm that he characterises as vague (e.g., not 
‘neglecting’ one’s child when deciding on a baby-sitter) actually plays a role, let alone 
a beneficial role, in the behaviour of citizens. ‘Under the Children and Young Persons 
Act,’ says Endicott, ‘the parent needs to decide whether it would be “neglect” (and 
may need to guess whether officials would count it as neglect).’169 Is this assertion, as 
to what a parent would need to do, capable of proving the role or the beneficial role of 
a vague term in a statute in the practical reasoning of an agent? Without elaborating 
on the example, Endicott quickly asks us to ‘note that many norms are addressed to 
officials or institutions.’170 Indeed, here as elsewhere in the paper, Endicott keeps 
hiding the problem of legal normativity under the carpet of justifying the alleged 
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inherent vagueness of norms vis-à-vis the practices of lawmaking and adjudication. It 
is not that the norm of ‘neglect’ actually functions as a reason for action for a parent. 
Rather, what matters is whether the evaluative term ‘neglect’ can and ought to be 
reasonably used as a resource for evaluating the conduct of parents. A parent that 
officials are likely to recognise as properly caring for their children would not need to, 
nor would be expected to, consult a statute requiring them to abstain from neglecting 
their children. At best, the inclusion of the term ‘neglect’ in a statute that is to be used 
when evaluating the conduct of a parent charged under the statute, helps officials to 
consider the widest possible array of circumstances surrounding the case (arguably 
necessary given the variety of parenting styles and the complexity of familial 
contexts), as well as to serve the liberal values of minimising the interference of the 
state in the private lives of families – in short, once again, the alleged vagueness of a 
term, especially when characterised as an inherent property of a term, helps to justify 
lawmaking and adjudicating practices. It does little to advance a solution to the 
problem of the normativity of allegedly vague rules with respect to the citizenry.  
To state this is not necessarily to disagree with Endicott that it may indeed be 
beneficial for ‘the framers of norms’ to ‘be prepared to assess competing forms of 
arbitrariness, and to judge whether the forms of arbitrariness resulting from a vague 
norm are more or less damaging than the forms of arbitrariness that result from a 
precise norm.’171 It is simply to state this argument is silent on the role of such norms 
in the behaviour of the citizenry – once again, it functions more as a justification for 
the use of certain kinds of resources in the post factum evaluation, by third parties, of 
the behaviour of others. That it is also capable of serving as a justification for 
minimising interference of the state in the regulation of private realms does not turn it 
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into a proof of the role, beneficial or otherwise, of such norms in the ex ante first 
person behaviour of the citizenry.  
The brief discussion above certainly raises a puzzle. One cannot but help ask: 
what is the purpose of the normativity of law debate for legal theories? What should 
they expect from any solutions to it? The temptation, given the highly unrealistic 
thought experiments engaged by theorists (e.g., as above, of the parent consulting a 
statute to decide on an appropriate baby-sitter) is that the demand for normativity is a 
litmus test for the reasonabless of norms, i.e., reasonabless here being correlated to 
the values a theorist might be sympathetic to in justifying (or criticising) certain 
lawmaking and adjudicating practices (e.g., disagreement over whether more or less 
regulation of private life is appropriate, or more or less faith in officials in their 
capacity to exercise wise judgement, etc.).  
A theorist for whom the reasonabless of the law, in line with certain values, is 
of prime importance, is John Finnis. Unfortunately, Finnis’s position cannot be 
considered here in any depth. Nevertheless, it will be useful, before going on to 
consider Hart and Raz, to indicate how he too privileges the first person ex ante 
perspective. Perhaps the strongest statement of the privileging of this perspective by 
Finnis, provided by him a recent article, and in effect a paraphrase of what Finnis 
takes to be the thesis of a co-authored paper by Hart and Stuart Hampshire, is the 
following passage: 
One has a knowledge of, and certainty about, what one is doing, one’s own 
voluntary actions, which is not an observer’s knowledge, and is not based like 
the observer/spectator’s on empirical evidence or on the observation of one’s 
own (the acting person’s movements): it is practical knowledge.172 
 
Nevertheless, Finnis, like Raz (as we shall see below), qualifies his endorsement of 
Hart’s first person ex ante point of view. The criticism is that Hart does not consider 
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the content of rules seen from the perspective of the internal point of view, i.e., from a 
perspective under which those rules are reasons for action. Hart’s legal theory, says 
Finnis, ‘leaves those reasons largely unexplored, and rests largely content with 
reporting the fact that people have an attitude which is an internal aspect of their 
practice.’173 ‘It does not’, as clearly Finnis argues it should, ‘seek to understand those 
reasons as reasons all demand to be understood – in the dimension of soundness or 
unsoundness, adequacy or inadequacy, truth or error.’174 Indeed, Finnis goes as far as 
to say that Hart’s position suffers from a serious incoherence: 
Trying to understand the internal point of view makes, I would say, no sense 
as a method in social theory unless it is conceived as trying to understand the 
intelligible goods, the reasons for action, that were, are and will be available to 
any acting person, anyone capable of deliberation or of spontaneously 
intelligent response to opportunities. Once these reasons are understood, along 
with accompanying, potentially reinforcing, potentially disruptive, subrational 
inclinations (passions, emotions), theorists are equipped to understand the 
myriad ways in which the practices of individuals and groups can, do and 
doubtless will respond, reasonably and more or less unreasonably, in the ever-
variable but far from random circumstances of human existence.175  
 
This prioritisation of rationality – at most, as above, accompanied by ‘subrational 
inclinations’ – is at odds with theories (including some law-as-tradition and legal-
work-as-tradition theoretical pictures) for whom emotions are always there, 
occasionally accompanied by tendencies for self-conscious reflection. The point here, 
however, is that, in effect, Finnis provides more fodder for the argument posed above, 
i.e., that the normativity of law is a thought experiment engaged in by legal theorists, 
or a thought-context set up by legal theorists, thanks to which the reasonableness or 
otherwise of the rules themselves can be evaluated. By creating a possible world in 
which the rules really do function as reasons for action (including, potentially, as 
exclusionary reasons – to be discussed below), the thought-context allows a theorist to 
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justify their own practice of taking the evaluation of the content of the rules seriously. 
Surely, or so the argument goes, if rules function as reasons, and thus are capable of 
guiding the behaviour of the citizenry, then the content of the rules matter. Of course, 
this is not the only way for the content of the rules to matter (one might, for example, 
place importance on how the ‘law itself’ symbolises, represents, the values of a 
particular community), but it certainly appears to be a way used by Finnis and others 
to justify taking seriously the importance of the reasonableness of the content of rules.  
It is time now to look a little more closely at the various articulations and the 
various treatments of the thought-experiment or thought-context referred to above in 
Raz and Hart. Of assistance here will be Sundram Soosay’s recently completed PhD 
thesis, ‘Skills, Habits, and Expertise in the Life of the Law.’176 As a work that 
engages directly and carefully with the behavioural underpinnings of contemporary 
Anglo-American analytical legal theory, Soosay’s work stands out as a rare avis. The 
aim of the discussion below is not to provide a comprehensive overview of Soosay’s 
contribution, but rather, to sketch some of the main critical points raised by him, 
while also making reference to some of the principal sources in legal theory that he 
focuses on.177 Again, to recall, the point of the discussion in the context of this section 
is to reveal another feature of the law-as-discourse paradigm, i.e., of the posing of the 
problem of the normativity of law, which afflicts human beings imagined as 
intentional, highly self-conscious and deliberative agents, and to which the only 
solution is one that grants already articulated or theoretically posited norms causal 
power in their role as reasons for action for such agents. The point is that the problem 
is just as artificial as the solution: it is only for agents imagined to be such that norms, 
imagined to be reasons for action, could have that kind of causal power.  
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It was mentioned above that Soosay’s discussions of Hart and Raz are critical. 
The aim here is not to be critical in the same spirit as Soosay, i.e., to argue over the 
reality or unreality of the pictures of behaviour offered by those theorists. In the 
context of the literature on the normativity of law, arguing over the reality or unreality 
of those pictures may mean that we will miss their function as thought-experiments or 
thought-contexts thanks to which those theorists discuss and evaluate the importance 
of rules, their pedigrees and their content. The general aim, in any event, is to describe 
the tendencies and features of theoretical pictures of law and legal work (in this part, 
that of discourse-oriented pictures); it is not to assert, as Soosay seems to assume, that 
there is a meta-standard or unproblematic account of reality, such that any one 
theoretical picture can be said to be closer to the truth of the matter.  
The object of Soosay’s criticism is directed to the ‘tendency always to imagine 
that intentional action is carried out in a wholly self-conscious and deliberate manner, 
with explicit decision-making included as an inevitable part of its structure.’178 In 
Soosay’s view, this is a tendency that has dominated thinking within legal theory, 
‘particularly, of analytic and positivist legal theory, the view championed by the likes 
of Hart, MacCormick179 and Raz’, but also Ronald Dworkin.180 The discussion below 
will not consider Soosay’s treatment of MacCormick and Dworkin, as both are 
returned to in subsequent sections (MacCormick is returned to in IA2b, and IC4, and 
Dworkin in IA2a). The discussion will proceed, instead, to discuss Soosay’s criticism 
of Raz, and then Hart. Before going on, it is noteworthy to remark that despite his 
fervent criticism of this tendency, and his attempt to replace it with another 
conception, Soosay does retain one of its most important features, namely, the notion 
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of intentional action. The decision to retain the concept of intentionality, however, 
may very well – as we shall see in discussions of legal-work-as-tradition, render 
Soosay’s alternative conception less radical than he may wish it to be. This is largely 
because the notion of ‘intentional action’ fits neatly into an intellectual history that 
carries with it the concepts of self-consciousness and strategic and explicit 
deliberation – it does not necessarily do so (which is an important point to emphasise 
– the conception of intentionality can be, as in Maurice Merleau-Ponty,181 a case of 
motor-intentionality), but it traditionally has.  
One of Soosay’s examples of the above-mentioned dominant tendency to 
favour the self-conscious and explicitly deliberative mode of explanation of behaviour 
is Raz’s Practical Reason and Norms.182 Raz, says Soosay, exemplifies ‘unspoken 
adherence to the self-conscious, deliberative model.’183 He assumes ‘a thoughtful, 
self-conscious attitude on the part of human agents’ and thus he speaks of action 
always and invariable being taken for reasons.184 Raz recognises that there ‘are 
occasions when decisions are made and action is taken where reasons do not appear to 
play the role we expect’ – where there is, in other words, ‘no careful weighing up of 
reasons.’185 Nevertheless, in explaining this phenomenon Raz ‘does not depart from 
his scheme of reasons’ and chooses, instead, to speak of ‘exclusionary reasons’, i.e., 
‘the idea…that among the reasons the individual has to work with, a special class of 
reasons exists which operates not by contributing to the process of reasoning, but by 
shutting the process down altogether.’186 An ‘exclusionary reason’, then, ‘is a reason 
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not to reason’,187 the latter being a reason undertaken deliberately and self-
consciously.188 Raz reifies the concept of a reason for action – he promotes, in other 
words, the view that we really do act for reasons even when it would appear that we 
are not.  
Soosay’s dissatisfaction with Raz’s approach is that an explanation that uses 
the concept of ‘exclusionary reasons’ is not ‘representative of our experience of 
norms and of legal life specifically.’189 But let us consider PRN from another angle – 
one that does not depend on its verisimilitude (or lack of) with legal life. In keeping 
with an observation made several times now, namely that theories are responses to the 
constructions of previous theories, PRN can be understood to be a response to – and 
an attempt at a solution of – a problem that Raz found with Hart’s ‘practice theory of 
rules.’ Raz’s characterisation of norms as reasons for action is designed to avoid the 
three major defects he argues that the practice theory suffers from: that ‘it does not 
explain rules which are not practices; [that] it fails to distinguish between social rules 
and widely accepted reasons; and [that] it deprives rules of their normative 
character.’190 Consider the alleged third defect: the claim is that the practice theory 
‘deprives rules of their normative character.’191 This defect is tied to the 
understanding that Raz attributes to Hart of the use of an expression such as ‘it is a 
rule that one ought to.’192 Raz takes it that Hart understands the use of such an 
expression to be warranted only if the practice of conforming to the rule exists.193 In 
this way, Raz states, ‘rule sentences are used to make normative statements’, but those 
normative statements are not statements that there is a reason to act in the manner 
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prescribed by the rule, but ‘merely…that there is a reason.’194 In other words, rules 
understood by Hart, according to Raz, do not provide reasons for action. They simply 
describe the circumstances – by way of Hart’s internal point of view – in which a 
member of a community can felicitously use the expression, ‘one ought to….’ In that 
sense, says Raz, the internal point of view reveals to us when a speaker, the member 
of a particular community, is not alone,195 but it contributes nothing to practical 
reasoning, i.e., it does not provide a reason for acting in accordance with the rule.  
Following on from Finnis’s critique cited above, Raz’s argument should feel 
familiar. As with Finnis, one of the points that can be made about Raz’s critique of 
Hart is that Raz identifies these three defects precisely because Raz needs to promote 
legal normativity – conceived of as a need for showing how rules function as reasons 
for action – as a problem. However, for Raz, unlike for Finnis, the reason why we 
need the problem of legal normativity is not in order to justify the evaluation of the 
reasonabless of the content of rules, but rather, to explain, or provide further proof for 
a particular explanation of, the authority of law. Saying that rules of law function as 
exclusionary reasons for action is a thought-context, or thought experiment, thanks to 
which we can see the authority of the law in action. Law is authoritative when the 
rules of law function as exclusionary reasons for action, and since law really does 
function as exclusionary reasons for action (how else could law be normative?), then 
it follows that those rules of law that function in such a manner are authoritative.196 It 
is, once again, a watertight argument, but it is one that emerges only because it sets up 
both the problem and the solution. Again, the point, in any event, is not to evaluate the 
argument, or even to defend the all too brief characterisation of it here; the point, 
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rather, is to show the interconnection between the problem of legal normativity, the 
picture of behaviour as intentional, conscious and deliberative conduct (functioning as 
a thought-context or thought-experiment), and other features or aims of a theorist’s 
inquiry (justifying law’s authority, or justifying the evaluation of the reasonabless of 
the content of norms, etc.) 
Let us move on to Soosay’s criticism of Hart. Soosay argues that ‘Hart insisted 
that our experience of…[law] was characterised by a “critical reflective attitude,” 
going out of his way to distinguish this attitude from “mere habits of behaviour”.’197 
Similarly with the distinction between internal and external rules – here, says Soosay, 
‘Hart sought to make clear that obedience to the law arises from a self-conscious 
commitment to the law, which is what the internal aspect amounts to. It describes not 
only cognisance of the rule in question, but explicit acceptance of it.’198 Finally, 
Hart’s ‘preference for a deliberate, self-conscious view of law is reflected…in his 
insistence that law and morality be seen as separate’, an insistence that Soosay 
attributes to the attempt to ‘make clear that legal life is not a matter of intuition or 
feeling or cultural inheritance’, but rather, ‘a matter of self-conscious choice’ – ‘a 
matter of taking a hand in our own destiny, approaching life in a thoughtful manner 
and making decisions as to how we will live.’199 Soosay calls Hart’s approach ‘a top-
down, bureaucratic model’, and one he wants to challenge by offering ‘instead a 
ground-up, experiential one.’200   
A good part of Soosay’s criticism is what Soosay calls Hart’s ‘searching’ 
investigation into ‘habits of behaviour.’201 Soosay argues that ‘for Hart, the 
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unthinking, automatic character of such habits surely could not be sufficient to 
account for the complexity of legal life.’202 For Soosay, habits, ‘both of perception 
and behaviour’ – or, in another way, ‘the embedding of the law in the environment the 
human agent perceives’203 – are ‘central to the operation of the law…in the present 
day.’204 Again, a proper analysis of Soosay’s own approach is not possible here: what 
can be said, however, is that in his criticism of Hart, Soosay privileges the task of the 
explanation of ‘compliance’ and ‘efficacy.’205 The very notion of ‘embedding of the 
law in the environment’ and the method of proceeding ‘bottom-up’, utilised by 
Soosay, are both heavily influenced by an interest in explaining not so much how law 
could work (in the now familiar fashion of a thought-experiment or thought-context), 
but how it actually works well, and further, not in spite of, but because of ‘our 
widespread failure to reason through our decisions.’206  
However, as we have seen with Finnis and Raz, the internal point of view – 
the privileging of the first person ex ante perspective and the imagination of 
behaviour as intentional, conscious, deliberative action for reasons – needs to be 
considered as an element in a theory, and its function within that theory must be 
examined. Although an appropriately subtle analysis cannot be made here, a few 
observations will be timely. It is important to see that Hart describes his own project, 
in The Concept of Law,207 as that of advancing ‘legal theory by providing an 
improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system and a better 
understanding of the resemblances and differences between law, coercion, and 
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morality, as types of social phenomena.’208 In that spirit, his theory is perhaps best 
taken as an analytical scheme that allows us to differentiate between types of rules, as 
well as different aspects of them, where, for example, the internal point of view is 
understood as a device (again, a thought-experiment or thought-context) that allows 
us to distinguish between the internal and the external aspects of rules. As Hart 
repeatedly stresses, ‘the ideas of orders, obedience, habits, and threats, do not include, 
and cannot by their combination yield, the idea of a rule, without which’, he thought, 
‘we cannot hope to elucidate even the most elementary forms of law.’209 In that 
respect, then, one has to see, as with Raz and Finnis, the privileging of the self-
conscious and deliberative mode of explanation of behaviour as playing a supportive 
role, assisting, in Hart’s case, in the drawing of distinctions without which his 
definition of a legal system as a union of primary and secondary rules would be 
impossible.  
There is one more contribution to the debate that ought to be briefly described 
in this context. In a paper entitled ‘Normativity and Norm-Subjects’,210 Michael 
Giudice argues that contemporary legal theory ignores the distinction between norms-
subjects and norm-subjecteds. Norm-subjects are those who ‘actually face, and so 
have a choice about, the normative claims of legal norms.’211 But to be a norm-
subject, as Giudice points out, requires, amongst other things, that one has knowledge 
of the norm. Such a lack of knowledge can arise – and one might think, in fact, that 
this is the normal rather than abnormal state of affairs – when citizens are not aware, 
for whatever reason, that new norms have been introduced into the legal system; or 
when new norms are introduced retroactively; or when citizens know that a relevant 
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norm exists, know that it makes a demand on their practical reason in the situation at 
hand, but are unsure of what exactly the norm requires. Where these conditions of 
knowledge, and others, are missing, citizens are better conceptualised as norm-
subjecteds, as persons subjected to norms.  
Giudice’s distinction is instructive in the context of the present discussion. 
Working under the conception of law-as-discourse, theorists are prone to conceive of 
persons as agents acting intentionally for reasons articulated by the law. The question 
of law’s normativity is positioned with respect to ex ante guidance at a micro-level of 
actions. As Giudice points out, when we acknowledge the case of norm-subjecteds, 
what we see is a functioning of law as post factum evaluation of behaviour. But what 
impels Giudice to notice this alternative is recognition of the limits of explanations of 
behaviour based on the causal power of reasons.  
A great deal more could be said in this context. The problem of legal 
normativity and its relationship with modes of explanation of behaviour is a topic ripe 
for debate in contemporary legal theory. There have been important contributions, 
like that of Sylvie Delacroix,212 which have not been discussed here.213 To have 
indulged any further, however, would be to step outside the boundaries of the 
purposes of the present discussion. The aim has been to show that it is an important 
feature of a conception of law-as-discourse that such conceptions tend to privilege the 
first person ex ante perspective, or, differently, tend to imagine behaviour as 
consisting of intentional, self-conscious and deliberative action for reasons, and that 
this mode of explanation of behaviour functions as a thought-experiment or thought-
context allowing for the performance of other kinds of functions within those theories. 
Whether or not the matters that those explanatory limits leave out (such as the case of 
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Giudice’s norm-subjecteds) are striking enough to ease theorists out of such a picture 
is an altogether different matter.  
 
 
IA1e. The Existence of Rules and the Philosophy of Language 
 
Another important feature of the conception of law-as-discourse is the insistence on 
identifying criteria of validity thanks to which the existence of phenomena as rules of 
law can be ascertained. This ambition has numerous implications. One of them is that 
it creates a need for social foundations for those ultimate rules that set the criteria for 
validity, which will be the topic of the next section. Another is its implications for an 
understanding of language, or, perhaps more accurately, its close link with a certain 
kind of understanding of language. It is the second of these that shall be explored in 
this section. The focus is on two theorists, beginning with Hans Kelsen, and then 
finishing with Hart.  
Kelsen begins his Pure Theory of Law214 in the following manner: the 
‘exclusive purpose’ of legal theory, he says, ‘is to know and to describe its object. The 
theory attempts to answer the question what and how the law is, not how it ought to 
be.’215 In describing the object (law), the further aim of this ‘science’ is to ‘eliminate 
from the object of this description everything that is not strictly law’, e.g., 
‘psychology, sociology, ethics and political theory.’216 Kelsen’s next move is to 
differentiate between an act or series of acts as perceived by our senses, and the ‘legal 
meaning of an act’217 – the latter being an ‘external fact’ that ‘is not immediately 
perceptible by the senses.’218 So, for example, a group of people assembling in a large 
room, making speeches, some raising their hands (others not), is an ‘external 
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happening’ that we can perceive with our senses. The legal meaning of this 
‘happening’, however, is that of a statute being passed in an assembly.219 Of course, 
we may, says Kelsen, intend our acts to have legal meaning – such that the subjective 
and objective meanings of the act coincide. So, for example, we may intend a certain 
document to be our last and will and testament. But whether our act of producing the 
document, and the document itself, amounts to a will and testament – in other words, 
whether that act possesses a legal meaning – does not depend on our subjective 
intentions. The legal meaning is, instead, ‘derived from a “norm” whose content 
refers to the act, this norm confers legal meaning to the act, so that it may be 
interpreted according to this norm.’220 But the very judgement as to whether some act 
or series of acts is legal or illegal – i.e., whether it possesses legal meaning according 
to the scheme of interpretation of a norm – is ‘itself created by an act, which, in turn 
receives its legal character from yet another norm.’221 It is the whole set of these 
norms, ‘which have the character of legal norms and which make certain acts legal or 
illegal’, that ‘are the objects of the science of law.’222  
It is instructive that Kelsen speaks of the ‘content’ of norms. The behaviour 
stipulated – i.e., ‘commanded, permitted, or authorised’223 – by the norm is the 
content of the norm.224 It is the content of the norm that enables the judgement as to 
‘whether the actual behaviour conforms to the norm, that is, to the content of the 
norm.’225 Kelsen notes that the ‘behaviour as it actually takes place may or may not be 
equal to the behaviour as it ought to be’,226 though the difference between ‘equality’ 
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and ‘identity’ is not further elaborated upon by Kelsen. Further, it is not clear whether 
by this Kelsen wants to refer to the above-mentioned difference between subjective 
and objective meanings of acts, or to an explanation of some necessary gap between 
behaviour as it happens and behaviour as it is normatively stipulated. In any event, 
whatever meaning was intended by Kelsen in that specific passage, he himself quickly 
moves on to the problem of validity: to that difference between subjective and 
objective meanings of acts. An act will only possess the legal meaning if it is 
authorised by a legal norm. The judgement of whether that act is authorised by a norm 
must itself be authorised by a norm, and so on. In order to avoid the infinite regress, 
Kelsen famously posits ‘a basic norm (Grundnorm).’227 It never follows simply from 
the factual act (from the ‘mere happening,’ from the ‘is’) of a judgement (that humans 
ought to behave in some way) that humans ought to behave in that way: it is only the 
objective validity of a norm that can guarantee the normativity (the oughtness) of the 
judgement, and indeed, of any command, prescription or proscription of any act or 
series of acts. The objective validity of that judgement or that stipulation needs to be 
authorised by a norm (for example, ‘custom can be interpreted as an objectively valid 
norm only if the custom has been instituted by a higher norm as a norm-creating 
fact’),228 which itself must be objectively valid, and so on until you reach the basic 
norm.  
But Kelsen is not happy to rest with the concept of objective validity. Instead, 
he seeks to further explain the significance of objective validity by reference to the 
notion of existence. Thus he says, ‘by the word “validity” we designate the specific 
existence of a norm.’229 The existence of such a norm is different to the existence of a 
‘mere happening’ or the subjective meaning of an act – further, they are not mutually 
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interdependent on each other, though they are not without relation.230 For example, it 
is not the command or will of a legislature that produces the existence of norms in a 
statute: that existence is only guaranteed by the acts of the legislature being authorised 
(conforming to) some further norm, which, when tracked all the way down, is finally 
supported by the basic norm. Validity, then, is the mode of existence of norms for 
Kelsen.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, talk of existence (or, one might say differently, 
making norms the object of a metaphysical analysis) leads Kelsen to confront the 
difference between validity and efficacy of norms. Effectiveness, says Kelsen, ‘is an 
“is-fact”—the fact that the norm is actually applied and obeyed, the fact that people 
actually behave according to the norm’231 – it is, if you like, a different kind of (social 
or empirical) mode of existence of norms that doesn’t always coincide with the other 
form of existence (validity). Nevertheless, there is a relationship between the two: ‘a 
general legal norm is regarded as valid only if the human behaviour that is regulated 
by it actually conforms with it, at least to some degree.’232 There is, in other words, a 
‘minimum of effectiveness’ that ‘is a condition of validity.’233 There is no complete 
and necessary overlap and there cannot logically be, because the validity of a norm 
‘presupposes…that it is possible to behave contrary to it.’234 
We can notice immediately two features here. The first is with the way norms 
are understood: there is, according to Kelsen, a determinable content of norms. 
Furthermore, that content is assumed to be capable of letting us pick out some ‘actual’ 
behaviour as either conforming to it or not: for how else can we read the statement 
that ‘behaviour can only conform or not conform with an objectively valid norm, but 
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cannot do so more or less’?235 If it cannot be a matter of degree (which would involve 
judgement), then it must be a matter of simple reference. The second closely related 
feature is that Kelsen believes there is ‘actual’ behaviour that ‘really’ happens or that 
‘merely’ happens, and that is visible to our senses in some straightforward fashion. 
For Kelsen, then, the efficacy of norms is assumed to be empirically observable: it is 
not a matter of judgement as to whether some behaviour conforms to a norm – it is a 
simple empirically-observable phenomenon. We observe the ‘mere happening’ of the 
behaviour in question and can, by reference to the norm, tell immediately whether it 
conforms or not. Notice, however, that Kelsen needs to posit that ‘mere’ or ‘actual 
happening’ that is straightforwardly and empirically-observable, for he needs it in 
order to be able to add another layer – the layer of the norm, the abstract object, which 
either supervenes or does not supervene on the empirical object (depending on 
whether it conforms to it or not).  
Language, then, for Kelsen, functions as a pointer to some specific set of 
objects, while the world is unproblematically made up of those objects – all we have 
to do is arm ourselves with language and we can see whether the objects it is designed 
to pick out are really there. The world is assumed to be already made up of the objects 
that language describes. Those descriptions can be straightforwardly either true or 
false, depending on whether the object of the description really exists or not.  
The above features are also visible in Hart’s The Concept of Law, to which it 
will now be appropriate to turn. As with Kelsen, the discussion is necessarily brief 
and selective, and focused on how the ambition to posit the existence of rules, or 
indeed a system of rules, has implications, or goes arm-in-arm with a certain 
understanding of language. Of course, one should expect there to be significant 
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differences between Hart and Kelsen. The story told by Hart is set against a very 
different intellectual background, and one much more informed by conventionalism 
than Kelsen’s could, perhaps, ever have been. Indeed, it is not without reason that 
Hart described his own project as falling under the term ‘descriptive sociology’, as 
opposed, arguably, to what he might have thought as the more metaphysical bent of 
Kelsen. As we shall see, however, there are also significant similarities, especially on 
the level of a theory of language.  
Hart begins The Concept of Law by noting how the discipline of legal theory is 
perhaps unique in its self-reflexivity. Contrasted with this torturous self-reflexivity is 
the relative success of legal practice: ‘Few Englishmen’, says Hart, ‘are unaware that 
there is a law forbidding murder, or requiring the payment of income tax, or 
specifying what must be done to make a will.’236 And yet, Hart was not content to 
seek to explain this more or less successful practical life of the law. He sought, 
instead, to investigate why it was that this question – what is law – perplexed the 
minds of so many. As is well-known, he identified three recurrent issues that, 
according to him, operated to motivate the question, ‘what is law?’ The first was that 
in societies with legal systems ‘certain kinds of human conduct are no longer optional, 
but in some sense obligatory’,237 and what that ‘some sense’ consisted in was most 
controversial and also peculiarly difficult to answer. The second issue was related to 
the first and concerned the relationship between law and morals: both, after all, 
seemed to have something to say about the obligation to act in certain ways, and yet 
there was (and remains) little consensus on just how these two forms of obligation 
interact with each other. The third issue, of particular relevance to this section, Hart 
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called a ‘more general one’, namely: ‘what are rules? What does it mean to say that a 
rule exists?’238  
The first intuitive attempt to answer this last, third, question by arguing that ‘a 
rule exists means only that a group of people, or most of them, behave “as a rule” i.e., 
generally, in a specified similar way in certain kinds of circumstances’239 is, argued 
Hart, unsatisfactory because ‘mere convergence in behaviour between members of a 
social group’240 does not provide the conditions under which we may confidently 
assert that a rule requiring such convergent behaviour exists. There are linguistic 
signs, Hart says, such as the words ‘ought’, ‘must’ or ‘should’, that point to the 
existence of a rule, as opposed to some ‘mere convergence.’ Some theorists, Hart 
notes, have thought that the crucial difference between ‘mere convergence’ and the 
existence of rules ‘consists in the fact that deviations from certain types of behaviour 
will probably meet with hostile reaction, and in the case of legal rules be punished by 
hostile officials.’241 But, argues Hart, such ‘predictability of punishment’ (no matter 
how well organised) cannot be accepted ‘as an exhaustive account of what is meant 
by the statement that a social rule exists’,242 primarily because rules do not merely or 
even always explain predictability, but are themselves guides – e.g., ‘in punishing’ the 
judge ‘takes the rule as his guide and the breach of the rule as his reason and 
justification for punishing the offender.’243 ‘The predictive status of the rule…is 
irrelevant to’ the judge’s purposes, ‘whereas its status as a guide and justification is 
essential.’244 It is this distinctive status of rules that Hart seeks to explain in The 
Concept of Law, or, to put it in his own words, it is the ‘further elucidation of the 
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distinction between social rules and mere convergent habits of behaviour’ that is 
‘crucial for the understanding of law.’245  
The shift from the characterisation of the problem of legal theory as one 
concerned with the definition of law, to one that describes their character so that the 
distinction between social rules and mere convergence can be delineated is not 
coincidental. The instinct for a definition of law is, says Hart, misguided: apart from 
many borderline cases (that any attempt for an absolute definition will not capture or 
properly account for), there are many different instances (or uses) of the general term 
that again leaves us to ponder the poverty of a definition.246 The purpose of The 
Concept of Law, then, ‘is not to provide a definition of law, in the sense of a rule by 
reference to which the correctness of the use of the word can be tested; it is to 
advance legal theory by providing an improved analysis of the distinctive structure of 
a municipal legal system and a better understanding of the resemblances and 
differences between law, coercion, and morality, as types of social phenomena.’247  
All this is very well-known, and yet, looked at closely, what one can see here 
is Hart attempting to satisfy the ambition to provide an account of how rules exist 
without eradicating the continuous change and fragility of the role of law in everyday 
life. In wanting to leave room for the latter, he is moving towards a conception of law-
as-tradition – a move that distinguishes him sharply from Kelsen. The ambition to 
establish the existence of rules, however, appears to win out. Hart appears to believe 
that it is necessary to account for the existence of rules in order to avoid what he sees 
as the only alternative: empirical observation of ‘mere convergence,’ ‘mere habitual 
regularities.’   
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Let us now consider, albeit necessarily briefly, the famous device – mentioned 
briefly in the previous section – that Hart introduces in order to provide the distinction 
he promised between the mode of law’s existence and ‘mere convergence.’ The 
device is that of the internal point of view, which helps us to see the internal aspect of 
rules. It is enough for a group to have a habit, unlike a rule, says Hart, when ‘their 
behaviour in fact converges’, where ‘deviation from the regular course need not be a 
matter for any form of criticism.’248 But, he argues, ‘such general convergence…is 
not enough to constitute the existence of a rule requiring that behaviour.’249 There are 
two moves here, and they are both complementary. One is to assume (as was also the 
case with Kelsen) that we can recognise and observe regularities as such, simply and 
unproblematically, without the exercise of judgement. The second is that ‘mere 
observation’ of this kind cannot on its own guarantee for us the existence of law. 
Thus, as with Kelsen, Hart finds himself positing an empirical given upon which the 
distinctive mode of existence of law (in Hart’s case, of rules, rather than norms as for 
Kelsen) is said to supervene.  
What, then, according to Hart describes the conditions of the existence of 
rules? Quite simply, it is the internal aspect of rules, namely that ‘if a social rule is 
said to exist some at least must look upon the behaviour in question as a general 
standard to be followed by the group as a whole.’250 This is Hart’s version of the 
mode of existence that Kelsen called ‘validity’, except that Hart’s is much more 
robustly social and conventional (and it is in that sense, once again, that it is a 
descriptive sociology and not a legal science). The internal aspect of rules opens up to 
us when we enter the reflective critical attitude of those participants in a legal system 
– that is, we get to see the internal aspect of rules only through the internal point of 
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view. We see evidence of this critical reflective attitude ‘in the criticism of others and 
demands for conformity made upon others when deviation is actual or threatened, and 
in the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of such criticism and demands when 
received from others.’251 But this critical reflective attitude should not be mistaken for 
some individual and subjective psychological feeling: ‘What is necessary’, says Hart, 
‘is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as 
a common standard, and that this should display itself in criticism (including self-
criticism), demands for conformity, and in acknowledgements that such criticism and 
demands are justified.’252  
Hart is quick to point out that his theory copes with change: as soon as 
standards of behaviour are accepted in the manner outlined above, so we may 
confidently assert that a social rule exists. But, as he acknowledges, social rules can 
also cease to exist, for societies can be – as they have been – subject to revolutions, 
after which a society may be faced with the burgeoning stock of entirely different 
standards from which deviations would be criticised, and justifiably so, according to 
Hart. Of course, in a contemporary legal system the persistence and stability of law is 
to some extent protected by our recognition of how social rules come to become 
standards of that kind: rules of making, applying and changing law, themselves 
ultimately supported by the rule of recognition. But at the bottom, and one may say 
also, at the heart of it all, is this deeply social and conventional mode of existence of 
social rules, explicable, ultimately, by the internal aspect of rules – a kind of Platonic 
cave that we can enter only by using the crutches of the internal point of view.  
What is the effect of Hart’s insistence on the positing of the mode of existence 
of social rules on his account of the meaning of rules? We saw in Kelsen that it was a 
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consequence of his postulation of the peculiar form of existence of norms that norms 
had to have a content that allowed us to use them to pick out already existing objects 
in the world. Again, although Hart’s view is more subtle, precisely because it is more 
social, more conventional, and less metaphysical than Kelsen’s, it nevertheless finds 
itself confining meaning to an inherent ‘core and penumbra’ of terms or phrases. It 
construes meaning as a property of the word itself. Let us briefly recall Hart’s well-
known account. Hart calls it ‘the open texture of rules.’ Hart recognises that ‘even 
when verbally formulated general rules are used, uncertainties as to the form of 
behaviour required by them may break out in particular concrete cases.’253 He makes 
it clear that it would be naïve to think that ‘particular fact situations…await us already 
marked off from each other, and labelled as instances of the general rule, the 
application of which is in question.’254 But, as we saw above with Endicott (who was, 
one can safely assume, influenced by Hart), Hart considers the uncertainty, or the 
limit of guidance that language can provide, to be ‘inherent in the nature of 
language.’255 There is, Hart thinks, a core of the meaning of a term such that no 
uncertainty exists: these are the plain, familiar, generally unchallenged cases of the 
extension of the word. Famously, the example he uses is that of a ‘vehicle in the 
park.’ Clearly, he says, a motorcar falls within the core of the term: there is no 
uncertainty that a motor-vehicle is part of the inherent meaning of the term ‘vehicle.’ 
Bicycles, airplanes, roller-skates, and so on, are much less clear – they ‘possess some 
features of the plain cases but others which they lack.’256 These latter cases, says Hart, 
illustrate the inevitability of indeterminacy, and thus also judicial discretion in legal 
reasoning. The determination by judges as to whether the resemblance of the 
                                                





penumbral cases is sufficiently similar and relevant to the plain cases depends ‘on 
many complex factors running through the legal system and on the aims and purpose 
which may be attributed to the rule.’257   
All this is, of course, perfectly familiar. But let us look closer. Hart tells us 
that the world is not ‘characterised…by a finite number of features’258 – and that, 
presumably because these features are infinite, we cannot anticipate them by 
language. Unfortunately, Hart does not elaborate on what he means by the finitude of 
the world’s features. It does not seem likely that he considers that finitude to be 
exemplified by the infinite ways in which we can look at the world – at the infinite 
number of aspects of things – and where, indeed, aspects are themselves things (forms 
of objectification). There are, after all, facts for Hart: there are motorcars, buses, and 
motorcycles. We can be certain that certain words pick out certain features of the 
world: e.g., vehicles pick out motorcars.  
Many, some of whom are discussed further in the legal-work-as-tradition 
section, have pointed out the problem with Hart’s core-and-penumbra theory of 
meaning. To cite but one well-known counter-example, how are we to respond to 
Bernard Jackson’s question as to whether an ambulance is a motor vehicle and thus 
falls within the rule banning ‘vehicles in parks’?259 For the purposes of the present 
section what is essential is that we see that the ambition to postulate the existence of 
rules comes hand-in-hand with a theory of meaning that assumes it is possible for 
words to latch on, to pick out, some feature of the world. It is a theory that neatly 
closes the gap between word and world, but in which the effect is unilateral: it 
proceeds from word to world, unproblematically (at least in the easy cases). In doing 
so, and in a feature familiar to conceptions of law-as-discourse, this grants language a 
                                                
257 Ibid., 127. 
258 Ibid., 128. 
259 See, Jackson 2000.  
 80 
great deal of autonomy: words themselves, rather than, say, a judgement made by a 
cognitive subject, that picks out some feature of the world. In cases of the core, for 
Hart, there is no space for judgement: language does the work for us. 
We return now, full circle, to a point made earlier in this part. Conceptions of 
law-as-discourse gravitate towards, or are constituted by (depending on the direction 
of explanations, which varies), intuitions that grant language itself – i.e., more 
generally, objects outside of us, abstract artefacts at first created by us – a good deal 
of power over us. In Hart as in Kelsen, the ambition to articulate the mode of 
existence of rules, has implications, or once again, proceeds arm-in-arm, with a 
particular understanding of language. In Kelsen, the mode of existence of laws is 
validity, and that validity is describable in true or false fashion by a legal scientist. In 
Hart, the existence of rule of law is guaranteed by the internal aspect of rules, 
describable by a theorist from the internal point of view. What was of interest in this 
section is how this ambition, and these solutions, are driven by, or result in, a picture 
of language as capable of referring to objects in the world, where those objects are 
actual or mere happenings, already there, ready for the picking by the terms and 
phrases of our language. Of course, in saying all this, the discussion above is not 
offered as a criticism of either Hart or Kelsen, or the above understanding of 
language. The point, once more, is merely to illustrate another common, and also 
important, feature of conceptions of law-as-discourse.  
 
 
IA1f. The Social Foundations of Validity 
 
As mentioned above, another feature of the conception of law-as-discourse – and 
indeed the final to be explored briefly here – is that of the requirement for the social 
foundations of validity. Rules of law are identified on the basis of a criterion or 
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criteria of validity: in contemporary legal theory, the two most popular of these are 
Kelsen’s Grundnorm and Hart’s rule of recognition. Famously, and perplexingly, 
Kelsen asked legal theorists to simply presume the existence of the Grundnorm – to 
take it as a presupposition that ought not, that could not, be problematised. Although 
Hart was, arguably, just as vague, in asserting that rule of recognition required to be 
practised by officials, i.e., that the rule of recognition rested on the foundations of 
social practice, legal theorists flocked to problematise, mull over, and attempt to 
articulate these social foundations, the dynamics of this social practice, at the 
foundation of the rule of recognition.  
What is interesting for the purposes of this section is how closely the two 
principal options taken here by theorists, namely, the theory of conventions taken 
from David Lewis,260 and the theory of shared agency courtesy of Michael 
Bratman,261 have loud and clear affinities with the mode of explanation of behaviour 
elaborated upon above in section 1A1d. In other words, it is unlikely to be a 
coincidence that out of all of the various possible sources thanks to which the concept 
of social practice could be articulated, legal theorists working under the conception of 
law-as-discourse should choose one of either two explanations, both of which tend to 
prioritise the first person ex ante perspective, and tend to place a lot of emphasis on 
the notion of intentionality, often requiring a good deal of self-conscious deliberation.  
Evidence of the above is not difficult to find. Gerald Postema, favouring 
Lewis’ account, argues that ‘social conventions of the kind Lewis modelled are 
generated and maintained by a form of practical reasoning which is essentially 
common.’262 In his latest paper, entitled ‘Salience Reasoning’, Postema uses a 
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concept, namely salience, that is also used by theorists working under the explanatory 
paradigm of tradition. For Postema, however, unlike for those theorists, ‘the 
remarkable ability of people to identify salient options and appreciate their practical 
significance in contexts of social interaction is best explained in terms of their 
exercise of…“salience reasoning”, which is a form of common practical reasoning.’263 
For those other theorists, as we shall see, the same ‘remarkable ability’ remains an 
‘ability’, embodied and not requiring any conscious deliberation or reasoning. 
However, Postema cannot accept such an account of salience, because such a theory 
would not offer the explanation he is seeking. He is clearest in the following passage: 
Rules are norms: they offer standards for behaviour, not just descriptions of it. 
They purport to guide behaviour of the rational agents they govern. To 
understand such norms, Lewis correctly argues, we must consider how they 
are meant to figure in the practical reasoning of these agents.264  
 
As with other theorists working under the explanatory paradigm of law-as-discourse, 
Postema works with a conception of a norm as already articulated and functioning as 
a reason for action in the deliberation of intentional agents. Indeed, for Postema, as he 
articulates in a previous article, ‘the self is what it is in virtue of what it is in time’, all 
the more ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ if it is consistent between the past, present and 
future of one’s life.265 Postema, it should be noted, does not restrict the reasonableness 
or rational of consistency over time to individuals; he extends it also to communities, 
arguing that ‘if we, in and through the communities we constitute, are to deliberate 
and act purposively and responsibly in time, we must be able to see our common 
actions as fitting into meaningful patterns and practices through time.’266 Needless to 
say, Postema believes and argues that indeed we ought to deliberate and act 
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purposively and responsibly in time. ‘The hopes, aims, projects, and values we hold 
as a community’, he continues, ‘take shape through our common deliberation, 
discourse, and activity over time.’267 For Postema, it is not just that ‘We are what we 
do together’;268 what is important is that that ‘doing together’ is a common act of 
temporally consistent deliberation. One might well suggest, as with the debate over 
law’s normativity above, that the deliberation of individuals and communities is 
functioning here as a thought-context for anything but the ‘mere acceptance’ of a rule 
of recognition. Acceptance must, in other words, be a matter of shared intentions or 
shared deliberation – it must be something explicit, intervening causally in minds. 
Once again, the demand for a justification is pushed back – this time said to reside in 
the reasonableness or rationality of the deliberation of a community.  
If he had extended his analysis to Postema, Soosay may well have 
characterised this demand for deliberation as unrealistic. Indeed, in a recent paper, 
Mathew Smith adopts a similar tone when he criticises accounts of the social 
foundations of the rule of recognition along the lines of Bratmanian shared agency 
theory as ‘hyper-committal’.269 For Bratman, as recounted by Smith, ‘it is in virtue of 
agents sharing intentions that an activity in which they are engaged is a shared 
activity.’270 Further, ‘in order that I can be responsive to your intentions, I must 
represent your intentions in my intentions (and so that you can be responsive to my 
intentions, you must represent my intentions in your intentions).’271 Thereafter, it is 
‘these interlocking intentions’ that ‘constitute the systematic unity within which 
mutually responsive and supportive actions occur.’272   
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Apart from summarising Bratman, Smith provides a few illustrations of legal 
theoretical work that has relied on Bratman. Thus Coleman, is said to employ the 
Bratmanian framework in arguing that judges share ‘an intention to apply primary 
rules together.’273 For Coleman, per Smith, ‘judges have a certain kind of shared 
intention that knits together their activities into a shared action. As a result, their 
activities as judges have a systematic unity.’274 By now, the references to unity and 
the demand for representing the intentions of others (representionalism) in an 
intentional mental state of one’s own (mentalism) should be familiar. They are part of 
the family of ideas belonging to the explanatory paradigm of law-as-discourse. 275 
As mentioned above, Smith argues that the five key features of Bratmanian 
shared activity – i.e., conceptual agreement, commitment to conceptual agreement, 
epistemic agreement, commitment to epistemic agreement, and strong practical 
commitment – are ‘hyper-committal’.276 What is required is ‘not only that there is 
conceptual agreement with respect to concepts deployed with respect to the activity to 
be shared but that the agents have more or less correct beliefs about each other’s 
subplans and intentions.’277 But that too, alone, would not be satisfactory, for we 
would need not only to ‘have shared beliefs about each other’s intentions and 
subplans; parties must also be practically committed to the shared activity and the 
subplans.’278 And the demands rack up, in a way that Smith finds simply unrealistic. 
‘Our intentions’, he says, ‘can easily fail to refer to each another [sic] and continue to 
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fail to refer to each other even once we begin to engage in our respective actions.’279 
Further, he says, in a move that is now commonly made by some adherents of the law 
and legal work as tradition conception, ‘there is psychological evidence that people do 
not commit themselves to actions for reasons that are prior to commitment they take 
themselves to have.’280 ‘Instead,’ he continues, following the work of the moral 
psychologist Jonathon Haidt,281 ‘they generate reasons post hoc to justify their 
commitment.’282 Smith concludes, in an echo that may remind us of Soosay’s critique, 
that: 
If shared activity is possible only in cases of explicit deliberative agency in 
which the agent reflects on all her reasons and then, based upon a careful 
consideration of all of them, identifies what it is to which the reasons 
recommend she ought to be committed, and she so commits herself, then 
shared activity will be quite a rare phenomenon.283 
 
As noted above, this thesis is not written in the spirit of identifying what theoretical 
picture identified in this brief history of jurisprudential inquiries is more realistic or 
better captures our intuitions about the experience of social or indeed legal life. What 
is interesting here for the purposes of this section is that even where the conception of 
law-as-discourse might be said to come closest to those favouring the conception of 
law-as-tradition, i.e., in the search for social foundations, the choice is made for the 
most un-tradition-like explanations, i.e., ones that seek the production of a systematic 
network of mental states (representing intentions to one another) formed thanks to the 
priority given to first person ex ante perspectives on human behaviour. We shall soon 
see how different are theoretical pictures of social life under the law-as-tradition 
conception. 
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We have come to the end of this account of the basic features of law-as-
discourse. This conception has been a particularly prevalent, particularly dominant, 
tradition of jurisprudential inquiry, at least in the Anglo-American context. It is not, 
however, without its critics, as we shall see in sections dealing with law-as-tradition. 
Nevertheless, one would not be exaggerating were one to assert that this tradition 




IA2. LEGAL WORK-AS-DISCOURSE 
 
In his ambitious series of papers entitled ‘Language and the Law’, serialised in the 
Law Quarterly Review, Glanville Williams stated that not only was language ‘perhaps 
the greatest of all human inventions’ it is also ‘the chief medium of thought.’284 
‘Almost all thinking’, he continued, ‘above a very primitive level, is in words.’285 
Remarkably, Williams noted that ‘a person congenitally deaf, who of course cannot 
think in vocables, can hardly think or reason at all…until he is taught or develops a 
gesture-language, or until he is taught to speak or read.’286 These papers were 
published in 1946, but in case one is liable to think such ideas are not taken seriously 
anymore, the following from George Pavlakos’ Our Knowledge of the Law, published 
in 2007, might serve as an example that the ideas live on: ‘without grammar’, 
Pavlakos asserts, ‘there is no possibility of intelligible and coherent human 
thought…grammar sets constraint on how we can think anything… To that extent, a 
fundamental thesis of the present work is that human knowledge, in any domain in 
which people may seriously claim to have knowledge, and to be able to distinguish 
knowledge from error (mistaken beliefs), is wholly dependent on grammar in this 
sense.’287 
The analysis of knowledge, at least in the analytical tradition, by reference to 
the alleged propositional content of thought, has been common enough. It is part and 
parcel of a package that echoes the demand for representationalism and mentalism 
referred to in the part above. It is also, one might note provocatively, somewhat 
convenient for philosophers – at least those attracted to the armchair. All that is 
required for an epistemologist to do is to posit the propositions said to exhaust some 
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claim to knowledge, and consider whether the claim is justifiable in light of the 
criteria the philosopher presents as capable of ascertaining whether knowledge has 
been attained. The debate then rages over how much the criteria proposed can explain, 
with examples and counter-examples swapped regularly. The debate is best 
symbolised by the notorious shock to contemporary epistemology caused by a short 
paper by Edmund Gettier288 – on its face, a very modest paper, containing just a few 
examples that revealed the explanatory limits of the dominant definition of knowledge 
in the analytical tradition at the time, i.e., of knowledge as justified true belief. 
Needless to say, a more detailed and careful discussion of the technical debates in 
analytical epistemology over the last few decades is outside the scope of this thesis. 
The point in referring to it is to acknowledge the debt owed by legal theorists to others 
who have attributed great importance to both already articulated bits of information 
and to the process of articulating them in accounting for knowledge.  
Another such source of inspiration may be said to come from the literature 
subscribing to the ‘Language of Thought Hypothesis.’289 According to this 
hypothesis, ‘thought and thinking are done in a mental language, i.e., in a symbolic 
system physically realized in the brain of the relevant organisms.’290 Thoughts, say 
these philosophers, are properly thought of as propositional attitudes. It should be 
noted, of course, that the tradition of the representational or computational theory of 
mind, of which it forms a part, popularised perhaps most prominently by Jerry 
Fodor,291 has been subject to many criticisms. Nevertheless, despite such criticisms, 
emanating mainly from outside the philosophical world (that is, mainly, from fields 
such as neuroscience, sociology, anthropology, and other behavioural sciences), the 
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grip of the picture that makes a philosopher move from the practice (perhaps at first 
unreflectively adopted, and, as suggested above, convenient strategy) of analysing 
thought by analysing language, to the thesis that thought is impossible without 
language, is all too easy. Further, even in philosophical works that set out to study the 
contrary, e.g., José Luis Bermeduz’s Thinking Without Words, thought without 
language (already from the first few pages almost exclusively whittled down to the 
thoughts of animals and children) is analysed with ideas that emerge from the 
philosophy of language.292 Thus, for example, Bermudez states that he will: ‘1) 
explain the metaphysics of nonlinguistic thought; 2) explain the semantics of 
nonlinguistic thought; 3) explain how it is possible for us to identify the content of 
such thoughts; and 4) explain the decision-making processes of nonlinguistic 
creatures in a way that underwrites the practice of psychological explanation.’293 The 
bias here towards discourse-friendly ideas, such as mental or semantic content, or 
decision-making processes, and the condescension revealed in the phrase 
‘nonlinguistic creatures’, makes the study sound not like the breaking of a new 
barrier, but like the extension of an old empire. Once again, the point in raising this 
line of literature here is simply to recall, and to encourage recognition of the force of, 
that philosophical temptation to replace our understanding of thought, and of thought 
in action, by an understanding of the more or less dynamic structure of language.  
In many respects, it is the legacy of the rule of law ideal that limits the legal 
epistemological picture to that of an analysis of the structure and interpretation of 
language. This legacy has been recognised, if not fully elaborated upon, by other legal 
theorists. Michael Moore, for example, suggested that ‘formalism survives because it 
is, prima facie, the theory of adjudication required by our ideals about the rule of 
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law.’294 Similarly, Brian Tamanaha has argued that ‘especially with regard to formal-
rational rule of law systems, legal knowledge has its own internal logic and demands 
that constantly push it to develop in directions that differ from commonsense 
notions.’295 ‘The more law becomes a specialised body of knowledge,’ Tamanaha 
continued, ‘the greater its potential to diverge in form and outcome from the 
understandings of the society to which it is attached.’296 We ought, however, to be 
careful about Tamanaha’s explanation. The explanation is problematic because it 
hides the move to locate legal-work-as-discourse in a historical argument: 
contemporary legal epistemology is to be exhaustively explained by reference to the 
structure and interpretation of language because, it is argued, that is the nature of the 
contemporary legal system (at least in the West) – it is a formal-rational system in 
which the medium of the law is language. However, as we shall see, that 
characterisation of contemporary legal systems is precisely the one that is challenged 
by those oriented towards the explanatory paradigm of tradition.  
It would be too simplistic to suggest that within the immense literature on 
statutory and constitutional interpretation legal epistemology is narrowed to the 
exegesis of the text itself. Although much more would need to be said to develop the 
point in appropriate depth, one can argue that the literature on statutory interpretation 
reveals a basic difficulty concerning the degree of influence to grant to the text itself, 
or put another way, how much reference to make to certain alleged inherent properties 
of the text when explaining the process of legal work.  
One illustration of the difficulties here is the debate over Stanley Fish’s call 
for a move away from an analysis of the properties of the text itself – away from, for 
example, an analysis of the Hartian core and penumbra of words – and towards a 
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recognition of the role of the reader, or a community of interpreters. Fish calls for 
recognition of the ‘reader’s active role and concomitant inability to measure any given 
interpretation against the “actual” text.’297 Here is Fish: 
Different notions of what it is to read…are finally different notions of what it 
is to be human. In [one] view, the world, or the world of the text, is already 
ordered and filled with significances and what the reader is required to do is 
get them out (hence the question, ‘What did you get out of that?’). In short, the 
reader’s job is to extract meanings that formal patterns possess prior to, and 
independently of, his activities. In my view, these same activities are 
constitutive of a structure of concerns which is necessarily prior to any 
examination of meaningful patterns because it is itself the occasion of their 
coming into being.298  
 
There are couple of things to be extracted from this passage. The first is that of the 
view of language, or the text, as in some sense exhausting what there is, what we may 
think of as existing: this a view rejected, not only by Fish above, but others more 
sympathetic to granting much more significance to the text, as for example, Glanville 
Williams, who says that ‘in the past philosophers have tended to mistake the structure 
of discourse for the structure of the universe’ – ‘a training in semantics,’ adds 
Williams, ‘helps to prevent this error.’299 Interestingly, a study of semantics did not 
prevent Pavlakos in Our Knowledge of the Law to come to the opposite view, namely, 
that ‘semantics exhausts ontology.’300 But though Pavlakos’s thesis shall be returned 
to below (see, IA2c), this general philosophical debate is outside the scope of the 
thesis.  
The second point raised in Fish’s passage is the challenge to the view of 
language as the realm of given meaning, and the turn towards the active reader, 
already armed with certain concerns and preoccupations. In a recent article, 
elaborating on this Fishian idea, Robertson argues that the notion of ‘an unconstrained 
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legal actor is a central character in modern jurisprudence.’301 ‘Legal formalists’, he 
continues, ‘fear that he [sic] will not respect the constraints imposed by the objective 
meaning of legal texts, and will instead distort the meaning to suit his partisan 
purposes.’302 Legal positivists, also, says Robertson, ‘fear that he [sic] will not respect 
the constraints imposed by the established legal rules, and will instead persistently 
advance his own moral and political principles, thus threatening both the rule of law 
and its democratic legitimacy.’303 On the other side, he says, ‘there are the anti-
positivist and anti-formalist legal theorists who are not dismayed by the prospect of a 
legal actor free of such constraints.’304 For Robertson, both of the above fears and the 
celebration rely on the premise that it is possible for an unconstrained legal actor to 
exist – a premise Robertson takes to be persuasively dismissed by Fish.305   
This is not the moment to rehearse Robertson’s argument – his idea of an 
already and always constrained legal actor shall, in any event, be returned to below 
(see IB2d). The point that Robertson’s point helps to make clear is disagreement over 
how best to explain what is going on in the process of legal work. This disagreement 
can be characterised as one posing the following question: is the process best 
explained by the inherent properties of a text, or by something external to the text, 
belonging perhaps to the mind of the worker, or the community of workers?   
Reference has already been made to Hart’s core and the penumbra theory of 
meaning. For Hart, it was at this level of meaning that the process of legal work was 
to be described. Notice that this line of disagreement cuts across the divide between, 
say, legal positivists and natural lawyers. Lon Fuller, for example, famously disagreed 
with Hart’s core and the penumbra theory of meaning, but did so nevertheless, at least 
                                                






on its face, on the level of a disagreement over how the meaning of words is 
determined. He argued, in short, that every interpreter of a legal text, in every 
situation (and not only, as Hart suggested, in hard cases) needed to take into account 
the purpose of the rule in question. Thus we have Fuller’s famous example of the 
upright sleeper – where we are unable to determine the scope of the role that prohibits 
sleeping in a railway station without taking into account the purpose of the rule306 – 
which has appeared in various manifestations in legal theory, e.g., Jackson’s above-
mentioned example of the ambulance in the park (designed as a counter-example to 
the core of the word vehicle being an motorcar).307  
Others, however, have not been tempted to remain – in the context of a 
theoretical picture of legal work – at the level of a theory of meaning. Thus, Karl 
Olivecrona argued, in his Law as Fact308 that we are only ‘dimly aware of a 
permanent existence of the rules of law… [That] a rule exists only as the content of a 
notion in a human being.’309 In a similar, though much more politically charged 
manner, David Kennedy has argued for the irreducibility of ideology-driven 
resolutions of disputes by the judiciary.310 These two views move further away from 
the paradigm of law-as-discourse than does Fish: the focus is not on the reader, as 
active as he or she may be in Fish’s work, but on the human being or the community 
member, whose legal work is explained by reference to other factors that are not 
reliant, or at least not as reliant, on the influence of the text. More accurately perhaps, 
as above, the explanations are not at the level, as they are with Fish, of a theory of 
meaning – over how best to understand language – but an altogether different level, 
say, a socially-cognitive one (with the proviso that that cognition may be embodied or 
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tacit). That latter level, in any event, is exactly the level that shall be investigated in 
the conception of legal-work-as-tradition. What is of interest in the present discussion 
is the use of theories of meaning or the properties of language as providing 
explanatory insights of, or, more strongly, exhausting, our picture of legal work.   
Before going on, a preliminary matter must be at this point clarified. Several 
references have now been made to the idea of ‘legal work.’ At other points above 
references were also made to other terms, such as ‘legal epistemology’ or ‘knowledge 
of the law.’ As used herein, these terms encompass theoretical pictures of the process 
of the work conducted by judges and lawyers, but do not include practices of 
lawmaking (the legal work, say, of parliaments and drafting committees). One might 
ask, of course, which judges and which lawyers, working from in what legal system, 
in what institutions, in what areas of the law? One might also ask: legal work as 
performed when? Theoretical pictures of legal work, one might argue, may very well 
change depending on the dominant style of law-making, as itself seen to be part of a 
particular age, e.g., the period of ambitious codifications, accompanied by 
Enlightenment ideology, and in France rather than in Prussia.311  
The very positing of these questions, however, is indicative of a kind of 
conception of legal work under which it is thought that the cultural, institutional and 
other contexts of legal work matter.312 It is not so for all theories, though it must be 
acknowledged that of the ones discussed here most are theoretical pictures of legal 
work in common law systems. The point is, however, that for those working under the 
legal-work-as-discourse explanatory paradigm, as with those of theories working 
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under the conception of law-as-discourse, theoretical pictures of legal work have 
either unreflectively avoided the particularities of socio-historical-cultural context, or, 
sought to represent their theoretical pictures as general or universal.  
One further preliminary matter must be noted. The explanatory paradigm of 
discourse feeds, primarily, an ontological rather than epistemological ambition. The 
law itself is asserted to exist (under certain conditions), and this, as we have seen, 
leads to an understanding of legal language as doing a good deal, if not all, of the 
cognitive work for us. The work of the human being, the scope for human judgement, 
tends to be minimised, or, in radical cases, excluded. Some illustrations are in order. 
Consider the following statement from Paul Laband, writing in the early part 
of the twentieth century: ‘Legal decision consists of a given case’s subsumption under 
valid law; like any other logical conclusion it is independent from will. There is no 
freedom of the resolution whether the consequence should take place or not; it is 
produced – as it were – by itself, by intrinsic necessity.’313 This statement echoes – at 
the epistemological level – what is made at the ontological one under the explanatory 
paradigm of law-as-discourse, i.e., an order or system of already articulated and 
authoritatively promulgated norms proceeds autonomously, with the addition here that 
it does so by travelling through the intentional mental states of actors faithful to the 
text.  
Of course, to cite Laband’s statement is not to suggest it is representative of 
the theoretical pictures of legal-work-as-discourse. Matters are much more 
complicated, and, as a result of the difficulties involved in offering a general theory of 
legal work, numerous ‘concessions’ are made. As we shall see, however, many of the 
difficulties are said to arise as a direct result of nothing else but the inherent properties 
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of the text: the vagueness of its terms, say, or the form of a phrase as a standard or 
principle rather than a rule. A typical example of the move from the ontological to the 
epistemological level in theories of legal-work-as-discourse is the move from the 
description of the structure of rules as syllogistic to the theory that legal work, 
particularly by the judiciary, operates in a syllogistic fashion. Of course, as we saw, 
the ontological ambition is accompanied by a political one, and thus what we see, at 
the epistemological level, is a theory designed to offer explanatory support for, or 
fight off scepticism about the very possibility of, the kind of legal work required to 
protect certain political aims. Thus, La Torre says, speaking of theory of legal 
reasoning espoused by the early MacCormick:314 ‘Deductive justification (on the basis 
of a particular norm taken as “valid”) thus comes about within the framework of the 
legitimacy of a particular institutional order.’315 In that respect, it is no coincidence 
that MacCormick’s most recent, and most definitive, statement of his theory of legal 
work, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law,316 is at heart a discussion of this tension between 
the epistemological and the ontological levels. These observations shall be returned to 
in section IA2b below.  
It would be amiss, given its popularity and stature in contemporary legal 
theory, not to mention Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation.317 It would 
certainly be amiss given that – though this part of the thesis specifically does not 
place much emphasis on the fact that – Alexy himself calls his theory a discourse 
theory of legal argumentation. There are two elements at work here: ‘First, that legal 
reasoning is inherently discursive, and second, that legal reasoning should be 
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rational.’318 Alexy, as is well known, is greatly influenced by Habermas, and he takes 
from Habermas the notion, or perhaps the assumption, that ‘ideas and concepts’, as La 
Torre puts it, ‘have a discursive origin.’319 According to La Torre, this means that 
‘one speaks, and thinks too, only because one is in and has been incorporated into a 
context of discourses from which our socialisation takes its origin.’320  
Nevertheless, Alexy’s model departs in some respects from certain typical 
ideas found under the explanatory paradigm of discourse. He criticises, for example, 
that model of legal reasoning that prioritises coherence, because a normative order is 
never complete, and thus ‘a model of legal reasoning centred on coherence must 
necessarily prove insufficient.’321 By contrast to the coherence model and others (i.e., 
the decision model taken from the legal realists, the deductive-syllogistic model, and 
the hermeneutic model taken from Hans-Georg Gadamer and Carlos Betti), Alexy’s 
model is procedural. Alexy’s ambition is to provide criteria for so-called ‘rational 
discourse’ under which any discourse (and thus also any decision within such a 
discourse) may be evaluated as rational.322 As La Torre puts it, ‘the point is…for 
Alexy…to make explicit what is implicit, and to universalise it. Universalisation is in 
turn a transcendental (implicit) requirement of discourse on norms, values and 
principles.’323 The above-mentioned criteria of ‘rational discourse’ is made explicit by 
Alexy in the form of certain kinds of rules – which, to remind ourselves, ‘spell out a 
series of standards which regulate the happy employment of prescriptive utterance 
and ultimately effect the evaluation of prescriptive speech to discourse’324 – including, 
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‘rules of logic; rules of rationality; finally, pragmatic rules for the utterance of 
normative sentences.’325  
In all this, what remains somewhat ironic is that the only person capable of 
transcending the discourse is the theorist himself or herself – or in this case, only 
Alexy – who is granted (or more clearly, self-granted) the power to make explicit the 
standards thanks to which the reasoning of all others can, and ought to be, evaluated. 
Though he takes a good deal from Alexy, it is a virtue of Pavlakos’ Our Knowledge of 
the Law that it spends the a good bulk of its time asserting that we cannot transcend 
the discourse within which we think and act – the ‘we’ here including the theorist, 
who is limited, at best, to providing some account of the dynamics of our participation 
in discourses, that participation, for Pavlakos, being captured best by his notion of 
‘practice’ (hence the title, ‘the Practice Theory of Law’). In other respects, however, 
as we shall see in section IA2c, Pavlakos’ theory of our knowledge of the law belongs 
centrally under the legal-work-as-discourse paradigm.  
Finally, by way of a preliminary matter, it can be observed that, as with the 
discussion above concerning the problem of legal normativity, the prime function, 
even if not aim, of a theory of legal-work-as-discourse may be to provide criteria 
thanks to which the process of legal work can be evaluated – evaluated primarily as 
either rational or not. This is despite any statements made to the contrary by theorists, 
e.g., that their theorists are descriptive rather than normative. As noted above, 
however, this thesis does not set out to present a history of jurisprudential inquiries 
from the perspective of their authors, taking on board their self-descriptions. 
Whatever the theorist himself or herself believes to be setting out to do or to have 
achieved is, for present purposes, beside the point.  
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There are three sections below. The three sections are: first, Dworkin’s 
adjudication theory; second, MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning, as developed in 
Rhetoric and the Rule of Law; and third, Pavlakos’ account of legal epistemology in 
Our Knowledge of the Law. The sections below are brief examinations, not designed 
to provide detailed or faithful readings of these contributions, but rather, designed to 
reveal common tendencies underlying the conception of legal-work-as-discourse, 
some of which have already been introduced above. 
 
IA2a. Herculean Adjudication  
In Law’s Empire,326 Dworkin states his aim as follows: it is to develop the idea that 
‘legal reasoning is an exercise in constructive interpretation, that our law consists in 
the best justification of our legal practices as a whole, that it consists in the narrative 
story that makes of these practices the best they can be.’327 His view, as is well 
known, is designed to account for disagreement about law – a disagreement that, he 
argues, is not taken seriously enough, indeed undermined, by those that fall foul of the 
semantic sting. That underwriting this view is the explanatory paradigm of law-as-
discourse is made explicit by Dworkin: the law exists in the form of propositions – 
‘let us call,’ he says, ‘“propositions of law” all the various statements and claims 
people make about what the law allows or prohibits or entitles them to have.’328 The 
truth or falsity of these propositions of law is itself, says Dworkin, parasitic on other 
propositions, which he deems ‘the grounds of law.’329 Theoretical disagreement about 
law, he continues, is ‘disagreement about law’s grounds.’330  
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When we understand the manner in which theoretical disagreements about law 
are resolved, and of course thereby accept Dworkin’s view, we shall see why it is 
wrong to think of judges as making law, at least in any arbitrary and therefore 
politically unaccountable way. The old debate, says Dworkin, between so-called 
progressive and mechanical judges will disappear once we accept the constructive 
interpretative account of legal reasoning Dworkin offers. Judges, says Dworkin, are 
participants in an interpretative community, and they are best thought of as engaged in 
the resolution of disputes via the exercise of the interpretative attitude. It is a mistake 
to think that when judges resolve disputes they are interpreting some concept itself, 
that they reach back, for example, to the intentions of the authors of legal texts, to 
derive the content of the concept itself. There is no such thing, once again, as a given 
meaning, to be merely recovered or revealed by the judge. Rather the concepts 
articulated in legal rules and principles – much like the concept of law itself – are 
interpretative, and once we adopt the internal point of view of participants in an 
interpretative community, we come to see that what matters, what actually goes on, is 
the use of interpretative concepts by members of a community who are possessed, 
inevitably, with an interpretative attitude. These members, involved in constructive 
interpretation, operate within paradigms of purposes of the values dear to a 
community, and in interpreting the interpretative concepts of the law, they are the 
captains of the law’s integrity, which is, at once, the community’s integrity. These 
paradigms of values are crucial – they are populated by concrete examples, such as 
the example of men rising when a woman enters the room in the case of the paradigm 
of value of courtesy, that one can find in the narrative of the law (its history of 
precedents) – and it is the member’s construction of the interpretive concepts at stake 
within the relevant paradigms of value that will allow Dworkin to say that some 
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interpretation either fits or does not fit the integrity of the law, and thus also the 
integrity of the community. That concept of fit, in turn, is what allows Dworkin to say 
that there is always, in some objective way, a right answer to any one legal dispute.  
That is, of course, a very sketchy summary, but it does reveal Dworkin’s 
location of the epistemology of adjudication within and under the umbrella of law-as-
discourse. It is interesting to notice just how much Dworkin wrestles with articulating 
the scope of the role of language in legal work. In his account, for example, of the 
stages of interpretation, Dworkin argues that the first stage is a ‘pre-interpretive’ 
one.331 In this stage, ‘the rules and standards taken to provide the tentative content of 
the practice are identified.’332 Immediately, however, he qualifies this formulation: ‘I 
enclose’, he says, ‘“pre-interpretive” in quotes because some kind of interpretation is 
necessary even at this stage. Social rules’, he continues, ‘do not carry identifying 
labels. But a very great degree of consensus is needed – perhaps an interpretive 
community is usefully defined as requiring consensus at this stage – if the interpretive 
attitude is to be fruitful, and we may therefore abstract from this stage in our analysis 
by presupposing that the classifications it yields are treated as given in day-to-day 
reflection and argument.’333 This is, it must be said, a slightly ambivalent explanation: 
Dworkin finds himself in a tangle precisely because he is forced into a position where 
he must resolve the priority of text and community, or, put another way, he reaches a 
point where an explanation is demanded that cannot be satisfied by a theory of 
meaning. It is perhaps unsurprising, given Dworkin’s orientation to law-as-discourse, 
that this notion of a pre-interpretative stage receives little attention in Law’s Empire, 
and that even when it does, Dworkin argues that ‘some interpretation is necessary 
even at this stage.’ Similarly so with the values that are said to be so important in the 
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process of legal work: these are, ultimately, for Dworkin, to be found in the concrete 
examples articulated in the narrative of the law.  
Dworkin’s notion of the development of precedent as a narrative, each 
precedent like another chapter written by a different author (forming a chain novel), 
posits the participants in law’s empire as submerged in the world of discourse. 
Discourse is both the anchor and the oxygen of adjudication for Dworkin. Studies of 
legal reasoning as exercises in narrative imagination have, of course, been undertaken 
by many other scholars: once again, an examination of the rich array of views in the 
law as literature movement falls outside the scope of this thesis. For present purposes, 
such contributions can be said to be part of the family of those theorists who feel 
comfortable, both in their presentations of the nature of law and of the nature of legal 
work, within the domain of discourse.  
Section IA1d, ‘The Normativity of Law’, above, had recourse to Soosay’s 
critiques of Hart and Raz. Soosay is similarly critical of Dworkin, though he does 
applaud Dworkin for attempting a ‘transformation of the field’ of legal theory, placing 
hard cases at the centre (where easy cases once were), and putting emphasis on an 
interpretative approach rather than on the ‘mechanical application of rules.’334 
However, says Soosay, the ‘process envisaged is’ still ‘one of conscious 
interpretation’, so that ‘the overall change’ of Dworkin’s approach is ‘not really so 
dramatic.’335 The problem, says Soosay, is with Dworkin’s account of ‘easy cases’, 
the reasoning of which, although Dworkin recognises is of an ‘automatic’ nature,336 
because of his alleged privileging of conscious and deliberative reflection, he is 
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nevertheless forced to explain ‘as a species of self-conscious reasoning.’337 Soosay 
continues as follows: 
Predictably enough, the result is unconvincing. Indeed, to make his account 
work, Dworkin is forced to invoke a judge of superhuman abilities, Hercules. 
Under this view, the fully self-conscious account he offers is true only of this 
superhuman judge, who explicitly reasons through all of the cases which come 
before him, whether easy or hard. Real judges fall short of this, though, and 
instead must rely on intuition, experience and something like a ‘common 
consciousness’, a sort of social understanding these judges share with their 
fellow citizens.338  
 
Soosay’s criticism is, for present purposes, instructive, as is his own explanation as to 
what ‘real judges do.’ References to such explanations as ‘a sort of social 
understanding’ will be the focus of the sections below dealing with conceptions of 
legal-work-tradition. The only gripe – an important one in the context of this thesis as 
a whole – is with the spirit of Soosay’s critique. Soosay believes that theoretical 
explanations are able to capture what ‘real’ judges ‘really’ do. He argues that 
Dworkin is forced to ‘invent an alternative reality’ and that this sort of ‘contortion’ is 
a ‘sign that the theory in question is profoundly mistaken in its design.’339 To the 
contrary, as may already be visible to some extent, this part of the thesis is designed to 
encourage the view according to which theoretical explanations lean towards certain 
explanatory tendencies, all the while also finding certain problems more important 
than others.  
One of Soosay’s alleged counter-examples is as follows: 
When we stop at traffic lights or board public buses, is the law in these 
instances essentially interpretative or argumentative? In such cases, do we 
seek to interpret the law, to make it the best that it can be, or do we, rather, 
seek simply to fall in line with it?340 
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For Dworkin, however, as noted above, the aim of Law’s Empire was to provide a 
‘plausible theory of theoretical disagreement in law.’341 There is not much room for 
theoretical disagreement when stopping at traffic lights or boarding buses, but if there 
were instances of such disagreement (e.g., two lawyers, discussing whether to stop or 
not at some particular traffic lights), then Dworkin’s scheme – particularly the device 
of interpretive concepts – may go some way towards explaining what is going on in 
such disagreements. In this respect, Soosay misses an alternative, and perhaps more 
charitable, reading of Dworkin, i.e., one that rephrases his view to be that insofar as 
we can think of our reflections on the law to be conscious and deliberative, then that 
conscious and deliberative reflection is best understood, according to Dworkin, as 
interpretive and argumentative. In this respect, one can see how certain explanatory 
tendencies are formed by the aims of a theory – which, in Dworkin’s case, may 
perhaps also be explicable on the basis that he was responding to Hart’s theory, 
which, as Dworkin understood it, had grossly underestimated the extent of 
disagreement in legal work.  
Before concluding this section, and in order to further illustrate the importance 
of not forgetting the incompleteness of one’s own theoretical picture, Soosay himself 
can be shown to work with certain assumptions. He states, for example, that ‘if real 
judges say that they rely on intuition, experience and a common consciousness of 
some sort, then surely the task of legal theory is to work out just what this means.’342 
However, as is common to anyone familiar with debates in sociological method, it is 
by no means clear that such access – that of representations by the subjects 
themselves – should be privileged in any way.343 
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IA2b. The Defeasability of Universalisation 
 
As with Dworkin, the following account is not meant as a faithful summary of 
MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning. A more faithful account would need to take 
into account an incredibly wide range of writing, beginning with Legal Reasoning and 
Legal Theory,344 including the important work done in Interpreting Precedents345 and 
Interpreting Statutes,346 and considering the place of the latest book, Rhetoric and the 
Rule of Law,347 in the four-volume series of which it is part. Needless to say, such a 
task is outside the scope of this thesis. 
It is, nevertheless, instructive for present purposes that the theme of RRL, 
announced already in the title, is the tension between the rule of law and what 
MacCormick refers to as ‘the arguable character of law.’348 The dilemma arises 
because it appears as if ‘the proper interpretation and application of legal rules, and 
the proof and interpretation of facts relevant to law-application can be hugely 
problematic’, and thereby pours ‘cold water on any idea of certainty or security.’349 
And without the latter, how can there be the rule of law? In seeking to reconcile this 
problem – which itself arises from a dispute over the limits of language-based 
explanations of legal work, or more accurately, over the limits of explanations found 
within a theory of meaning for a theory of legal work – MacCormick draws on the 
resources of rhetoric.  
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MacCormick’s first step is to remind us that it does not necessarily follow 
from the arguable character of law that ‘the law is not logical’ or ‘that logic 
contributes nothing to legal argument.’350 On the other hand, its arguable character 
ought to make us recognise that legal argumentation is ‘a practical skill, a practical 
art’, and one that depends being ‘intimately familiar with…a great body of legal 
learning’ – though MacCormick’s conception of what such learning entails is at least 
partly revealed when he says that ‘legal science, the structured and ordered study of 
legal doctrine, is…one essential underpinning of law as praxis.’351 The next step is to 
soften the requirement that needs to be achieved for the rule of law to be observed. 
This is done by suggesting that the rule of law is observed when ‘people can have 
reasonable certainty in advance concerning the rules and standards by which their 
conduct will be judged, and the requirements they must satisfy to give legal validity to 
their transactions.’352 The same ‘reasonableness’ obtains in the case of the security 
persons may find in ‘their expectations of the conduct of others, and in particular of 
those holding officials positions under the law.’353 As will be familiar to us after the 
discussion above concerning law-as-discourse, MacCormick provides that the rule of 
law will be possible: 
…provided there is a legal system composed principally of quite clearly 
enunciated rules that normally operate only in a prospective manner, that are 
expressed in terms of general categories, not particular, indexical, commands 
to individuals or small groups singled out for special attention. The rules 
should set realistically achievable requirements for conduct, and should form 
overall some coherent pattern, not a chaos of arbitrarily conflicting 
demands.354 
 
The third, and most significant, step, however, is made in asking us to acknowledge ‘a 
fundamental constraint on the process of legal argumentation’, i.e., that legal 
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argumentation ‘must conform to conditions of rationality and reasonableness that 
apply to all sorts of practical reasoning’ – this being an acknowledgement, as 
MacCormick states, first pressed upon on us by Alexy.355 Of course, the requirement 
itself does not guarantee that ‘any actual advocates and judges in any particular state 
confine their use of argumentation to the practically reasonable’ (otherwise there 
would be no point in asking us to acknowledge the constraint).356 But the requirement 
does impose ‘at least that there may not be assertions without reasons’,357 as well as, 
significantly, but not noted by MacCormick, providing legal scholars with tools for 
the evaluation of the actions of legal officials, and with a justification for engaging in 
that evaluation (i.e., to protect and further the rationality and reasonableness of legal 
argumentation).  
The tool of reconciliation between this reasonably achievable rule of law and 
the reasonably arguable character of law (which obtains ‘wherever there is a process 
of public argumentation’358) ought not to be understood ‘as reducing the rational 
acceptability of an argument to its actual persuasiveness.’359 What MacCormick is 
after, instead, is ‘what is persuasive in an objective sense.’360   
The key move made by MacCormick is to suggest that though there is 
objectivity, it is not static, but dynamic; although it obtains at any one time, it can be 
changed; it forms an order of certainties that are defeasible. It is this notion of 
defeasibility, which is itself a combination of two ideas, i.e., certainty at any one time 
and possibility of change at any time, that in the end plays the role of creating the 
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common ground upon which both a reasonably achievable rule of law and the 
reasonably arguable character of law can be reconciled. 
To see this one must first notice how MacCormick sets up the requirement for 
a certainty at any one time. This extract is exemplary: 
What we see is how legal processes move through a chain of putative 
certainties that are at every point challengeable. No claim or accusation may 
be made without proper citation of the legal warrant that backs it and without 
giving notice of the allegations of fact in virtue of which it is asserted that the 
law warrants the conclusion proposed (by prosecutor or by plaintiff). This has 
the full logical certainty that inheres in syllogistic form. There is a rule 
‘Whenever OF then NC’, cited by prosecutor or plaintiff in indictment or in 
pleadings, and it is there also alleged that OF has occurred in a concrete case 
at a specified time in a way that materially involves the accused person or 
defendant. So the relevant normative consequence ought to be demanded. This 
is the standard legal syllogism variously embodied in criminal or civil 
pleading and procedure.361 
 
The certainty, at one point, is captured in the syllogistic form. In other words, the 
syllogism functions as a carrier of universalization, but is also produced by the 
requirement for decisions to be universalised. These syllogisms can be relied on by 
citizens, as the laws that will be used to evaluate them, such that if the facts as proved 
show their conduct obtains (i.e., the facts are operative, hence OF above), then the 
normative conclusion (NC above) follows. Further, this universalization does not float 
mid-air: it takes its place amidst a newly formed order within the rules and principles 
that together form the legal system. The principle of that order, in turn, is coherence: 
In a legal argument, no one starts with a blank sheet and tries to work out a 
reasonable conclusion a priori. A solution offered must ground itself in some 
proposition that can be presented with at least some credibility as a proposition 
of law, and such a proposition must be shown to cohere in some way with 
other propositions that we take to state established laws. Legal argument 
makers and decision makers do not approach problems of decision and 
justification in a vacuum, but rather in the context of a plethora of material 
that serves to guide and to justify decisions, and to restrict the range within 
which the decisions of public agencies can legitimately be made.362  
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Crucially, however, this coherence is defeasible coherence: in allowing ‘everything 
that is arguable be argued’, but demanding that any solution be universalizable both in 
form (as a syllogism) and context (of an already existing body of doctrine), the two 
sides meet, i.e., the reasonably achievable rule of law and the reasonably arguable 
character of the law. Once again, by allowing – partly, says MacCormick because 
legal materials are communicated ‘in natural languages’ and ‘these are afflicted with 
ambiguity, vagueness and open texture’363 – ‘the rights of the defence’ to raise doubts 
‘concerning fact or concerning law’, i.e., by providing for ‘contests over proper 
interpretation of legal materials, over evaluation of conflicting pieces of evidence, 
over the proper characterisation of facts proven or agreed, or over their relevance to 
the legal materials adduced’,364 but by requiring, at the very same time, that the 
arguments raised on either side be reasonably arguable, i.e., be universalizable in a 
way that forms a coherent order of the re-interpreted materials, the system, almost 
itself as it were, re-creates the conditions for a marriage between a reasonably 
achievable rule of law and the reasonably arguable character of law.  
The argument is a pleasing one, at least partly because it appears to keep a 
good deal of voices in contemporary legal theory happy, though not without 
concessions on both sides: the formalists must come to recognise the reasonably 
arguable character of the law, and the critics must recognise the gravitational pull of 
universalizability fitting into a coherent order. But the argument is in fact deeper, and 
it is one that returns us to the section above concerned with the political life of law-as-
discourse. Ultimately, MacCormick is not as interested in beginning with and working 
towards a theoretical picture of legal work, or more accurately, he is concerned to do 
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so, but only in the course of a jurisprudential inquiry that can only be characterised as 
thoroughly political. Consider the following passage: 
No legal norm can be interpreted reasonably in abstraction from its place in a 
larger whole. As will be seen in Chapters 7 to 11, this accounts for the 
omnipresence in law of arguments from coherence. These look to ensuring 
that a proposed rules or interpretation makes good sense, indeed the best sense 
possible, in the context of the ‘local’ part of the system – the statute read as a 
whole, the particular branch of common law, and the closely comparable 
cases. They also concern, more generally, an effort to ensure that the system as 
a whole hangs together well. The idea of ‘system’ or ‘order’ is itself an 
internal element in practical legal argumentation, not just in theoretical 
conceptions of law.365  
 
One can, and one is appropriately urged, to proceed through RRL as a source of much 
wisdom about legal reasoning. But one must be warned that this is legal reasoning 
insofar as it conforms to certain ideals, themselves, as MacCormick admits above, 
part and parcel of what has been referred to above as the political life of the 
conception of law-as-discourse. It is no surprise, then, to read MacCormick’s 
endorsement of Dworkin’s statement, as paraphrased by the former, that it is ‘out of 
rival conceptions of legality rather than by way of some kind of empirical descriptions 
of things as they are or of the semantics of ordinary language that we develop 
different possible philosophies of law.’366 To cite this is not necessarily to agree with 
Dworkin (or MacCormick) as to what creates plurality in theoretical conceptions of 
law and legal work. But it is certainly to agree that in the case of conceptions of law-
as-discourse, the political values of legality, modelled on, as discussed above, the 
explanatory paradigm of discourse, influence deeply, if not overrun, associated 
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IA2c. Rule-Following  
 
It will be useful to turn, finally, to Pavlakos’ account of legal epistemology, not only 
because it offers the most sophisticated recent theory of legal knowledge, on the back 
of an obvious familiarity with analytical philosophy, but also because, as we shall see, 
it will help us to bring out some more of the arguably deeply rooted intuitions of those 
working not only under the conceptions of legal-work-as-discourse, but also law-as-
discourse. The connection between the two conceptions is immediately visible in 
Pavlakos’ work, particularly insofar as he sets out to offer a theory of legal knowledge 
– ‘of our knowledge of the law,’ as he puts it – that is at once objective and 
normative. We can see how the two ambitions (i.e., securing objectivity and 
normativity) are connected in Pavlakos’ definition of the Practice Theory of Law 
(hereinafter, ‘PTL’). PTL, Pavlakos asserts, offers the following answer to the twin 
requirements of the objective and normative existence of law: it ‘argues that legal 
facts can be known objectively, if we conceive of legal practice as a normative 
activity of making assertions (judging).’367 Normativity ‘generates standards which 
“guide” practice’ and the ‘ability to judge…makes it possible to refer to legal facts 
through well-formed sentences.’368 ‘Combine the two’, Pavlakos promises, ‘and what 
you get is the possibility to make reference [as required by normativity] to legal facts 
through sentences whose truth can be grounded by adducing objective standards.’369 
There are a number of important steps that, taken together, contribute to 
Pavlakos’ overall account. The first is the particular understanding of objectivity that 
Pavlakos advances. Central to this notion of objectivity is the notion of intelligibility. 
The first step, then, will require an examination of the role of the notion of 
intelligibility in Pavlakos’ idea of objectivity. The second step will require unpacking 
                                                




the notion of intelligibility, which itself will need to be broken up into a discussion of, 
first, the device of intentional realism, and second, the notion of grammar. The third 
and fourth steps are linked to Pavlakos’ conception of practice, which is designed to 
satisfy the requirement of normativity. The first is the notion of rule-following, which, 
as we shall see, depends on the notion of the internality of rules. This notion of rule-
following is at once the bridge between grammar and the conception of practice. The 
fourth and final aspect is that of the ‘rationalist understanding of normativity’, which 
relies on the language of reasons. The last two aspects combine to provide an account 
of content that Pavlakos calls ‘pragmatic rationalism.’ These four steps are the 
principle building blocks of Pavlakos’ account of PTL, and it is time now to consider 
them in sequence. 
First, then, let us turn to Pavlakos’ idea of objectivity. For Pavlakos, an 
understanding of objectivity rests upon how we conceive of the relationship between 
the mind and the environment.370 Pavlakos identifies two philosophical traditions, 
both of which he criticises for ‘fanning scepticism’: first, the tradition of 
representationalism; second, the tradition of realism. Representationalists, he asserts, 
‘submit that in order to gain access to the environments and its constituents we need 
to delve in our minds and study some special mental objects that are capable of 
representing to the mind what lies outside it.’371 Almost always, those mental objects 
are thought to consist in propositional representations, resulting in the philosophy of 
representation becoming subsumed under the empire of the philosophy of language.372 
According to Pavlakos – relying on the famous work of Saul Kripke and Hilary 
Putnam – representationalism is beset by problems to do with the instability of 
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reference of linguistic signs,373 which lead ultimately to ‘the more general problem of 
scepticism.’374 The resulting scepticism, which Pavlakos discerns from Donald 
Davidson’s writings, appears in two forms:  
If mental definitions are conceived as being independent of the environment, 
there is no guarantee they say anything about the world; what is more, there is 
no way of checking them against the world, since they themselves are the 
vehicle of thought, of what we know (or can know) and what not. On the other 
hand…representations are, from their nature, supposed to be representations of 
something. Accordingly, if they are conceived as being independent of what 
they represent, representations are prevented from being representations of 
anything, hence they fail to materialise in the first place.375  
                                                    
The second tradition, realism, asserts – to the contrary of representationalism – that 
‘thoughts are not individuated by self-standing, environment-independent mental 
constructs (definitions, representations) but, instead, by what they stand for in the 
environment.’376 Here, ‘certain constituents of our thoughts (names such as 
“Aristotle” or “gold”) acquire their meaning through a direct causal link with their 
referents in the environment.’377 Although realism avoids some of the problems 
associated with representationalism, it is accompanied by its own paradoxes: e.g., if it 
is the environment which determines meaning, then how do we explain the meaning 
of the term ‘unicorn’? Pavlakos argues that paradoxes such as the above problem of 
non-referring names are the result of two further philosophical positions: essentialism 
and first person authority. Realism relies on essentialism because ‘in removing 
meanings from the head’ it argues that ‘what fixes meaning lies in the intrinsic nature 
(essence) of the entities denoted by the words.’378 The problem here is that of 
indeterminacy: ‘microstructures [as in the vocabulary of physics] are no more certain 
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or determinate as guides of thought-content than are mental representations.’379 Even 
acknowledging attempts made by realists, such as Putnam, to rely not on 
microstructures but on stereotypes (i.e., paradigmatic cases without final definitions) 
– which may or may not work in the context of the philosophy of science – Pavlakos 
thinks that the same problems remain, particularly for law: most legal requirements, 
such as that of causation in cases of tortuous liability, cannot be seen, he says, to be 
necessary, but at most, only sufficient.380 The second problematic position – upon 
which realism is said to rely – is that of first person authority. This position refers to 
the ‘ability of thinkers to have access to their own thoughts.’381 If, as in realism, the 
‘content of one’s thoughts…is fully individuated by the environment…then the 
absurd conclusion would follow, that they do not know what they are thinking of’ – 
thus undermining first person authority.382 In ‘expelling content from heads’ realism 
leads to the ‘ignorance of the standards that guide content and meaning, hence 
thoughts become elusive.’383  
Pavlakos asserts that what is common to both representationalism and realism 
is that both ‘require a strong link between thoughts and whatever they take to 
determine thought-content, be it representations in the former or essences of things in 
the latter.’384 This ‘fundamentalism’, says Pavlakos, places ‘the entire weight of the 
account [of objectivity] on the two ends of an otherwise continuous activity.’385 In a 
significant passage, he summarises his position as falling between the ‘two extremes’: 
Viewing the two extreme moments in isolation obscures the fact that thoughts 
acquire their content as a result of a more complex and continuous practice, 
where minds interact with the environment under certain constraints or 
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conditions of intelligibility. These conditions are dynamic and static at the 
same time: dynamic in that they always allow for new information to make its 
way into our thoughts and concepts; static in the sense that they provide for a 
normative structure which constrains the practice of content formation, 
making out of a regulated or normative activity, as opposed to one that 
happens randomly, or for no reason.386 
 
Intelligibility, then, is of central importance to Pavlakos. It is intelligibility – falling, 
allegedly, between what Pavlakos sees as extremes (as above, representationalism and 
realism), that is to provide the foundation of objectivity. The notion of intelligibility, 
however, is complex and is propped up by a series of other ideas – and it is that which 
we must now examine in this, the second step.  
On the one hand, as mentioned above, there is the idea of grammar, which is 
said to guarantee intelligibility ‘through a network of rules which determine what 
linguistic move is allowed in making sense and which is not.’387 Where sentences are 
well-formed, they guarantee intelligibility and ‘are capable of effecting 
communication.’388 Further, ‘the rules of grammar form the background against which 
error and correction can be accounted for.’389 Finally, grammar is also – especially 
insofar as it ‘abides by the slogan…semantics exhausts ontology’390 – that which 
‘guarantees’ the ‘intelligibility of content and, hence, knowledge.’391 Apart from 
grammar, however, which shall be returned to below, the other concept used to prop 
up the notion of intelligibility is intentional realism. Thus, chapter two of the book 
‘opens with a restatement of the requirement of the intelligibility of thought through 
the idea of intentional realism.’392 Thus, before turning to the concept of grammar, it 
will be useful to consider, briefly, Pavlakos’ account of intentional realism.  
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The first step in explicating intentional realism is to explain how it is that 
intentional states are real. The second, but ultimately inseparable, step – for Pavlakos 
– is to show how these real intentional states are ‘embedded within linguistic 
structures.’393 The first step is broken down into the following argument: first, 
‘intentional behaviour is a fact’ or, put another way, the reality of intentional states is 
‘self-evident’;394 second, for ‘intentional behaviour to be possible, one has to assume 
the existence of intentional states’;395 third, therefore, ‘there are intentional states.’396 
The second step then kicks in with the effect that intentional states are explicable by 
way of intentional content, where that content is understood as being possible only 
when it ‘exhibits certain patterns of logical structure (grammar).’397 We then come 
back full circle to the importance of grammar because it is grammar that Pavlakos 
uses to offer what he calls a non-representationalist theory of the individuation of 
content.  
Although a proper evaluation of Pavlakos’ picture is beyond the scope of this 
section, it must be said that it is difficult to identify an argument for accepting the 
basic premise that ‘intentional behaviour is a fact’ – except to say, as per Pavlakos 
above, that it is ‘self-evident.’ Perhaps the best explanation for the need for a bare 
assertion comes from Pavlakos’ insistence this claim (i.e., for the reality of intentional 
states) ‘enjoys the status of a necessary pre-supposition “projected” upon the trivial 
fact of the existence of human behaviour that interrupts, as it were, the causal flow of 
the physical universe.’398 It is, says Pavlakos, ‘this necessity to account for human 
behaviour coherently or meaningfully, as an intervening-factor-in-the-world, that 
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forces on one some version of realism about thoughts, beliefs and other intentional 
states.’399 Otherwise, Pavlakos thinks, we simply cannot ‘support a rational account of 
human behaviour.’400 What one can see, emerging already from the discussion is 
Pavlakos’ deep identification with ideas falling under the canopy of the explanatory 
paradigm of discourse. His retention of, as in some sense fundamental, the notion of 
intentionality, is linked, as we can see, to the theoretical ambition (again, a typically 
discourse-oriented ambition) to account for human behaviour as rational, coherent, 
and relatively consistent over time – as if behaviour itself formed a ‘rational 
discourse.’ 
Let us return, however, to this brief exposition of Pavlakos’ view. It was noted 
above that the second step in accounting for intentional realism – i.e., that ‘intentional 
states are embedded in linguistic structures’ – relies on the notion of grammar, to 
which it was promised the discussion would return. Grammar, for Pavlakos, is that 
‘set of norms which govern the form and inferential relations between judgements.’401 
It is important for Pavlakos to assert that nothing else, aside from grammar, is given 
priority when it comes to determining the content of our thoughts. The content of our 
thoughts for Pavlakos must exist only in the form of propositions, for if it did not, 
there would be something else that would be determining the content of those 
thoughts and that thing would not be grammar – for, obviously enough, the rules of 
grammar apply only to those thoughts that exist in the form of propositions. This is 
also the significance of the slogan referred to above, namely, ‘semantics exhausts 
ontology.’ Pavlakos wants to avoid the idea that anything in the environment (the 
world) determines the content of our thoughts – an idea, that we shall see, is dear to 
some of those working within the legal-work-as-tradition paradigm, but not in the 
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guise of a determinative relation, but more so on in the form of an informing, 
constraining ground, that offers possibilities for mixing and matching (allowing, 
thereby, for an explanation of the emergence of the idea of unicorns). There may very 
well, then, be some theorists who work with the idea of realism that Pavlakos 
criticises (again, an idea demanding a deterministic relation flowing from the 
environment to the mind), but this is not the only kind of realism available.  
Pavlakos’ notion of the ‘semantics exhausts ontology thesis’ is that it 
‘substantiates the idea that the structure of thought precedes that of the structure of the 
world.’402 Grammar is tied intimately to this thesis because it is via the study of 
grammar that we can study ‘the patterns of thought and to the extent that thought is 
individuated through language, a study of language.’403 ‘The whole programme’, then, 
‘of studying semantics or the grammar of thought before or instead of ontology boils 
down to the claim that there is no non-conceptual or transparent experience of 
reality.’404 It is this basic notion, of the structure of the mind (conceived itself on the 
model of a structure of a discourse, regulated by grammar), imposed on the structure 
of the world, that renders Pavlakos an excellent example of the conception of legal-
work-as-discourse.  
We have so far proceeded through two of the projected four steps: first, the 
notion of intelligibility as the foundation for the claim of objectivity of knowledge, 
and, second, the notions of intentional realism and grammar as the ideas that unpack 
the concept of intelligibility. It is time to consider the third and fourth steps, both 
linked intimately to the notion of practice. The third step, rule-following is said to 
bridge the gap between grammar and the concept of practice. The fourth step, 
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‘pragmatic rationalism’, is designed to help us understand the practice of evaluating 
assertions, i.e., judging.  
Rule-following is an important element of Pavlakos’ picture. He states that he 
will ‘proceed to identify the capacity to follow a rule, as the capacity to engage in 
normative activity, as the foundation of all content.’405 Further, he says, rule-
following ‘constitutes a practice which constrains the ascription of content to mental 
states, linguistic signs and token of behaviour.’406 The key to Pavlakos’ account of 
rule-following lies in the notion of the internality of rules in practice (practice, to 
recall, is constituted by rule-following). Rules, Pavlakos asserts, ‘bear an internal 
relation to their applications.’407 ‘Internality’, he continues, ‘guarantees that rule-
following constitutes the most fundamental level as regards intentionality.’408 Using a 
famous phrase of Wittgenstein’s – namely, that ‘there is a way of grasping a rule 
which is not an interpretation’409 – Pavlakos argues that there is a way of 
understanding the production of meanings that is not an interpretation (for one can 
only assert that some production of meaning is an interpretation from the outside).  
It is significant, however (in a way that shall be explained below), that 
Pavlakos feels compelled to add something to this ‘pragmatic concept of practice.’ 
That addition – at once the fourth step and final aspect of Pavlakos’ picture – is ‘a 
rationalist understanding of normativity.’410 This ingredient combines with the above 
exposition of rule-following to produce ‘an account of content I shall call pragmatic 
rationalism.’411 The relevant terminology at play in this rationalist understanding of 
normativity is, as one would expect, the terminology of reasons. Reasons, Pavlakos 
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promises, will ‘specify the structure and nature of rationalist constraints’, which will 
‘create a space between membership or participation in the practice and exhaustive 
appreciation of its contents’, such that ‘notwithstanding one’s competent use of a 
concept in everyday communication, one may still fail to have full knowledge of the 
concept’s content.’412 
There are three steps here: first, it is argued that reasons ‘guide judging as a 
form of activity’; second, it is argued that ‘the idea of rationalist constraints requires 
that grammar be conceived of as the most fundamental content-giving practice’; and 
third, ‘it will be suggested that a grammatical structure, in whose light content 
formation emerges as a normative activity, renders all agents who partake of it 
autonomous.’413 The constraints that Pavlakos has in mind are represented by him ‘as 
reasons for abiding by the rules of the practice.’414 Reasons, he explains, reflect 
‘better the fact that the ascription of content to thoughts is the result of an activity, for 
activity is constrained by reasons rather than causes.’415 These constraints are 
‘intelligible…only within practice.’416 In this respect, they resemble the ‘internality’ 
of the rules of grammar, and, indeed, at times Pavlakos refers to reasons as ‘the 
constraints of rule-following.’417 However, here, Pavlakos goes further – and in a way 
that makes it clear that the rules of grammar are quite different to reasons. He asserts 
that the ‘basic constraints (reasons) of rule-following are facts.’418 They include, 
Pavlakos says, facts that ‘refer to the naturalistic aspects of the environment,’ as well 
as ‘legal, moral or other social facts.’419  
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What Pavlakos is struggling with here is a way to retain the rationality of 
behaviour – of the notion of human beings as intervening in the causal structure of the 
world – but without that turning us into solipsists or idealists. Thus, he says, a ‘fact-
as-reason can stand in a causal relation to a token of thought or action without 
amounting to a full causal explanation.’420 Similarly: ‘where causal explanation 
purports to illustrate a strict causal connection between constraints which are 
conceived of naturalistically [e.g., the fact that the red pen is on the table determines 
the content of my thought that there is a red pen on the table], and tokens of thought 
or action’,421 rationalistic explanations, it is said, ‘purport to explain content by 
linking thought and action with non-naturalistic reasons.’422 The example provided by 
Pavlakos is the thought of someone who realises that if he parks in front of the 
delivery entrance of a shopping centre he will be fined, in which case Pavlakos asserts 
that the content of that thought is caused by the knowledge of the non-naturalistic fact 
that parking in front of the delivery entrance is forbidden.423  
A detailed analysis of Pavlakos’ concept of reasons is impossible here. He 
certainly surrounds this concept with a great deal of conditions. To be reasons, in 
Pavlakos’ sense, ‘reasons must simultaneously be motivationally efficacious and 
objective’424 – where that capacity to motivate is said to reside in the ‘reasons’ 
universality.’425 That universality, in turn, is said to be guaranteed by three further 
conditions that reasons ‘must meet’: independent identifiability, direct readability, and 
fallibility.426 
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What is interesting for present purposes is that Pavlakos’ insistence on a 
rationalist understanding of normativity – and on the correlate positing of reasons – 
has immediate repercussions on his picture of legal work. Thus, for example, the 
condition of independent identifiability mentioned above, ‘expresses the idea that any 
reason must be identifiable or determinable by a finite subject independently of any 
particular instance of application.’427 This requires ‘judging-subjects’ to be capable 
‘of generalising a reason to future cases.’428 Further, in accordance with the condition 
of direct readability, ‘judging-subjects’ must be able to ‘read straight off what 
[reasons] require.’429 The point is not to disagree with whether this picture of 
‘judging-subjects’ is accurate: the point is to see how a picture of legal work is built, 
from the direction of abstract phenomena to certain capabilities.  
To summarise: the rules of grammar, with which we comply intentionally, but 
not self-consciously (explained by Pavlakos courtesy of the internality of these rules), 
are necessary, because without them we could not think. Our following of these rules 
explains intelligibility, which is the foundation of objectivity. On top of this, however, 
is another layer, namely, reasons. Reasons, of the form, say, of a prohibition on 
parking outside a street – a form, furthermore, that must be generalisable (as this 
prohibition is), directly readable (let us say it is articulated in a statute or case), etc. – 
not only motivate (they are practical; they function pragmatically), but also determine 
content, and thus lay the groundwork for evaluation as either correct or incorrect. It is 
these reasons, functioning in such a manner, that guarantee normativity. Together, 
these explanations of objectivity and normativity constitute an explanation of how 
knowledge of the law is possible.  
                                                




Pavlakos himself gets to his picture of the work performed by judges in the 
following way. At the highest level of generality is what he calls judging simpliciter. 
At the level of legal work is judging in a domain. Judging simpliciter ‘is the thinnest 
or most general way of conceiving of the practice of judging as reflexive.’430 
Reflexivity ‘refers broadly to the ability to supply reasons which constrain ascription 
of content’,431 doing so in two ways: first, by laying ‘down the rules which delineate 
the semantic structure of judgements as well as the inferential relations that hold 
between them (rules of grammar)’; and second, by revealing to us that ‘grammar 
points out the need for depicting reasons when judging.’432 Judging in a domain refers 
to the notion of distinct ‘cognitive contexts (e.g., law, morality, physics etc).’433 These 
domains are made up of ‘substantive rules.’434 Here, ‘substantive rules constitute a 
more specialised level of normativity which regulates adequately the practice of 
judgement formation with respect to a cognitive domain.’435 In the domain of law, 
these substantive rules may take the form of Hart’s primary and secondary rules, and 
it is these rules that ‘prescribe the formation of judgements within a legal domain.’436  
Recall now the definition of PTL (as cited at the outset of this section). PTL 
‘argues that legal facts can be known objectively, if we conceive of legal practice as a 
normative activity of making assertions (judging).’ Normativity ‘generates standards 
which “guide” practice’ and the ‘ability to judge…makes it possible to refer to legal 
facts through well-formed sentences.’ ‘Combine the two’, says Pavlakos, ‘and what 
you get is the possibility to make reference to legal facts through sentences whose 
truth can be grounded by adducing objective standards.’   
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The above discussion has proceeded through Pavlakos’ account fairly 
carefully because it is the most sophisticated recent account, drawing on philosophical 
resources, of legal epistemology. Despite its complexity, the account does help us to 
reveal some features of the legal-work-as-discourse orientation. These basic features 
include: 1) the insistence on intentionality; 2) the desire for a retention of a 
theoretically-describable account of the coherence of human behaviour, meaning an 
account that creates room for human beings as self-movers, intervening in the causal 
structure of the world; 3) the postulation of the primacy of a rational structure in the 
mind imposed on the world (or the environment); 4) the need to retain the problem of 
normativity, which also allows for explanatory primacy to be given to abstract 
phenomena (reasons, as above, that are generalisable and directly readable, etc.), 
which guide human beings; and 5) the view that thought is not possible without 
language, no matter how softened by the constitutive role of rules of grammar that we 
need not be conscious of.  
Indeed, the last requirement – that of a sense of intentionality without self-
consciousness – is, as mentioned above, one that may very well appeal to certain 
theorists working under the tradition paradigm. The crucial difference, however, is as 
follows. Pavlakos explains this phenomenon as due to the property of rules 
themselves. He argues, as above, that rules (at least certain rules, i.e., in this case, the 
rules of grammar) have an internality that renders it impossible for us to step outside 
them – to see our following them as interpretations. There is a way of going on, as 
Wittgenstein put it, that is not an interpretation – for there is no one who can stand 
outside the practice to such an extent that they would have the authority, or the 
insight, to say that that way of going on is such-and-such an interpretation of such-
and-such a rule. What is happening here is that we are being witness to the very limits 
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of rule-based explanations of behaviour. ‘Knowing how to go on’ is not a notion that 
requires or will be satisfied by a rule-based explanation. It is, primarily, an ability. 
However, abilities are notoriously difficult to fit into or use as part of an account of 
human behaviour that wants to present it as rational, coherent and consistent over 
time, and thus as capable of being evaluated by reference to standards. Perhaps it is 
the desire to give those standards themselves some authority that impels theorists to 
situate them, to force them into every kind of explanation. Perhaps it is the desire for 
retaining the image of human beings as self-movers, as in some sense above and 
beyond the causal patterns of the environment, that is fundamental. This need not be 
decided upon here; nor, more likely, is it possible to decide for certain. This notion of 
idolising rationality and the associated idea of humans-as-self-movers shall, in any 
even, be returned to in section IIC, ‘Philosophy and the Examined Life.’ For present 
purposes, what is sufficient is that some basic features of legal-work-as-discourse 













In a paper entitled ‘Mute Law’437, Rodolfo Sacco outlines some of the features of 
what shall be referred to here as the explanatory paradigm of law-as-tradition. 
Significantly, for present purposes, Sacco does not limit his concept of mute law 
geographically or historically – even if both geographical and historical 
considerations play a large part in his explication of the concept of mute law.  
‘Law may live,’ Sacco argues, ‘and lived, even without a lawgiver.’438 The 
very notion of a ‘law-giver’, he says, is ‘a recent innovation, in the actual meaning of 
a central authority entrusted with overall legislative powers.’439 At other times, and in 
other places, the creation of law was left to other sources: in Chinese and Japanese 
law, for example, he says, ‘the rules of social interaction were thought to mirror a 
cosmic order.’440 In Roman law, at least in its origins, and in the customs of the 
common law, we find a law that precedes any individual design.441 In some respects, 
the conception of mute law and the absence of a law-giver coincide, but they do not 
overlap perfectly. To the extent that there is an overlap, it may remind us of the 
criticisms of those who argue that the myth of given meaning in legal texts, and the 
correlate restriction of those who resolve disputes in accordance with those texts 
‘merely’ to ‘revealing’ that given meaning, goes hand in hand with the safeguarding 
not only of authority, but also of the authority of the profession. As we might recall, 
these critics noted that ‘law as language is aimed principally at reasserting the 
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autonomy of law—at returning law to lawyers by claiming that law is a specialised 
language that only lawyers can speak.’442   
But law, says Sacco, can and has existed and evolved without lawyers.443 We 
do not find the more or less bureaucratised, centralised, professionalized structures of 
law that we are used to everywhere, ‘nor—more importantly—have they always 
existed everywhere. And even where they do exist, they can influence the life of 
society to greater or lesser extent.’444 Looking back, Sacco argues that ‘when the 
Homo Habilis produced the first pebble tools…ceremonies and acts constituted legal 
acts. Adherence to the rule implied its existence and validity (manifested by 
spontaneous conduct of the members of the group). The law’, continues Sacco, ‘was 
mute, except for yelling accompanying ceremonies and self-help. Sources were mute. 
Acts were mute.’445 At that time, Sacco suggests, ‘the dichotomy between law and 
enforcement did not exist.’446  
Sacco does argue that ‘the biggest legal revolution took place when a 
descendent of the Homo Habilis began to use an articulated language.’447 Even then, 
however, he says, it is unclear ‘whether man began immediately to use it for purposes 
of law.’448 Significantly, as mentioned above, Sacco does not limit his concept of 
mute law to the above historical or geographical illustrations. He says, for example, 
that ‘except for the two typical ceremonies, i.e., appropriation of land and courtship, 
unspoken acts and mute sources continue to operate today.’449 Sacco acknowledges 
that language does make a difference; for example, it ‘introduces questions about the 
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future, abstract questions about law not yet applied, principles unrelated, at least for 
the moment, to realities.’450 But Sacco is certainly careful and circumspect about 
placing too much emphasis on the text and on those who administer it. Thus, he says, 
for example, that ‘the advent of legal science did not modify operative relationships, it 
simply improved the conceptual definition of the relationship between masters and 
dependents.’451  
Turning to more contemporary legal systems, Sacco argues that ‘a 
combination of both spoken and mute elements can…be found at work.’452 Sacco 
reminds us that ‘our legal system is familiar with spoken sources (the written rules, of 
splendid form and content, produced by legislative assemblies) as well as’, 
importantly, ‘unspoken sources (commercial uses, determination of standards of 
conduct, construction, by an interpreter, of concepts such as fault, reasonableness, bad 
faith).’453 We are familiar, says Sacco, ‘with acts carried out through words (contracts 
made by fax, deeds, wills),’ but we ought also to recognise that there are ‘acts carried 
out with words (deliveries, contracts made through devices that allow the buyer to pay 
and receive merchandise).’454 There are categories with both spoken and mute 
elements: ‘such are contracts that can be made by declarations, but also by material 
acts; such are confirmations; such are acceptances of inheritance, which can be 
express or implied.’455 However, Sacco points out, ‘lawyers are primarily interested in 
spoken sources and acts and feel uneasy with mute sources and acts’;456 ‘when we 
refer to mute acts,’ says Sacco, ‘we do it by analogy to spoken acts.’457  
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It is instructive to begin with Sacco for several reasons. The first has already 
been mentioned directly above, i.e., that although Sacco uses historical and 
geographical illustrations, he does not limit his notion of mute law to other times and 
places – especially times and places where legal materials were not articulated and 
recorded in the way we are accustomed to today. Were the concept of law-as-tradition 
to apply only to such times and places, it would hardly be an alternative conception to 
law-as-discourse. Secondly, and in a related fashion, the conception of law-as-
tradition does not rely on either the presence or absence of textual legal materials, or 
on explaining how textual legal materials are valid (though it may be interested in the 
circumstances under which certain legal materials are effective), or on using concepts 
used to explain features of language to explain other things by analogy. Sacco is right 
to warn us above that contemporary legal theorists are prone to find such ceaseless 
reference to the text and such textual analogies attractive.458 
There are nine sections below, all of which attempt, as with the case of the 
discussion of law-as-discourse, to be bring out some basic features of those working 
under the conception of law-as-tradition. The nine sections are: 1) the Living Law; 2) 
Stabilised Interactional Expectancies; 3) Projections of Experiences; 4) Concepts of 
Legal Culture; 5) the Turn to Activities; 6) the Authoritative Presence of the Past; 7) 
Customary Law and the Common Law; 8) Pluralism, Process and Evolution; and 9) 
the Political Life of Law-as-Tradition. Each is, naturally, brief and does not purport to 
represent or summarise the views of the theorists discussed in any detailed or 
‘faithful’ manner. 
Two preliminary points should be noted. First, the conception of law-as-
tradition is not as well represented as that of law-as-discourse, at least not in Anglo-
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American legal theoretical literature, and certainly not in its contemporary 
manifestations. Indeed, some theorists may argue that the basic features of law-as-
tradition do not belong to ‘jurisprudential inquiry’ properly so-named, but to 
sociology or anthropology of law. Nevertheless, it is an important aim of this part of 
the thesis to point to some of the available resources and to suggest that these 
resources ought to be seen as making a contribution to our understanding of law. As 
above, the aim here is not to either endorse or criticise these contributions, but to 
reveal some of their commonalities, including some of their common problems, 
common assumptions, and common sources of explanatory refuge.  
Second, the aim here is not to be faithful to, or discuss in any detail, the 
literature on the concept of tradition in sociology and social theory. Interestingly, even 
in these fields, a recent paper suggests that ‘insufficient attention’ has been paid to 
‘the topic of tradition.’459 Nevertheless, there have been important works here, 
perhaps most prominently, Edward Shils’ 1981 volume, entitled simply Tradition.460 
A number of preliminary points and discussions made by Shils will be useful to 
mention at this point. The first is that Shils is careful to distinguish ‘tradition’ from 
‘traditionalism’, the latter being ‘the support of traditional rules and beliefs on the 
grounds of their originating from a sacred source.’461 According to Shils, the former, 
by contrast, refers to ‘transferring the patterns of belief and images or models of 
conduct from “the past into the present” in which these are respectively rethought and 
embodied in actions, to be taken into the future.’462 The transferral of these patterns 
need not be a conscious one – indeed, drawing on figures such as Edmund Burke, 
Alfred Whitehead, and Michel Polanyi, Shils suggests we are often ‘irremediably 
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ignorant’ of facets of the traditions of which we are part.463 We participate in 
traditions because of ‘deep seated “impulses”, “needs”, and “dispositions”.’464 The 
‘learning’ involved consists in the preservation and conveyance of ‘bodies of 
knowledge and skill’465 – where that preservation and conveyance is not be 
understood as the passing on of ideas or practices (which, Shils says, without the 
bedrock of tradition, ‘are ephemeral’),466 but rather, and in keeping with other 
theorists such as Max Radin and Michael Oakeshott, is an active process, ‘a 
concrete…manner of living in all its intricateness.’467 Finally, unlike for some, such 
as Anthony Giddens and Eric Hobsbawm for whom traditions are inventions that 
originate as objects of design or planned creation, for Shils, traditions are partly 
evolutionary, i.e., they are ‘successful adaptations to changes in the environment’ and 
partly ‘spontaneous.’468 The last of these points deserves special re-iteration, and will 
be addressed as the political life of the conception of law-as-tradition, though not, as 
with the previous discussion, at the outset of this part, but at its conclusion. As the 
discussion proceeds below, the echoes of some of these basic features in legal 
theoretical literature will become prevalent.    
 
IB1a. The Living Law 
Eugen Ehrlich, an important figure in the law-as-tradition conception, defined law as 
consisting ‘of rules of conduct followed in everyday life—the customary practices 
and usages which give rise to and maintain the inner ordering of associations (the 
family, village community, corporations, business associations, professions, clubs, a 
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school or factory).’469 Famously, he dubbed his concept that of ‘the living law,’ which 
he described as ‘the law which dominates life itself even though it has not been 
posited in legal propositions.’470 The living law was not, he said, ‘part of the content 
of the document that the courts recognise as binding when they decide a legal 
controversy, but only that part which the parties actually observe in life.’471 The 
centre of gravity of the development of law, he continued, was custom, and this made 
him look upon legal texts, and the efforts of legal scientists, with some scepticism.472 
In the case of Roman law, for example, he argued that the texts of Roman law were 
nothing more than decisions about which customs to consider valid – those texts were 
not themselves the source of law.473   
In a paper published in 1922 – and prefaced by ‘An Appreciation of Eugen 
Ehrlich’ by Roscoe Pound474 – Ehrlich brought some of his ideas to a much wider 
audience.475 His running theme, in that paper, is the relationship between what he 
calls Legal Provisions and the Social Order. A ‘Legal Provision’ is ‘an instruction 
framed in words addressed to courts as to how to decide legal cases or a similar 
instruction addressed to administrative officials as to how to deal with particular 
cases.’476 In other writings, Ehrlich refers to these instructions as ‘norms for 
decision.’477 It is no surprise, says Ehrlich, that because these instructions are part of 
the everyday practice of ‘the modern practical jurist’, that it is these instructions that 
he or she understands to be law.478 Social Order, on the other hand, not only predates, 
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but also exists in the absence of any such instructions.479 Further, ‘even today the 
whole of law is incapable of being included in Legal Provisions’, for to attempt to 
‘embrace the whole variegated body of human activities in Legal Provisions is about 
as sensible as trying to catch a stream and hot it in a pond.’480  
Ehlrich’s discussion raises an issue that will accompany us throughout this 
discussion. It is, in fact, a mirror issue to the one discussed above in relation to the 
conception of law-as-discourse. Where, in the explanation of law, ought we to place 
articulated norms? We have seen, above, how law-as-discourse theorists have 
struggled with accounting for the role of laws – conceptualised as articulated norms – 
in the everyday life of the citizenry, sometimes reluctantly, as in Endicott, covering up 
the problem of a seemingly unrealistic explanation of that role with a reference to the 
importance of articulated norms (with their various properties) for constraining the 
conduct of evaluation of citizens by officials. The beginning point here, however, is 
different. Theorists working under the law-as-tradition conception begin with the 
experience of everyday life – both amongst the citizenry and officialdom – and place 
a good deal less explanatory power in the hands of discourse, not only because they 
do not explain the happenings in question by reference to articulated norms 
functioning as reasons for action, but also because they do not tend to place as much 
emphasis on a rational or rationally reconstructed order.  
As we saw above, Ehlrich’s picture, at least in this 1922 paper, is one that 
contains an explanatory split between the citizenry and those ‘modern practical 
jurists’ (Legal Provisions taking priority in the case of the latter), but as we shall see, 
not all law-as-tradition theorists make this move. Indeed, as we shall also see, whereas 
the discourse-oriented theorist is more likely to stress the ontological aspects in his or 
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her explanations, the tradition-oriented theorist is more likely to situate his or her 
explanations at the epistemological level, often to the extent that articulated norms are 
subsumed in the explanation by the epistemological tradition of legal officials.   
One further illustration of the lack of an appeal to articulated norms in 
Ehrlich’s paper is his criticism of explaining both the emergence and the continuity of 
such features of social life as ‘marriage’ or ‘contracts’ by reference to Legal 
Provisions. ‘The great mass of law’, he asserts, ‘arises immediately in society itself in 
the form of a spontaneous ordering of social relations, of marriage, the family 
associations, possession, contracts, succession, and most of this Social Order has 
never been embraced in Legal Provisions.’481 Therefore, ‘it is entirely wrong to 
believe that social institutions, marriage, family associations…have been called into 
existence through Legal Provisions, or, worse yet, through statutes.’482 Although state 
institutions, and indeed ‘only’ state institutions, ‘are created through statutes’, (though 
to say this is not to say that the state is created by law, for Ehrlich states explicitly that 
‘the state is older than state law’)483 the great mass of Legal Provisions is made ‘not 
through forethought, but through afterthought’, ‘for in order that the judges and jurists 
may become occupied with a juristic dispute, the institution involved must already 
have its existence in life and must have given rise to the dispute.’484  
It is also important that for Ehrlich too much focus on the Legal Provisions 
valid at any one time may make one miss the dynamism of the Social Order, and the 
changes that are perceptible only when one considers longer periods of time in one’s 
explanations. He repeatedly stresses that the Social Order is ‘not fixed and 
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unchangeable… It is in a constant flux.’485 ‘In the short period of human life’ he 
continues, changes such as the emergence of the ‘workman’s contract’, or the 
‘competition clause in commercial contracts’, or the ‘railroad freight contract’ (terms 
that, significantly, are by no means surprising, and indeed sound antiquated to us in 
2008) – these changes are ‘rarely recognisable, but in the course of centuries, they 
assume the proportions of tremendous revolutions.’486 It is almost as if, for Ehrlich, 
Legal Provisions are like our vision of stars: we see their light, but it has taken so long 
for it to arrive in our retina that we could be looking at non-existent objects.  
We can recognise Ehrlich’s ideas in a wide range of legal theoretical literature 
– some of which refers explicitly to him. For example, in a very recent paper 
(published in July 2008), David Nelken traces Ehrlich’s influence to everything from 
the ‘law in context’ series (published in the UK from the 1960’s onwards),487 Pound 
and the realists on the ‘law in action’, (though in other work Nelken criticises the 
equation between living law and law in action),488 to work by Philip Selznick, Lon 
Fuller and Lauren Edelman on law emerging from interaction and organisational life 
and recent work by Marc Hertogh on ‘legal consciousness.’489 Space will not permit 
an examination of all – Selznick and Fuller are discussed in sections below – but it 
will be worthwhile to briefly mention Hertogh’s work, if only because he has been 
probably the most determined adherents, amongst contemporary legal theorists, of 
Ehrlich’s work.490  
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Hertogh calls on Ehrlich in developing his account of ‘legal consciousness.’491 
A popular definition of the term, he suggests, is one that encompasses ‘all the ideas 
about the nature, function and operation of law held by anyone in society at a given 
time’,492 but as he quickly points out, such an explanation remains ambivalent about 
the conception of law in question. Hertogh considers the analysis of legal 
consciousness by reference to works by Sally Engle Merry, Patricia Ewick and Susan 
S. Silbey, and others,493 for whom the primary focus is ‘How do people experience 
(official) law?’494 However, Hertogh’s focus is on Ehrlich’s conception of law, which, 
Hertogh says, enables the study of ‘legal consciousness “from below”.’495 The 
metaphor is not a coincidence. As we shall see in the section below on Fuller’s work, 
whereas conceptions of law-as-discourse tend to proceed top-down, proceeding 
downward from a central authority, conceptions of law-as-tradition proceed bottom-
up, proceeding from the interactions of persons themselves. Whether these 
conceptions meet is another matter (MacCormick’s theory, as we shall see in section 
IC4, tries to accommodate both, with a definition of law, i.e., as institutionalised 
normative order, that tries to find such a meeting place). The metaphor has also been 
used as a marker in other theories, perhaps most prominently in recent times, the 
bottom-up legal cosmopolitanism of Bonaventura de Sousa Santos. Santos argues that 
we can think of law, or at least some law, as ‘very informal, unwritten, so deeply 
embedded in family relations that it is hardly conceivable as an autonomous 
dimension thereof.’496 One such kind of law is what Santos calls domestic law: ‘the 
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set of rules, normative standards and dispute settlement mechanisms both resulting 
from and in the sedimentation of social relations in the household.’497  
Ehrlich similarly makes much of the ‘the household and how it organises its 
social relations by norms.’498 Hertogh’s purpose is to push an interpretation of 
Ehrlich’s theory according to which ‘law is a notion that lives in people’s heads and 
which can be identified “on the basis of people’s attitudes”.’499 Under this conception, 
‘law is considered a dependent variable; the definition of law is not provided by the 
researcher, but is part of the empirical enquiry itself.’500 The contrast with Luhmann’s 
methodological position could not be more stark, i.e., to recall from chapter one of 
Luhmann’s Law as a Social System, entitled ‘The Location of Legal Theory’, 
Luhmann argues that it is law itself that determines its own boundaries and thus the 
demarcates the object of legal theoretical concern.501 Of course, there have been 
others – not necessarily all of whom would be sympathetic to Ehrlich’s account – who 
have accepted and argued for this methodological postulate, such as Frederick 
Schauer502 and Brian Tamanaha.503 As we will see, it is also an idea familiar to 
students of legal pluralism and critical legal pluralism, which is returned to below in 
section IB1h.  
Hertogh’s analysis cannot be considered here in any more depth. One further 
point he makes, however, deserves to be mentioned. Hertogh’s Ehrlich-inspired legal 
consciousness method allows him to unearth a value remarked upon by those he 
interviews when examining house regulations systems in the Netherlands. The value 
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in question is ‘responsiveness’, which those interviewed described variously in the 
following ways: 
Town government should be at the heart of society, outward-looking and 
cooperative. Policy is not made from behind a desk; public officials know 
what’s going on in Zwolle and their work is directed at the needs of the client. 
There is a very close cooperation with all partners in the city.504  
 
Our golden rule is: listen to what the residents say. Our second rule: do not shy 
away from creative solutions.505 
 
These are significantly different political ideals than those invoked by the law-as-
discourse conception. The value of ‘responsiveness’ that Hertogh says they express 
will be returned to in section IB1i below (‘The Political Life of Law-as-Tradition’).  
 
IB1b. Stabilised Interactional Expectancies 
Lon Fuller, one of the most underrated of legal theorists, deserves much more 
attention than can be given here. In his paper, ‘Human Interaction and Law’, we can 
recognise a good deal of Ehrlich’s ideas.506 Fuller opens the paper with the 
announcement that his conception of law includes not only ‘the legal systems of states 
nations’, but also ‘smaller systems…to be found in labour unions, professional 
associations, clubs, churches, and universities.’507 A good part of Fuller’s discussion 
is concerned with revealing the limitations of jurisprudential accounts of ‘customary 
law’ for the proper understanding of his wider conception of law. The core of his 
critique is his attack on those who ‘reduce’ the concept of customary law to ‘mere 
habit or usage’,508 as opposed to those who recognise that it is best described in the 
‘language of interaction’, meaning an order composed of predictable patterns and 
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supported by ‘intermeshing anticipations’509 and ‘complementary expectations’ (a 
term Fuller borrows from Talcott Parsons).510 What Fuller sets out to do, then, is to 
provide some account of ‘the actual social processes through which law’511 emerges 
from these contexts of human interaction – or, one might say, with Ehrlich, from the 
associations of human beings.  
In a move commonly made in law-as-tradition conceptions, but not, as we saw 
above, in law-as-discourse ones, Fuller insists that we must not conceive of that 
‘interactional expectancy’ as actively entering our consciousness.512 Indeed, Fuller 
asserts that ‘the anticipations which most unequivocally shape our behaviour and 
attitudes towards others are often precisely those that are operative without our being 
aware of their presence.’513 ‘Our conduct towards others, and our interpretations of 
their behaviour towards us,’ he notes, in anticipation of a good deal of contemporary 
cognitive science (particularly of the socially-embodied school), are ‘constantly 
shaped by standards that do not enter consciously into our thought processes.’514   
Elsewhere in the paper, and in another move common to law-as-tradition 
conceptions, Fuller is keen to reject a picture of law as exclusively an instrument of 
social control emanating from a central authority. Such a picture for him skirts over 
important complexities that emerge when one takes a longer period of time as one’s 
window onto the world of law. The law-as-an-instrument-of-social-control view, says 
Fuller, is sometimes 
…coupled with the notion that the necessity for law arises entirely from man’s 
defective moral nature; if men be counted on to act morally, law would be 
unnecessary. As for the way law is conceived to come into existence, it is by 
an exercise of authority and not from anything like an interplay of reciprocal 
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expectancies. The law does not invite the citizen to interact with it; it acts 
upon him.515  
 
At first blush, such a conception may seem well-suited to explaining criminal law. To 
do this, however, would be to forget, says Fuller, that ‘interactional issues that were 
once central have…been pushed to the periphery’ (thus, for example, the law against 
murder is said to have emerged out of the regulation of blood feuds).516 It is not the 
exclusive or even essential characteristic of law that ‘it is an exercise of authority’,517 
as those who conceive of law-as-an-instrument-of-social-order tend to take for 
granted. In later work, Fuller made more of this bias towards a centralised authority as 
the exclusive source of law. Indeed, he attributes to that the bias the difficulty legal 
theorists have in dealing with customary law.518 Seeing law as ‘a species of control 
imposed from above’, as ‘if it derives from, and is dependent upon, some established 
centre of authority’519 is to miss the existence of and significance of ‘social processes 
from which rules can emerge and become effective as law without receiving the 
imprimatur of any explicitly legislative organ of government.’520 
A major part of the message here for Fuller is that enacted law or statute law 
itself depends on those stabilised interactional capacities. Thus, he says, ‘the existence 
of enacted law as an effectively functioning system depends upon the establishment of 
stable interactional expectancies between lawgiver and subject.’521 The following 
passage is exemplary: 
On the one hand, the lawgiver must be able to anticipate that the citizenry as a 
whole will accept as law and generally observe the body of rules he has 
promulgated. On the other hand, the legal subject must be able to anticipate 
that government will itself abide by its own declared rules when it comes to 
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judge his action, as in deciding, for example, whether he has committed a 
crime or claims property under a valid deed. A gross failure in the realisation 
of either of these anticipations – of government towards citizen and of citizen 
toward government – can have the result that the most carefully drafted code 
will fail to become a functioning system of law.522 
 
As is well-known, Fuller’s vision of what criteria lawmakers, i.e., those central 
governmental authorities, had to fulfil for law to become efficacious received its full 
treatment in The Morality of Law,523 where Fuller articulated the conditions of the 
internal morality of law, which included prohibitions against unclear, retrospective, 
impossible-to-comply-with, and other such undesirable features of laws. What is 
instructive for present purposes is that although one may, at a stretch, characterise 
Fuller’s conditions of the internal morality of law as criteria for the validity of laws 
(without them, Fuller says, laws do not deserve the name of law, for they cannot 
command the respect of the citizenry), they are better understood, and indeed 
explained by him as facilitating, the efficacy of law. It is not that validity does not 
matter – it can still be used as a conceptual placeholder for certain criteria that 
determine the existence of abstract phenomena as laws – but it is just that efficacy 
matters more.  
A closer examination of this aspect, and other aspects, of Fuller’s work lie 
outside the scope of this thesis. Some of his writings use concepts that may resemble 
ideas falling under the law-as-discourse conception. Thus, he is happy to explain 
‘systems of stabilised interactional capacities’ as shaped by ‘standards’, or even more 
clearly, by reference to an ‘unwritten “code of conduct.”’524 A closer reading of his 
work, then, may very well reveal that he is more profitably read as a theorist 
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struggling with the tension between the two explanatory paradigms – as with the other 
five theorists looked at in sections IC1 – IC5 below. Fuller has been referred to here, 
however, for a purpose. What is of significance in the context of the present 
discussion from Fuller’s work are the following features: 1) Fuller’s insistence on the 
explanatory power of, and importance of explaining, the emergence of law from 
stable interactional expectancies; 2) his recognition that those interactional 
expectancies need not, indeed often the most powerful do not, play any role in our 
conscious deliberations; and 3) his location of the dependence of the efficacy of 
enacted law on those interactional expectancies (and thus generally, as above, his 
prioritising of the problem of efficacy). All three are features that are common to most 
conceptions of law-as-tradition.  
 
IB1c. Projections of Experiences  
Like Ehrlich and Fuller, Leon Petrazycki is an important figure for law-as-tradition 
conceptions. His theory is rich and wide-ranging.525 He certainly deserves more 
attention than he received in Anglo-American legal theory. For present purposes, his 
significance lies not only in his understanding of language as ‘an essentially practical 
tool of interpersonal communication moulded by practical non-scientific 
considerations, full of metaphors and hypostates’,526 but more so in his criticism of 
those theories that locate law ‘in the misty realm of abstract norms and rules in the 
field of mental, ideal entities’, and in his insistence that legal (and moral) norms ‘can 
be found and observed much nearer in our consciousness.’527 According to Rudzinski, 
for Petrazycki, ‘law and morality consist…of…psychological human experiences 
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containing negative or positive valuation and a dynamic consciousness of duty.’528 
The ‘moral or legal norm is a projection of our moral or legal “emotional” experience, 
its reflection, its mirror image partly intellectual in content projected outwards and 
viewed as objective reality.’529 Put another way, in the paraphrase of Krzysztof 
Motyka, for Petrazycki, ‘law, and likewise morality, has its real existence only in the 
human psyche, where it takes the form of legal experiences, while norms, rights and 
duties, are nothing more or less than an “emotional phantasmata” or a “projection,” 
which results from the inclination of man, including the legal scholar, to objectify the 
content of his or her psychical experiences.’530  
Petrazycki’s theory is important for law-as-tradition concepts because it not 
only resists, but also positively and explicitly distances itself, from those tendencies 
for projection mentioned above, i.e., from those tendencies to reify and give 
explanatory priority to abstractions (e.g., norms, rules, laws, etc.). By seeing those 
abstractions as products of experience – we shall see later, how this fits in well to 
contemporary theories of cognition that argue that language is made up of metaphors 
built up from experience (see section IB2d) – Petrazycki liberates himself from 
remaining dependent upon them as basic or constitutive elements of law. He also saw 
other tendencies – such as ‘the tendency to develop a single pattern of norms…the 
tendency toward precision and definiteness of content and compass of legal concepts,’ 
and others531 – as psychological tendencies, whereas, as we saw above, these tend to 
be seen by those working under the conception of law-as-discourse as features (even 
if ideal) of law itself.  
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Petrazycki’s theory is astoundingly rich and complex, and a proper study of 
his work would need to take into account the often idiosyncratic meaning he gave to 
terms that were important to him, e.g., a typical example offered of an emotion in 
Petrazycki’s sense is that of ‘hunger-appetite’,532 which is quite different to the 
contemporary understanding (which would presumably refer to fear, anger, joy, 
shame, etc.). Like Ehrlich and Fuller, Petrazycki wanted to bring law ‘directly into the 
sphere of every face-to-face interaction.’533 Perhaps unlike Ehrlich and Fuller, he 
focused more on the psychological, as opposed to socio-historical, context in which 
that interaction functions. What he helps to bring out is the possibility of resisting the 
reification and explanatory reliance on abstractions, themselves conceptualised as 
nothing but projections of experiences. 
Further, it is important to remember that Petrazycki influenced an impressive 
generation of Russian scholars, including Nicholas Timascheff, Pitirim Sorokin, 
Georges Gurvitch, and Bronislaw Malinowski. Malinowski is particularly important 
to mention because he extended Petrazycki’s own pluralistic and anti-statist 
perspective on law, but did so in the context of impressive empirical studies that made 
their way into Anglo-American legal theoretical literature. In his famous Crime and 
Custom in Savage Society,534 Malinowski argued that ‘legal rules consist of a class of 
binding rules which control most aspects of tribal life, which regulate personal 
relations between kinsmen, clansmen, and tribesmen, settle economic relations, the 
exercise of power and of magic, the status of husband and wife and of their respective 
families.’535 As an aspect of tribal life, the law, for Malinowski, was to ‘be found in 
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the customary practices that people actually follow in their social behaviour.’536 For 
Ehrlich, as we saw above, the enforcement mechanism at play here was to be found in 
social relations, while for Malinowski, it was to be found in ‘concatenation of the 
obligations, in the fact that they are arranged into chains of mutual services, a give 
and take extending over long periods of time and covering wide aspects of interest 
and activity.’537 In either case, what we can see in Malinowski, as in Ehrlich, Fuller, 
Petrazycki and others, is a deep interest in the location of law in actual and effective 
interaction amongst human beings.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these theorists have been criticised for producing a 
concept of law ‘of unrestricted scope, which tends towards absurdity by including all 
rules of conduct as law.’538 In answering this attack, some theorists, such as Alex 
Ziegert, have suggested that the conception is deliberately provocative in seeking to 
‘run counter to any experience of a lawyer.’539 In the context of the present 
discussion, however, what we may be entitled to say is that the very anxiety over the 
scope of a conception is an anxiety likely to afflict those working under the 
conception of law-as-discourse, in neat contradistinction to those attracted to law-as-
tradition.   
 
 
IB1d. Concepts of Legal Culture  
 
Caution is required when approaching the idea of legal culture. There are several 
possible ways of developing this concept. Indeed, there are also several ways of 
suggesting the different uses of the concept. One broad distinction sometimes made is 
between law-in-culture and law-as-culture – a distinction that mirrors the law-in-
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literature and law-as-literature division. Another set of distinctions would find the 
following uses of the concept: 1) one that focuses on the dependence of law on 
culture; 2) one that treats law as an expression of the culture at the relevant time; 3) 
one that argues that law emerges from a culture – that culture is in some sense the 
source of law; 4) one that observes and analyzes the attitudes to and beliefs about law 
amongst the citizenry; 5) one that considers the professional legal culture – of 
attitudes and beliefs about law amongst legal officials; and 6) a way of understanding 
legal work, namely as not a knowledge of the rules, but as a stock of  embodied skills 
and abilities that emerge over long periods of time in certain communities or 
institutions of legal professionals (including academics).  
The purpose of the discussion below, however, is not to provide an overview 
of the concept of legal culture. Such overviews have been provided before.540 Rather, 
it is to consider, in the writings of those who have used the concept, ideas and 
approaches that may bring to light some features of the law-as-tradition conception. 
As we shall see, some of the above aspects are at play in the various treatments of the 
idea of legal culture and by no means are all of them of relevance here.   
One source in which the opaqueness of the idea of legal culture is visible is 
that of the work of Friedrich Carl von Savigny, and the historical school of 
jurisprudence. Savigny argued that ‘Law grows with the growth, and strengthens with 
the strength, of the people.’541 On the other hand, he also, very famously, argued that 
law (together with language) was an expression of the volksgeist, the spirit of the 
people. As Cotterrell explains it, ‘the spirit of a nation or people is the encapsulation 
of its whole history, the collective experience of the social group extending back 
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through the ages of its existence.’542 Cotterrell suggests that the concept of culture 
used by Savigny was to be understood ‘in its widest anthropological sense’, i.e., as 
‘that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.’543 Savigny 
also famously used his theory to fight against the attempts at codification in Germany 
in the early nineteenth century. The proposed codification was, for him, ‘disastrous 
because it sought to fix in immutable principle legal ideas which, as an expression of 
culture, should be allowed to develop spontaneously.’544 At the same time, Savigny 
had a historical argument to the effect that where ‘customs’ were written down as 
‘rules’, it lost its character as custom.545 It also went arm-in-arm with ‘the rise of 
political authorities’ and with the increasing division of a society into class and 
functional subgroups, with the double effect that the ‘common consciousness of the 
people’ does not provide the same ‘impetus for the spontaneous creation of new law’ 
and the law that is enacted by authorities becomes so complex that it leaves that 
‘common consciousness’ far behind ‘the details and technicalities of the rules 
concerned.’546 Savigny’s conception is useful to take note of, not least because of its 
political uses, placing emphasis on the need for law to be adaptive, responsive and 
spontaneous. This is a theme that shall be returned to below (see section IB1i).   
Before turning to treatments of the legal culture that will be more useful for 
present purposes, it will be instructive to consider some examples where the use of the 
concept of legal culture resembles more closely ideas belonging to law-as-discourse 
conceptions. Doing so will also allow us to realise that conceptions of law-as-
discourse and law-as-tradition do not fit neatly into an analytical philosophy – 
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sociology divide. Many sociologists of law who speak of legal cultures work with a 
conception of law much closer to the conception of law-as-discourse. Consider, for 
example, Volkmar Gessner’s conception of legal culture.547 Although Gessner begins 
with a promising (for law-as-tradition pictures) concept of culture as consisting of 
both ‘learned behaviour, attitudes and values,’ as well as ‘institutionalised forms of 
individual responses’ (e.g., in families, enterprises, etc.), which, when repeated, lead 
to cultural stabilisation,548 his application of this legal culture does not move any 
further away from the law-as-discourse tradition as it might have. Thus, whereas 
Gessner’s general examples of the learned behaviour, attitudes and values includes 
learning ‘how to build houses, how to flirt with the other sex, how to treat foreigners, 
how to distinguish work and leisure’, etc.,549 his description of European legal culture 
is a description of the regulatory scope of European Community (as it then was) rules, 
and observations of such activities as the ‘systemisation of the new European 
normative order’ by legal science.550 
Another example is the well-known work of Lawrence Friedman – sometimes 
called ‘the acknowledged father of the term’ legal culture.551 Legal culture, for 
Friedman, are ‘the ideas, values, attitudes and opinions, people in some society hold, 
with regard to law, and the legal system.’552 However, Friedman goes further; he goes 
on to say that ‘legal culture is the source of law – its norms create the legal norms; 
and it is what determines the impact of legal norms on society.’553 This thesis flows 
for Friedman from the observation that the subjects of law, persons, ‘are not robots or 
inert lumps of clay; they are living human beings, with thoughts, ideas, minds, habits, 
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behaviours; they react to orders and institutions of law, and their reactions determine 
the effect of these orders and institutions.’554 Friedman’s conclusion, and the clearest 
statement of his conception of legal culture, is as follows: 
In short, legal culture is a kind of intervening variable. Social forces make law, 
but they do not make it directly. A war or a depression, a technological change 
(the computer, the telephone) – these do not automatically result in shifts in 
the legal order. What they do, rather, is to change the social configuration, the 
way things are in the world, or in some society; this in turn changes the way 
people see their society, the things they expect from it. And this then changes 
their orientation toward law as well.555 
 
As may have become obvious, despite the usage of some ideas belonging to law-as-
tradition conceptions, Friedman is working not only with a conception of law as a 
realm of articulated norms, but has also inherited a problem typical of law-as-
discourse conceptions, namely, the problem of the source of law. It would not be 
productive to list other examples, although there are many, not only of those 
discourse-oriented conceptions of legal culture, but also of legal tradition.556  
The views of Gessner and Friedman – at least in the no doubt unfair 
caricatures offered here – are not representative views of law-as-tradition, despite 
their uses of the term itself or its obvious analogues (i.e., culture). To say this, of 
course, is not to criticise their views – on the contrary, it is to express a limitation of 
the process of coming to understand the history of jurisprudential inquiries, i.e., of 
establishing distinctions and oppositions (such as that between law-as-discourse and 
law-as-tradition) that makes one see certain features of certain contributions as more 
salient than others. For present purposes, then, more luck is to be found in the writings 
of Jeremy Webber, David Nelken and Roger Cotterrell.   
In his reply to Nelken’s overview and use of the concept of legal culture, 
Jeremy Webber offers a summary of his own view, expressed in greater length in 
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other writings.557 Webber is responding to Nelken’s broad definition of legal culture. 
Legal culture, Nelken had suggested, ‘is one way of describing relatively stable 
patterns of legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes.’558 The elements of legal 
culture so conceived may include ‘the number and role of lawyers or the way judges 
are appointed and controlled’ as well as ‘various forms of behaviour such as litigation 
or prison rates’, and ‘ideas, values, aspirations and mentalities.’559 Webber argues that 
there are two aspects of the concept that are at play here – once again, an illustration 
of the conceptual difficulties at play in the concept of legal culture.  
The first, says Webber, treats culture as an ‘explanatory concept’; the second 
as an ‘interpretive one.’560 The explanatory aspect ‘treats culture as a discrete 
explanatory variable alongside such other causal factors as institutional structure or 
the funding of the courts’, and here the central question is ‘what contribution does 
culture make to a particular outcome?’561 The interpretive aspect, on other hand, 
‘treats culture as an aggregating concept, capturing everything relevant to the 
operation of law in a specific social field’ – it becomes, in other words, ‘a vision of 
the whole’, so that factors treated as separate in the explanatory aspect, such as levels 
of funding, institutional structure or number of judges, are ‘under the second treated 
as components of culture.’562 In his paper, Webber attempts to reconcile the 
interpretive and explanatory aspects into a version he thinks both implicitly underlines 
Nelken’s use of the concept of legal culture and also better captures his own.  
What is of note for present purposes is the way Webber uses the interpretive 
dimension of the concept of culture to bring out the dynamics of social life. The 
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interpretative aspect, for Webber, focuses on the ‘way in which participants draw 
lessons from the contexts in which the act and shape their conduct accordingly.’563 He 
calls it the ‘process of institutional feedback – of normative reflection and re-
incorporation – in which all social actors engage.’564 The distinctiveness of the 
concept of culture, at least in this interpretive dimension, consists in the 
‘intersubjective dimension of human understanding’ – a process of making sense of 
social interaction, of constructing meaning and the influence of those constructions 
(or interpretations) on action565 – which, importantly, ‘derives not just from the body 
of articulated concepts and beliefs one inherits, but also from the patterns of 
interaction existing in any society, even when these have not been articulated in 
conceptual terms or when they remain the subject of only partial and pragmatic 
articulation.’566  
The interpretive concept of legal culture is not designed, Webber argues, to 
capture ‘a single, constant and bounded content – for example, a specific set of beliefs 
that all members of that culture hold in common.’567 On the contrary, ‘the concept 
focuses…on the processes by which individuals draw on what has gone before, 
confront new experience, revise their preconceptions, and fashion through (often 
through collective discussion and debate) how to proceed.’568 We may recognise this 
sense of dynamism in other terms used by those working under the conception of law-
as-tradition, e.g., efficacy. Indeed, Nelken himself, writing soon after Webber’s reply, 
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says that at work in the concept of legal culture may be ‘the very idea that law is 
something which does or should work.’569 
It is also important to see that this dynamism is only visible over long periods 
of time: it is not, in other words, a matter of compliance, as the very idea of efficacy 
might be interpreted by law-as-discourse conceptions – thereby, once again, revealing 
the tendency to reify norms, to use norms as if they unproblematically picked out 
features of human behaviour (i.e., that it is straightforward whether some behaviour 
complies or not, rather than always a judgement made in certain circumstances), and 
to focus on short-term action (rather than long-term activities). Thus, Webber argues, 
‘the degree of commonality – the depth and richness of the particular culture – will be 
shaped by the intensity of interaction over time’, with the proviso that we can 
recognise that ‘any pattern of sustained interaction will produce its own distinctive 
vernaculars.’570  
In a way that resembles, as we shall soon see, Cotterrell’s notion of law-and-
community, Webber’s understanding of contexts of interaction is broad. It includes 
any ‘context that involves repeated social interaction over time’, including 
workplaces, neighbourhoods, cities, families, religions, states, and so on.571 And 
because we all participate in many of these, often times simultaneously, the 
boundaries of such ‘cultures’ are ‘going to be indistinct and porous.’572 However, as is 
typical of law-as-tradition conceptions, Webber does not display any anxiety over the 
difficulty or impossibility of clear and distinct demarcation. Instead, he says: 
The concept of culture is not so much a way of identifying highly specified 
and tightly bounded units of analysis…as a heuristic device for suggesting 
how individual decision-making is conditioned by the language of normative 
discussion, the set of historical reference points, the range of solutions 
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proposed in the past, the institutional norms taken for granted, given a 
particular context of repeated social interaction.573  
 
What we can see, then, in Webber, as in other law-as-tradition conceptions, is the 
disappearance, or at least much stifled voice, of the ontological ambition, replaced by 
the interest in the epistemological dimension (indeed, it is no coincidence that 
following the above general summary of culture Webber applies it to theories of legal 
reasoning), though understood dynamically as a matter of transmission of embodied 
skills, habits and dispositions emerging over long periods of time in patterns of 
interaction (hence the need, also, for a broader term than ‘legal reasoning’, i.e., legal 
work). As we shall see later, these ideas are at the heart of the conception of legal-
work-as-tradition, but are also indicative of the artificiality of the ontological-
epistemological distinction in jurisprudential inquiries, where, depending on the 
explanatory orientation, either one or the other disappears. 
Cotterrell’s instructive paper, ‘Law in Culture’, begins by noting the opacity 
of the concept of legal culture, locating at least six different uses, including: 1) law’s 
dependence on culture; 2) law’s recognition of culture; 3) law’s domination of 
culture; 4) law as an object of cultural competition or struggle; 5) law as a cultural 
projection; and 6) and law’s stewardship of culture.574 Cotterrell’s task in the paper is 
to take what he finds as most persuasive in certain of the above treatments of the 
concept to explain his own notion of law-and-community. Some of these features 
include ‘a sense of shared cultural inheritance of some kind’, ‘a sense of convergence 
or commonality in ways of thinking, commitments, outlooks or attitudes’, all of which 
may also be infused with ‘an effective (emotional)’ element.575 Echoing Fuller, 
Cotterrell says that this vision of culture helps to avoid seeing law as ‘a technical 
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instrument of control.’576 It helps us, instead, Cotterrell says, to see it as ‘part of a way 
of life, a means of interpreting social relationships, a component of an entire outlook, 
deeply rooted in all kinds of experience (not just juristic).’577 Further, it helps us to 
avoid wanting to see it as a unity, and accepting instead ‘a fragmented diversity of 
influences, experiences, understandings, environments, expectations, and 
constraints.’578 
As mentioned above, Cotterrell prefers to use the term community rather than 
culture. His views in this respect are complex and span a sizeable literature in its own 
right.579 He speaks, for example, of various ideal types of community, such as 
communities of belief or value, traditional communities, affective communities, and 
instrumental communities. The concept of community, then, allows him to distinguish 
between kinds of interaction that he believes the ‘“blanket” category of culture’ 
cannot.580 At bottom, however, his definition of his law-and-community approach 
uses many of the ideas he takes, as above, to be most persuasive in uses of the concept 
of culture. Thus, he says, that the ‘law-and-community approach sees law as rooted in 
community life; as an ever-changing web of norms expressing and influencing the 
interactions of many different networks of community.’581 It is important to 
acknowledge, as well, that Cotterrell’s work contains elements that fall under both 
law-as-tradition and law-as-discourse conceptions. In the context of his work on law-
and-community, for example, he often uses the concept of law as if it had its own 
autonomous life, not only constituted by, but also constitutive of social reality. Thus, 
he says, ‘Law is not neutral about’ the above-mentioned networks of community; ‘it 
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judges the particular norms arising in them, in terms of its existing doctrine, and it 
represses, adopts, integrates, modifies, or comprises these norms.’582 Section IC3 will 
return to reading a certain aspect of Cotterrell’s work by reference to ideas falling 
under both conceptions.  
 
IB1e. The Turn to Activities  
Although one must be careful – as we saw above with respect to uses of the concept 
of legal culture – it would certainly be amiss for a discussion of the conception of 
law-as-discourse to neglect to discuss legal theorists who themselves had had recourse 
to the term ‘tradition.’ There are two contemporary legal theorists who have had 
recourse to term, and who, more significantly, have used it in a way that will help us 
bring out some features of the law-as-tradition conception. The first, discussed in this 
section, is that of John Bell and the second, considered in the next, is Martin Krygier.  
John Bell has also made extensive use of the concept of legal culture. Indeed, 
recourse shall be had in section IB2c below (‘Institutional Contexts’) to his important 
recent book, Judiciaries Within Europe,583 which itself leans on the conceptual 
apparatus first articulated at length in his French Legal Cultures.584 In the paper that 
will form the present focus of the discussion, Bell prefers the concept of ‘law as 
tradition.’585 The paper sets out to ‘draw from the methodology of comparative law 
some lessons for a general theory law’ – lessons which lead Bell, ultimately, to the 
suggestion that ‘law is best viewed as a tradition within a legal community, rather 
than essentially as rules or norms of conduct.’586 Drawing partly on Patrick Atiyah’s 
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and Robert Summers’ Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law,587 Bell asserts 
that ‘rules function and operate as part of a tradition of legal ways of doing things 
which has various complex relations to the kind of society in which it operates and the 
functions it accords to law.’588 In making this remark, Bell articulates a central plank 
of the law-as-tradition conception, namely, the characterisation of rules and other 
abstract phenomena as subsumed not only under ways of doing, abilities and skills, 
but also within the context of particular institutions or communities, and visible as 
such only over relatively long periods of time.  
Bell’s notion of tradition is, however, yet richer. He argues that it has three 
features: ‘it is a process in which actors are engaged, it sets the context for decision-
making, and it is a group of people engaged in the activity of the tradition and shaping 
it.’589 Further, tradition does not signify the ‘inertia of routine’, and it is not inherently 
conservative. On the contrary, at least according to Bell, tradition ‘has a dynamic and 
life-giving possibility.’590 Bell’s clearest statement of the definition of tradition is ‘as 
a complex of rules, concepts, institutions, and practices which characterise the way 
law works in a particular area’,591 but one ought not take the reference to rules, for 
example, as in any way part of an ambition to focus on the articulated norms valid at 
any one time in a legal system. Rather, as Bell is at pains to point out, all these 
features (rules, concepts, etc.) ‘build together into a process’; as above, they are ‘ways 
of doing things, which is handed down and shapes the way in which the law 
operates.’592 
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Importantly, then, Bell does not neglect the importance of legal textual 
materials. Instead, he incorporates them into a broader vision. In this respect, he 
reminds us that just as law-as-discourse is not to be confused with the identification of 
law with articulated norms alone, so law-as-tradition conceptions are not ones that 
apply or seek to explain law in the absence of authoritative texts. Bell’s discussion 
here takes us somewhat further into legal-work-as-tradition conceptions, but as noted 
above, this is inevitable – it is inevitable in the same way that law-as-discourse 
conceptions exhausted a good deal of the legal-work-as-discourse picture.  
Bell acknowledges that ‘the central feature of most modern legal systems is 
the text – of statute, case-law or legal doctrine’, and he acknowledges that the 
‘activity of reading and interpreting these texts is central to the activity of law.’593 
Importantly, however, he places more explanatory priority on the activity of reading 
and writing rather than on the alleged inherent properties or characteristics of the 
texts. Furthermore, he places these activities in long-term temporal contexts, as well 
as social and institutional spaces, or, in other words, forums for the interaction of the 
present between past and future.  
Bell also acknowledges that ‘different geography’ (echoing Montesquieu, who 
is, however, not referred to in Bell’s paper), ‘historical accident’, as well as 
differences in ‘ideas of justice’ can lead to very different solutions, in different legal 
traditions, to similar problems.594 In essence, for Bell, the tradition is ‘the practice of 
people who operate and perpetuate the tradition.’595 ‘Law’, he says, ‘is what specific 
institutions and professions do, and how they operate’596 and again ‘law is what 
                                                
593 Ibid., 26. 
594 The idea that legal problem in different legal traditions may be similar is controversial, and has been 
discussed by proponents and critiques of functionalism in comparative law. This is a topic that falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
595 Ibid., 29. 
596 Id. 
 158 
lawyers do.’597 There could be no clearer illustration of the disappearance of the 
ontological ambition and the prioritisation of the epistemological level of explanation. 
Helpfully for present purposes, Bell distinguishes, though in a characteristically 
modest fashion, his approach from numerous ideas revealed above to fall under the 
law-as-discourse paradigm: 
It is, of course, possible and valuable to analyse law in terms of the reasons for 
action it provides, or in terms of its paradigm role within society: providing 
stability and state coercion, or guiding individual conduct in situations of 
problems of coordination. Various legal theorists have done so. This paper has 
been suggesting that, if we want to look at the phenomenon of law in its own 
right, then we are best focusing on it as a tradition situated among a legal 
community which both mediates its pastness to the present, and offers an 
authoritative standard for its interpretation and development.598  
 
In more recent work, Bell has continued to focus on the activities of legal officials in 
institutional contexts, and it would be a worthwhile project, though it falls outside the 
scope of this thesis, to examine the links between the concept of law-as-tradition in 
the paper discussed here, and his subsequent work on the judiciary.599  
 
IB1f. The Authoritative Presence of the Past  
Apart from Bell, the other prominent legal theorist who uses the term ‘tradition’ – and 
is perhaps better known for it than Bell (who also acknowledges him) – is Martin 
Krygier. The papers focussed on here are ‘Law as Tradition’600 and ‘the Traditionality 
of Statutes.’601  
Krygier begins the former by lamenting the lack of concepts in legal theory 
‘which address the traditionality of law and life.’602 He does not denigrate, but he does 
distinguish his own position, from those traditions of legal theory that have conceived 
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of law ‘as a species of…commands, norms, rules, rules-and-principles, principles and 
policies, and so on.’603 In its most general terms, his position, or more accurately, his 
‘project’ is as follows: 
Law is a profoundly traditional social practice, and it must be. This is not 
merely to say that particular legal systems embody traditions, which of course 
no one would deny. To understand much that is most central to and 
characteristic of the nature and behaviour of law, the ‘time-free’ staples of 
modern jurisprudence are not enough. One needs to understand the nature and 
behaviour of traditions in social life.604 
 
Krygier acknowledges the project of conveying law’s traditionality is a large one, and 
he confines himself in the paper to examining three of its elements: the first element 
refers to the pervasiveness of traditionality in legal systems; the second refers to the 
presence of change within the very concept of traditionality; and the third refers to the 
notion that ‘tradition is inescapable in law’ and that although not always, this is 
‘frequently…a good thing.’605 In order to establish the first of these, Krygier posits 
three characteristics of tradition: 1) its pastness; 2) its authoritative presence; and 3) 
the fact that it is transmitted. Each will need to be considered very briefly.  
‘Every tradition’, says Krygier, ‘is composed of elements drawn from the real 
or imagined past.’606 This pastness may be composed of ‘beliefs, opinions, values, 
decisions, myths, rituals’, all deposited over generations, and all, importantly for 
present purposes, ‘frequently inconsistent.’607 The institutionalisation of these 
deposits – in the form of written recordings of them, some classified as authoritative, 
others persuasive – is not a necessary, but nevertheless is an important feature of 
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many legal systems. This pastness also has a power in the present, though this power 
‘is not absolute’,608 if only because ‘the past speaks with many voices.’609  
Krygier’s identification of the inevitability of inconsistency or incoherence is 
important – certainly it tends to be a feature not feared by law-as-tradition 
conceptions, unlike law-as-discourse ones – but it is also significant that Krygier 
argues that sometimes these inconsistencies ‘amount to a crisis’ and sometimes they 
do not, and that when this occurs is an important question for legal and social 
theory.610  
The second feature of tradition is that of its authoritative presence. This notion 
emerges from contrasts, such as the notion that ‘much of the past enters into no 
tradition’, and a lot that does is not necessarily authoritative.611 In law, Krygier 
continues, ‘the past has profound present significance’, and this present significance 
or this authoritativeness manifests itself in two ways: it can be ‘known or thought to 
be the past’, or it can be ‘unnoticed by participants.’612 The latter is of particular 
interest to law-as-tradition conceptions. ‘The past’, says Krygier, ‘is often most 
powerfully and pervasively present when it is not known to be past or present.’613 In 
this latter sense, Krygier strays into a discussion that is also relevant for legal-work-
as-tradition conceptions, or the epistemological level of tradition-oriented explanatory 
paradigms. He cites, with approval, Watson’s suggestion that ‘to know a legal system 
is not just to have learned its rules but to understand how the rules are put together, 
how the system is structured, how the rules are interpreted.’614 Krygier calls such 
knowledge ‘tacit knowledge’, and in elaborating upon this notion, he acknowledges 
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the work of Michel Polanyi,615 as well as the legal scholar and comparativist Bernard 
Rudden. The latter is approvingly quoted to have observed the following:  
Not only is the individual judge conditioned by his background, but...the 
decades, or even centuries, of a traditional training, of particular methods of 
recruitment, even of the physical characteristics of the place where the job is 
done, create a corpus of professional habits and assumptions which affects 
judicial method and, through it, the legal order, and so all the more stronger 
for being so rarely made articulate.616  
 
Interestingly, Krygier characterises this picture of legal knowledge to be analogous to 
the knowledge human beings have for ‘knowing and understanding a language.’617 
Knowing language, in this sense, is to have the ability to use it; what explains the 
process of communication is not some inherent property or properties of language 
itself, but our abilities, which are both constrained and enabled – indeed, enabled in 
being constrained – by the authoritative presence of language as a mode of 
communication. ‘Language’, says Michael Oakeshott as cited by Krygier, ‘is not a 
fixed stock of possible utterances, but a fund of considerations drawn upon and used 
in inventing utterances; a fund which may be used only in virtue of having been 
learned, which is learned only in being used, and which is continuously reconstituted 
in use.’618 What is significant here is the explanatory priority given to the concept of 
learning – a concept that itself necessarily relies on a temporality level of explanation 
as stretching out over time, and thus not merely the action of a mind (leading, say, to a 
mental state consisting of a proposition or set of propositions), but rather of an 
activity, embodied and affective, that infuses and influences future behaviour in ways 
that the actor may not at all be aware of.    
At first blush, one might think that the notion of ‘learning’ links in neatly with 
the notion of ‘transmission’, the third general feature of tradition according to 
                                                
615 See, Polanyi 1967. 
616 Rudden quoted in Krygier 1986a, 247; see also, Rudden 1974.  
617 Krygier 1986a, 247. 
618 Oakeshott quoted in Ibid., 248. 
 162 
Krygier. However, transmission, in Krygier’s sense, and in the context of the legal 
systems he is interested in examining, refers to the ‘sophisticated and complex means 
of recording, preserving, editing and transmitting a legally authorized past for present 
and future use.’619 Krygier’s elaboration here is brief, and it is unclear what is the 
relationship in his account between the notion of ‘learning’ – itself a kind of ‘passing 
on’, a mode of transmission – and the ‘formalisation and institutionalisation,’ as he 
himself puts it,620 of law. Again, as we have seen throughout, it matters a great deal 
for legal theories just where they place their explanatory priority: on the ‘ability’ of 
the text itself to be transmitted to future generations, or on the practices of persons 
that are at best nourished by texts, producing, as Krygier himself puts it, and thus in 
keeping with Bell and Geoffrey Samuel, ‘substance, models, exemplars and a 
language in which to speak within and about law.’621   
Such are the three elements of tradition that together assist Krygier to illustrate 
the pervasiveness of traditionality in law. The second and third parts of Krygier’s 
paper, to recall, are the presence of change in the very notion of tradition, and the 
inescapability of tradition in law. The second is designed to defend the concept of 
tradition against the charge of conservatism. It is an ironic charge given that, as we 
shall see (in section IB1i), law-as-tradition conceptions, at least as characterised here, 
tend to argue for the importance of spontaneity, adaptation and responsiveness. 
Krygier fights off this ‘Enlightenment’ misunderstanding of tradition by arguing that 
‘it is impossible for traditions to survive unchanged’,622 and that ‘even in traditions 
which permit no such change, it occurs, always and inevitably.’623 Indeed, this 
observation goes hand-in-hand with the earlier one that most of what is authoritatively 
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present is not accessed by us self-consciously, with the result that the most important 
changes may be ones we are, perhaps necessarily, unaware of. Finally, it is also an 
observation that is supported by an epistemological explanation that points to the 
active, rather than passive, dimensions of the life of the law, i.e., as Krygier puts it, 
‘the interpreter is not a passive recipient of meanings. He is active in seeing to 
understand them in terms of what he knows, values, understands, and seeks to do with 
them’,624 the point also being that he or she may not be aware of that which he or she 
‘knows, values, understands and seeks.’  
Indeed, the above points are related to the third part of Krygier’s discussion, 
namely, that of the inescapability of tradition in law. So, Krygier remarks, ‘the major 
cognitive contribution of transmitted inherited tradition is, at were, to have done our 
thinking for us and to have done it ahead of time.’625 It is an illusion – sometimes used 
for ideological purposes626 – to think that we start afresh. Traditions provide us, says 
Krygier, ‘with storehouses of possibly relevant analogies’,627 i.e., salience, our always 
and already being oriented in some specific way, is deeply historical, deeply 
embedded in us, as a result of the ‘when, where and with whom’ we learnt, and 
although not determinative of future actions, it is, in this sense, simultaneously 
inescapable.  
In his later ‘Traditionality of Statutes’, Krygier continues to press home the 
point that his thesis is not merely that ‘law includes traditions’, but that ‘legal systems 
should be understood as traditions.’628 Further, and as with Sacco, Krygier is at pains 
to point out that his thesis is not to be geographically and historically delimited, i.e., 
that it applies equally to all legal systems, and that it ought not to be thought that it is 
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only capable of explaining the phenomena of custom, case law and precedents, but, 
just as well, contemporary statutes. Krygier presents the ‘submergence’, in 
contemporary times, of both common and civil law systems in statutory law as a 
challenge for his concept of traditionality, which, to recall, he defines as ‘the 
authoritative presence of real and purported past.’629  
Krygier does not depart from a characterisation of statutes as ‘deliberately 
made…at a particular time’, possessing a ‘legal authority’ that ‘stems from formal 
sources not historical origins.’630 He does not disagree with views that suggest that 
statutes ‘need not refer to what went before’ or that they ‘can change the legal 
landscape swiftly, radically and broadly.’631 The kernel of his argument for the 
traditionality of statutes lies in the idea that statutes are ‘situated in and deeply 
affected by contexts which they presuppose, from which they cannot escape, and 
which make it possible for them to have such effects as they do.’632 For Krygier, the 
‘facts’ that statutes are ‘conceived and born into a world they did not make’ and that 
‘they are designed to control the behaviour of large numbers of people, in a variety of 
circumstances, that they do not know’ have important consequences.633 
What do statutes presuppose? First of all, and most obviously, they presuppose 
language – but it is important to see that language, for Krygier as for other tradition-
oriented theories, is made up of activities, i.e., ‘ways of speaking and writing, and 
ways of thinking about, reading, interpreting…etc.’634 Conceptualising language in 
this manner also makes it inseparable from the ‘particular community of speakers and 
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readers’ from which the statute emerges.635 In the case of statutes, which use ‘legal 
language,’ their meaning is given life, and dwells in the activities of, the particular 
community of lawyers who, often and at least sometimes necessarily without any 
awareness or self-consciousness, use ‘conventions’ containing ‘expectations’ (e.g., 
about how some term or phrase is used).636 Statutes also presuppose the entire 
panoply of ‘substantive law, procedures, remedies, methods of interpretation’, such 
that even if may be correct to say that the ‘Code’ itself does not ‘depend upon pre-
existing law’, nevertheless its ‘content almost invariably does’,637 meaning that 
without being able to ‘be made to fit the existing canon’ the statute will have a 
difficult time playing the role it is designed by the legislators to play.   
Although there are elements here of the tradition-oriented explanation (e.g., 
the explanation of language via activities and ways of doing, and the 
acknowledgement of a lack of self-conscious awareness of those conventions), it is 
important to note that certain other features may more readily strike us as discourse-
like, e.g., the idea of a statute fitting in coherently into a whole web of law. The fact 
that Krygier argues that, following James Boyd White, those rules are ‘invisible’, is 
indicative of the grip of the discourse conception. Indeed, Boyd White’s term for such 
rule structures that govern the language that statutes presuppose – a term that Krygier 
endorses and uses – is ‘invisible discourses.’638   
Krygier’s contribution to law-as-tradition conceptions is important. His focus 
on the presuppositions of statutory law answers a common rebuttal to such 
conceptions, namely, that they are but of historical interest in applying to, say, 
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customary law or so-called judge-made law. The notion of tradition has been echoed 
by others who have focused on problems of interpretation – Krygier himself reminds 
us some of these figures when he quotes Hans-Georg Gadamer,639 and Gerald Burns, 
the latter of whom echoes the former when he says:  
Tradition is the mode of being of the law. The law comes down to us from the 
past, that is, from a world of situations different from our own, and our 
hermeneutical task is to determine the applicability of the law to the situation 
in which we now find ourselves, where we are called upon to address issues 
and resolve dilemmas that are particular to the moment at hand, or where we 
are required to provide for what the law, up until now, had never foreseen.640  
 
A good many of these contributions have remained within the idea of interpretative 
communities (Burns, for example, offers a combination of Dworkin and Gadamer, 
and the other well known example here, as we know from above, is Fish), but though 
Krygier does place some emphasis on interpretative communities, he does not rely on 
them exclusively. What is more significant for present purposes is the more general 
strategy Krygier utilises, i.e., explaining statutory law by giving priority to activities 
and ways of doing. Language here is not conceived of as independently existing 
structure, but rather as something deeply embedded, and deeply reliant, on the 
dynamism of activities and ways of doing that are themselves only visible in the 
context of generous time-frames, transmissions, i.e., of the authoritative presence of 
the past.  
 
 
IB1g. Customary Law and the Common Law 
 
At first blush, a promising resource for law-as-tradition conceptions might seem to be 
the philosophy of customary law and the philosophy of the common law. The two are 
discussed together, for, at least in a good deal of Anglo-American legal theory, the 
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first has been seen to be a subset of the latter. William Blackstone, for example, 
insisted that we see the common law as an ‘ancient collection of unwritten maxims 
and customs.’641 The source focused on here, Brian Simpson’s ‘Common Law and 
Legal Theory’,642 follows on in Blackstone’s footsteps. Of course, as usual, the aim is 
not to be comprehensive. The aim is merely to consider Simpson’s paper, as at least 
partly representative of the wider literature, looking out for features of the law-as-
tradition conception. In focusing exclusively on Simpson, other important works will 
not be able to be considered, e.g., including such important individual contributions as 
Gerald Postema’s Bentham and the Common Law Tradition,643 Harold Berman’s Law 
and Revolution: the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition,644 and J.H. Baker’s 
The Law’s Two Bodies,645 and collections as Folk Law: Essays in the Theory and 
Practice of Lex Non Scripta646 and more recently, The Nature of Customary Law: 
Legal, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives.647 
Simpson begins his paper with a complaint that there has been ‘to date no very 
satisfactory analysis of the nature of the common law…provided by legal theory; 
indeed’, he suggests, ‘the matter [has] received remarkably little sustained attention 
by theoretical writers.’648 Where it has, at least been commented on, as in the work of 
Kelsen, common law is conceived of, according to Simpson, under two assumptions: 
first, it is said that the norms of the common law are, like statutory law, posited. In the 
words of Kelsen himself, ‘since custom is constituted by human acts, even norms 
created by custom are created by acts of human behaviour, and are therefore like the 
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norms which are the subjective meaning of legislative acts – “posited” or “positive” 
norms.’649 Second, it is thought that all law, including common law, is to be 
‘identified with a notional set of propositions which embody the corpus of rules, 
principles, commands, norms, maxims, or whatever, which have, at any given time, 
been laid down’ – law, it seems, however we look it, is a ‘sort of code.’650 As 
Simpson notes, ‘combining these two assumptions…the common law must be 
conceived of as existing as a set or code of rules which have been laid down by 
somebody or other, and which owe their status as law to the fact that they have been 
so laid down.’651 We are thereby led, says Simpson, ‘to conceive of the common law, 
somewhat perversely, as if it had already been codified, when we know it has not.’652  
It would certainly make life simpler – says Simpson, not without a sense of 
mischief, for he is clearly addressing what he sees as the legal positivistic inability to 
capture the nature of the common law – ‘if the common law consisted of a code of 
rules, identifiable by reference to source rules, but’, he says, ‘the reality of the matter 
is that it is all much more chaotic than that, and the only way to make the common 
law conform the [positivistic] ideal would be to codify the system, which would then 
cease to be common law at all.’653 Bentham was perhaps, and characteristically, the 
most vehement critic of this ‘chaos’ of the common law, calling it ‘a fiction from 
beginning to end’; ‘mock-law’, ‘sham-law’, ‘quasi-law’; no more than a ‘mischievous 
delusion.’654 It is, as we have seen, one of the hallmarks of the law-as-discourse 
conception, to fear the inconsistency, disorder or incoherence of a system of norms. 
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Simpson endeavours, however, to face the ‘chaos’ and to offer what he 
describes as a non-positivistic conception of the common law. In doing so, he calls on 
the assistance of two theorists – most commonly now only attended to by legal 
historians: Sir Mathew Hale and the above-mentioned William Blackstone. As 
Simpson notes, Hale divided the law of England into the lex scripta and the lex non 
scripta: where the former was restricted to statutes, the latter included ‘not only 
general customs, or the common law properly so called, but even those particular laws 
and customs applicable to certain courts and persons.’655 Blackstone’s view was 
similar; he categorised three kinds of unwritten or common law: ‘1. General Customs, 
which are the universal rule of the whole kingdom and form the common law, in its 
stricter and more usual signification. 2. Particular customs which for the most part 
affect only the inhabitants of particular districts. 3. Certain particular laws; which by 
custom are adopted and used by some particular courts, of pretty general and 
extensive jurisdiction.’656  
Of course, Simpson is quick to point out – in keeping with Blackstone – that 
not all the rules of the common law are customary, in the sense of regularly observed 
practices, such as that of drinking the health of the Queen after dinner.657 However, 
where they are not – such as the rule against perpetuities, or the doctrine of 
anticipatory breach – their authority nevertheless rests ‘entirely upon general 
reception and usage.’658 Unlike in the law-as-discourse paradigm, then, what is 
prioritised here is the value of efficacy. As has already been seen from the opening 
salvo provided by a discussion of Sacco, under the conception of law-as-discourse the 
gap between law and enforcement disappears. Whether one dubs it living law, mute 
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law, or customary law, under the law-as-tradition conception law is already built with 
a normative engine. 
However, what one notices in discussions of customary law is that unlike in 
some other theories said here to fall under the law-as-tradition conception, the validity 
problem does not disappear. On the contrary, it begins to acquire such proportions 
that it threatens any non-discourse like treatment of custom. Even if one states, as 
Blackstone does above, that the authority of a norm rests entirely upon usage, by 
introducing the problem of authority – by demanding the examination of the authority 
of the norm (which is more authoritative, indeed one might even say, obtains its 
power from the fact that, it is not examined, that it is simply accepted), one begins to 
treat custom outside of the realm in which it is most comfortable (i.e., the realm of 
tradition). Thus, one may argue, for example, in the following terms: it is the efficacy 
of a practice that is said to lead to the validity of the norm; it is not the validity of the 
norm that, say, demands or requires it be adopted in practice. In saying so, one might 
be giving a reasonably accurate picture of customary law, but by importing the very 
idea of validity, the essence of the idea of efficacy (i.e., not being problematised, its 
authority not called for to be justified) begins to disappear.  
Let us return to Simpson. Though sympathetic to Blackstone and Hale, 
Simpson does distance himself somewhat from them. He does so primarily on the 
grounds that the view of these earlier theorists is not conducive to identifying ‘the 
theoretical propositions of the common law – putative formulations of these ideas and 
practices.’659 Seeking to bring a sense of cohesion to what he calls the ‘customary 
system’, Simpson asks us to accept that the ideas and practices of the common law 
‘exist only in the sense that they are accepted and acted upon within the legal 
                                                
659 Ibid., 134. 
 171 
profession…and transmitted both by example and precept as membership of the group 
changes.’660 A large part of Simpson’s motivation is the viability of a scholarly study 
of customary law: he cites, as a welcome example, D.A. Thomas’s Principles of 
Sentencing,661 which published ‘in comprehensive literary form the customary laws of 
the criminal appeal in England.’662 He expresses anxiety about the extent of 
disagreement, and on the lack of procedures for establishing consensus. Accordingly, 
he calls for the student of the common law not merely to study the common law 
scientifically, but to participate in it: a form of engagement with the common law that, 
particularly in tightly cohesive groups of professionals, is more likely to lead to a 
cohesive picture of the common law. He points out that the increasing popularity of 
citation rules in the common law is a result of a much larger community of judges 
(rather than the twelve men in scarlet of past times); for, as he notes, where 
‘agreement and consensus actually exist, no such rules’, as to the proper sources of 
the common law, are needed.663  
On one reading, what Simpson is wrestling with here is the lack of any 
conceptual and methodological tools within legal theory and legal scholarship for any 
account of customary law that does not subsume them under concepts and methods 
better suited (in his view) to legal textual materials, such as statutes. Such a reading, 
however, would assume that that is indeed the best or only way to imagine statutes, 
and we have already seen from the previous sections that there are many other ways 
to incorporate textual resources, such as statutes, under a law-as-tradition conception. 
But Simpson could also be said to be struggling with something arguably more 
fundamental, something about the nature of theoretical practice itself. In making 
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custom an object of inquiry, a theoretician already sets out to make explicit that 
which, to retain its peculiar mode of existence, must remain implicit. However one 
reads it, though, what one can witness in Simpson’s discussion of the treatment of 
customary law are the basic features of both law-as-tradition and law-as-discourse 
conceptions in tension with each other. Although this cannot be illustrated here, one 
can also see these tensions at play in the most recent collection devoted to the topic.664    
 
 
IB1h. Pluralism, Process and Evolution 
 
Before turning to the promised discussion of the political life of the law-as-tradition 
conception, it would be amiss not to mention a number of other resources of the law-
as-tradition conception that have received little attention so far. Although one can 
remain reasonably confident that a good many of the principal features of the law-as-
tradition conception have been unearthed in the above sections, a more elaborate 
discussion would need to investigate the burgeoning literature of legal pluralism, 
evolutionary jurisprudence, the process theory of law, some versions of natural law, 
and other individual figures, such as Sir Henry Maine and Emile Durkheim. A few 
brief comments on these will be in order. 
The contemporary legal pluralist literature is significant not only because 
many of the figures considered above, such as Ehrlich, have been discussed, and 
interpreted, within it in specific ways. The legal pluralist literature is at crossroads 
both political and philosophical – the first because of the fight, even within the ranks 
of legal pluralists, as to how much explanatory priority should be given to the state,665 
and the second, as to how to deal with the implications of globalisation and its alleged 
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production of various kinds of supra-national or trans-national legal orders.666 Of 
course, the very term ‘legal pluralist literature’ ought not to mistake us into thinking it 
all deals with the same kinds of problems, uses the same kinds of methods, and finds 
the same phenomena particularly revealing. On the back of a section dealing with 
customary law, it will be useful to note here that Tamanaha distinguishes between two 
kinds of legal pluralist movements: the ‘older version which refers to the 
incorporation of customary law regimes in colonial and post-colonial legal systems; 
and the newer version which refers to the coexistence of more than one legal system 
in all social arenas.’667 
One should also not think that all of legal pluralist literature would fall under 
the explanatory paradigm of law-as-tradition. One must, as the above sections have 
tried to, look more carefully at the underlying explanatory tendencies in theoretical 
inquiries. Consider, for example, Cotterrell’s recent division of approaches to legal 
pluralism.668 He presents them as four, but reluctantly (in a footnote), acknowledges a 
fifth: 1) monistic; 2) agnostic; 3) statist; 4) conventionalist; and 5) his own, 
community-based approach. The monist approach, signified by Kelsen, argues that 
‘there must be a single criterion of law to be applied to the diversity of legal regimes 
and this criterion will then determine the relationship between those regimes.’669 The 
agnostic ‘avoids any final determination of the criteria of law and merely recognises 
the interaction of various normative regimes with various degrees of practical 
effectiveness and authority’ – Twining represents this view for Cotterrell.670 The 
statist view, represented by Andre-Jean Arnaud, is said to ‘recognise some regime as 
law by reference to particular criteria usually modelled on those applicable to nation-
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state law, and would see other regimes as merely non-legal regulation.’671 The 
conventionalist – the one acknowledged reluctantly by Cotterrell – is signified by 
Tamanaha’s notion that we ought to ‘accept as law whatever people identify and treat 
through their social practices as law.’672 And, finally, Cotterrell’s own view, namely, 
that we ‘adopt criteria of the legal that are sufficiently flexible to recognise many 
different forms of law in currently indeterminate but potentially developing relations 
with each other.’673 One could argue that these disagreements mirror, at different 
times and by different persons, similar, but no doubt not the same, conceptual 
difficulties to those sought to be unearthed in the sections above and below (i.e., 
tensions between features belonging to tradition or discourse paradigms).  
Cotterrell’s own way of making sense of the diversity of views on offer is 
instructive. He suggests that they are driven by the differences in, on the one hand, 
juristic-philosophical and, on the other, sociological, concerns. The first of these has, 
he says, ‘always’ tried ‘to identify stable and – as far as possible – uncontroversial 
structures of authority.’674 ‘If much legal philosophy’, he continues, ‘has been 
concerned to demonstrate the systematic unity of law, a major reason has been that it 
has tried to meet lawyers’ need for a clear specification of the location of legal 
authority and the criteria of legal validity’, seeking to do so by demonstrating law’s 
‘systematic character or the hierarchical structure of legal rules or norms.’675 
Sociologists, on the other hand, ‘do not necessarily have juristic concerns with finding 
clear, uncontroversial sources of legal authority or criteria of legal validity. They are 
not necessarily disturbed by the idea of many such sources or criteria, competing or 
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remaining fluid or vague.’676 Whether one presents them as theoretical concerns or 
explanatory tendencies, what emerges here is the very construction of one’s own 
theoretical position as a process of finding a middle ground between pictures one 
characterises as extremes. What one finds, however, as with Cotterrell’s discussion in 
the paper in question, is that such understandings of the traditions of inquiry 
themselves come to dominate the attempt at articulating the middle position. In the 
case of Cotterrell’s list, it is responses to juristic concerns that drive the various 
distinctive approaches, missing, thereby, other kinds of approaches that cannot neatly 
be subsumed to be responding to such concerns.677 In other words, what we might 
have here is another illustration that the process of understanding traditions of inquiry 
is, at once, a process of constructing one’s view about the problems that matter.    
Another potential promising approach for the law-as-tradition conception – 
particularly in its explanatory prioritisation of the temporally long-term and sense of 
ongoing dynamism and change, as first revived in modern times by Henrik Bergson 
and Alfred North Whitehead, but stretching back, in effect, to Heraclitus and 
Lucretius – is the process theory of law. David Cohen, writing on Law, Violence and 
Community in Classical Athens, argued that the process approach discloses that ‘legal 
systems are the continuing creation of human beings with various, shifting, and 
contradictory motivations and interests, motivations and interests which range from 
settling disputes to exacerbating them, from using the law as an instrument of social 
justice to honing it as a weapon of oppression, from making peace with one’s enemies 
to annihilating them with the help of legal institutions.’678 The process approach has 
also received some attention in the international legal theoretical literature, with the 
most prominent contemporary being Rosalind Higgins, though, as usual, one must be 
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careful here not to take the label for granted.679 James MacLean’s very recent thesis at 
the School of Law at the University of Edinburgh, Towards a Process Theory of Law, 
building on the ontological and epistemological work of Alfred North Whitehead, also 
deserves special mention here.680 Process theory of law might also find an ally in the 
evolutionary theory of law,681 though in some versions, this theory has been 
assimilated with systems theory.682  
From approaches in natural law, the most prominent example of a law-as-
tradition oriented approach may well be Hugo Grotius, who famously defined natural 
law as forms of social interaction, already socialised, already inherent in the 
relationships between nations.683 Under Grotius’ conception, the aim of an exposition 
of natural law in the international sphere was to reveal the accepted usages of civilised 
nations.684 For Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, custom was indeed a primary 
source of law, but the aim of a theory of natural law was to subject all possible 
sources of law to the law of reason.685  
There are many other key social theorists and historians of law who have not 
been addressed here, such as Emile Durkheim, who, himself building on the work of 
Sir Henry Maine, thought of law as ‘nothing more than the most stable and precise 
element’ in the organisation of social life.686 Durkheim’s claim that ‘morality and law 
are only habits, constant patterns of action which come to be common to a whole 
society…it is like a crystallisation of human behaviour’687 fastens on to an important 
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feature of the law-as-tradition conception – as is visible in such terms as living law, 
process theory, evolutionary theory, and others – namely, that explanations, of either 
the existence or knowledge of law, ought not to prioritise abstract phenomena, but 
rather the dynamics of associations, or forms of interaction, or processes, and the like.  
 
IB1i. The Political Life of Law-as-Tradition 
Though there may be other ways to articulate the political value at the heart of 
conceptions of law-as-tradition, the one emphasised here is that of responsiveness. 
The term comes from the work of Philip Selznick and Philippe Nonet, who, as 
summarised below, refer with approval to responsive law.688 In later work on his own, 
especially in The Moral Commonwealth,689 Selznick further developed the concept of 
responsiveness, using it more widely than in his work with Nonet. As we shall see 
throughout, neither Selznick himself, nor Selznick and Nonet, are unaware of the 
limitations of responsiveness as a political aim, or even as a value of forms of 
institutional and other social organisation.  
Selznick and Nonet argue that the study of ‘the foundations of law’ cannot be 
divorced from ‘the place we give law in society’ and in that spirit they call for an 
integration of legal, political and social theory.690 In writing their book, they offer 
their own view for ‘assessing the worth of alternative modes of legal ordering’,691 that 
is, ultimately, for assessing the place of law in society. In setting the scene for 
responsive law, which they offer as the mode of legal ordering against which the 
current states of affairs should be evaluated, they criticise two other identifiable 
modes, namely, repressive law and autonomous law. In the case of the former, they 
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argue that ‘every legal order has a repressive potential because it is always at some 
point bound to the status quo and, in offering a mantle of authority, makes power 
more effective.’692 Under a repressive form of legal ordering, ‘short shrift’ is given to 
‘the interests of those governed’, resulting in their position becoming particularly 
‘precarious and vulnerable.’693 They acknowledge that to some extent all modes of 
legal governing are repressive, and that the emergence of that repression depends on 
many factors including ‘the distribution of power, patterns of consciousness and much 
else that is historically contingent.’694 Nevertheless, there are identifiable forms of 
avoidable repression, particularly where the use of coercion is unrestrained and results 
in the suppression of deviance and the putting down of protests.695  
The emergence of autonomous law, the second alternative mode of legal 
ordering, assists in ‘taming repression.’696 More commonly referred to as the Rule of 
Law, such taming is made possible when ‘legal institutions acquire enough 
independent authority to impose standards of restraint on the exercise of 
governmental power.’697 Such autonomous institutions must themselves have only 
‘qualified supremacy’, and be subjected to ‘defined spheres of competence.’698 But 
there is a price, ultimately too high according to the authors, for the preservation of 
this kind of institutional integrity. Sharp lines are drawn between politics and law and, 
thus also, between the legislative and judicial function.699 The legal order is 
understood as a model of legal rules, which does ‘enforce a measure of official 
accountability’, but also ‘limits…the creativity of legal institutions.’700 Regularity and 
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fairness, rather than substantive justice, become ‘the first ends and the main 
competence of the legal order.’701 Finally, ‘fidelity to law’ is ‘understood as strict 
obedience to the rules of positive law.’702  
Thankfully, however, according to the authors, the autonomous mode of legal 
ordering contains within it the seed for the development of responsive law. Where law 
is responsive to social needs, it is ‘competent as well as fair’, it helps to ‘define the 
public interest’ and it is ‘committed to the achievement of substantive justice.’703 The 
vision of a responsive legal order is one which takes ‘affirmative responsibility for the 
problems of society.’704 The ideal of responsive law does not entirely replace the 
warnings of repressing legal ordering and the aims of autonomous law, for it 
recognises that these levels of development may at times be historically necessary. It 
does, however, move the ideal beyond them, calling, ultimately, for ‘larger 
institutional competencies to the quest for justice.’705 
The movement away or beyond the ideal of the rule of law is a significant one. 
It has emerged also in other literature, including most recently in a policy movement 
dubbed ‘the legal empowerment of the poor.’706 Stephen Golub’s paper, entitled 
‘Beyond the Rule of Law Orthodoxy’707 provides a neat summary of the basic 
principles of ‘the legal empowerment alternative.’ By ‘rule of law orthodoxy’ Golub 
refers to an approach in the international aid field of law and development that 
‘focuses too much on law, lawyers and state institutions, and too little on 
development, the poor and civil society.’708 As a ‘top-down, state-centred approach’, 
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it tends to concentrate ‘on law reform and government, particularly judiciaries, to 
build business friendly systems’, and it is a system ‘most prominently practiced by 
multilateral development banks.’709 The problem with this approach, says Golub, is 
not with the ‘economic and political goals, per se’, but rather, ‘its questionable 
assumptions, unproven impact, and’, most relevantly for present purposes, 
‘insufficient attention to the legal needs of the disadvantaged.’ 710 
The alternative approach, i.e., legal empowerment, which Golub describes as 
‘more balanced’, focuses on the ‘use of legal services and related development 
activities to increase disadvantaged populations’ control over their lives.’711 It is 
‘community-driven’ development, and ‘is grounded in grassroots needs and 
activities.’712 More concretely, there are four further differences. Under the legal 
empowerment approach: ‘1) attorneys support the poor as partners, instead of 
dominating them as proprietors of expertise; 2) the disadvantaged play a role in 
setting priorities, rather than government officials and donor personnel dictating the 
agenda; 3) addressing these priorities frequently involves nonjudicial strategies that 
transcend narrow notions of legal systems, justice sectors, and institution building; 4) 
even more broadly, the use of law is often just part of integrated strategies that include 
other development activities.’713 What is key here is the lack of an anxiety concerning 
values of the legal order conceived as a discourse – i.e., coherence, consistency, and 
unity – and anxiety, instead, about the needs of the citizenry, particularly the poorest 
citizens. Golub does not, however, overstate his case. He argues that it is not his 
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position that ‘rule of law orthodoxy is the wrong path to take under all circumstances; 
nor is legal empowerment a panacea.’ 714 The two are not mutually exclusive. 715 
Similar modesty is displayed by Selznick in his The Moral Commonwealth. 
As he explains it there, responsiveness invokes the challenge ‘to maintain institutional 
integrity while taking into account new problems, new forces in the environment, new 
demands and expectations.’716 A responsive institution, in short, ‘avoids insularity 
without embracing opportunism.’717 This richer picture of responsiveness recognises 
that what is required is ‘controlled adaptation’: all institutions must be, to some 
extent, isolated and inflexible, but responsiveness demands that this be balanced with 
openness to the needs of the citizenry. Thus a well-working legislature, for example, 
is at once open – it registers majority will; it is composed of representatives elected 
democratically and responsible to the people – but it also has its own ‘moral 
principles’ which ‘safeguard the deliberative character of legislation.’718  
However, not only does Selznick offer a richer account of responsiveness than 
in previous work with Nonet, he also spends a considerable amount of time bringing 
out the limitations of the value. The ‘perils of responsiveness’, as he puts it, all centre 
around one big problem: selectivity. The strategy of responsiveness ‘entails a burden 
of choice…there is always a need to decide who shall be the privileged beneficiaries 
of help or forbearance.’719 Selectivity, he reasserts, ‘is the Achilles’ heel of 
responsiveness’, and it is because of it that ‘what appears to be responsiveness may 
turn out to be a hidden form of domination or a screen for covert, opportunistic 
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adaptation.’720 Selznick provides an illustration, which shall not be dwelt on here, and 
which he himself has developed at much greater length, concerning the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (‘TVA’).721 The point to make here is a general one: responsiveness, 
adaptation and spontaneity are the values that drives the political life of the law-as-
tradition conception, but their limitation is the problem of selection, of not being able 
to help all simultaneously, and not all to the same degree.  
There is another problem, too, not addressed by Selznick, but one alluded to in 
Kapuscinski’s reflections on communism in the USSR. Kapuscinski argues that ‘the 
system depended on…punctiliousness, on a psychotic control of very detail, an 
obsessive desire to rule over everything’,722 illustrating this obsession with an 
example of the kind of detail engaged in by Stalin: ‘Transfer’, Stalin ordered, ‘the 
sewing machine belong to tailor’s shop number 1 to factory number 7.’723 On this 
reading, then, a government can become too ‘responsive’, too involved in the affairs 
of everyday life, too intrusive into private affairs, and, even worse, act and justify its 
actions in the name of the people, believing it is concerned with and addressing their 
needs.   
A reaction to this fear of intrusive government can be seen in the evolutionary 
theory of law, building on Friedrich von Hayek’s support of governance in the form 
of ‘spontaneous order’, which he identified with the market and with common law, 
and his criticism of ‘rational constructivism’, which is associated with a planned 
economy and regulatory law.724 Hayek was famously sceptical of the ability of human 
beings, and particularly those in government, to know the innumerable facts that 
would be necessary to know to support governance according to rational 
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constructivism. Our knowledge of those facts was ‘widely dispersed and 
fragmentary’; we relied at best ‘on limited information normally pertaining to 
localised environments.’725 Given that the human mind cannot transcend the 
spontaneous order out of which it emerges, it is best to leave governance to such 
spontaneous orders, exemplified for Hayek by the market and the common law. 
Lawmaking is, ideally, ‘a continuous, adaptative process dealing with unforeseen 
consequences.’726 Of course, matters are much more complicated in Hayek’s theory, 
but at the distance from which traditions of jurisprudential inquiry are herein being 
observed, Hayek’s scepticism about the possibility of making everything explicit and 
controlling society from the top-down, and his criticism on the alleged hubris behind 
the thought that we can reveal all the forces behind the regularities and patterns of 
interaction we form is representative of tendencies belonging to the law-as-tradition 
conception. To say all this is not to say, of course, that others within the law-as-
tradition conception would agree with Hayek. Finally, none of this is to say that there 
are not dangers with spontaneous forms of governance, i.e., their capacity to create 
needs for us (as markets tend to do) or to perpetuate and further increase the power of 
those who manage, sometimes at first simply fortuitously, to enter the market with 
great and swift success.     
What one can see from this brief discussion is that the political life of law-as-
tradition, no less so than with law-as-discourse, is rife with difficulties, contradictions 
and inconsistencies. What appears as an advantage or an advancement can easily 
metamorphose into a nightmare. On one reading, responsiveness is openness to the 
needs of the citizenry; on another, it is said to result in the unwelcome intrusiveness of 
the government. On one reading, law-as-tradition is adaptive and spontaneous; on 
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another, the very same structures make it difficult to change and perpetuate injustices. 
These matters are messy and difficult, as they must be. The very point is that politics 
is alive when it offers no easy answer; when all these various questions concerning 
the interrelationship between ways of characterising the structure of government, 
ways of suggesting how it should go forward, and ways of characterising the effects 
of its past, current or proposed endeavours, all interrelate, all are in tension with each 




IB2. LEGAL WORK-AS-TRADITION 
 
On first blush, Arthur Leff’s view that ‘law is not something we know, but something 
we do’,727 appears to conform to certain features of the law-as-tradition paradigm: it 
signifies scepticism of abstractions as a source of knowledge, and it makes the 
knowledge of law disappear into an account of skills and abilities. In one respect this 
is correct, but in another it leaves the concept of knowledge unnecessarily behind. For 
legal-work-as-tradition conceptions, as we shall see, what is being explained by the 
development of skills and abilities in certain communities and institutions, and over 
long periods of time, is not ‘merely’ some nebulous ‘doing’, but indeed, ‘knowing.’ 
At stake, then, is not just the exposition of a different explanatory paradigm of legal 
work, but the appropriation of the concept of knowledge.  
The philosophical roots of the legal-work-as-tradition conception run deep. 
Their perusal is outside the scope of the thesis. Nevertheless, a few brief indications 
can be given. One important feature is that knowledge, unlike in the law-as-discourse 
paradigm, cannot and should not be limited to the analysis of articulated thoughts, 
conceptualised as an introduction to action. Hayek, whose work was mentioned 
above, put it this way: ‘man acted before he thought and did not understand before he 
acted.’728 ‘What we call understanding,’ he continued ‘is in the last resort simply his 
[sic] capacity to respond to his environment with a pattern of action that helps him 
persist.’729 That capacity to respond is learnt over long periods of time, and the result, 
says Hayek, ‘of this development will in the first instance not be articulated 
knowledge but a knowledge which, although it can be described in terms of rules, the 
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individual cannot state in words but is merely able to honour in practice.’730 Human 
conduct under this view, again following Hayek, is ‘constituted and coordinated 
through shared habits, modes of action, customs, practices.’731  
There are, of course, others who have sought to reorient epistemology to a 
focus on skills, abilities and dispositions, as well as social habits, practices and 
customs. These include modern classics such as the work of Whitehead,732 John 
Dewey,733 Gilbert Ryle,734 and Polanyi,735 but also more recent philosophical work, 
such as that of Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus,736 Alva Noë,737 Andy Clark, and thus also 
much of the embodied knowledge literature in the cognitive sciences.738 Another 
important recent source of insights is the work currently being conducted by the Max 
Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, where the picture being advanced 
is that of ‘adaptive behaviour in a fundamentally uncertain world.’739 Some of this 
work has also addressed the picture of legal work resulting from such a general 
account of behaviour.740 In all these theories, what one can witness is resistance to the 
idea that the knowledge of human beings can be exhausted by the propositional 
content of beliefs, thereafter subjected to testing by certain criteria of correctness 
(e.g., conformity to the laws of logic or the norms of grammar, or conformity to the 
standards of reliable evidence). What one sees, instead, is a focus on the conditions of 
possibility of acting in the world – on the skills, abilities and dispositions a person 
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develops, over time, and in emotional and physical engagement with the world, all, 
furthermore, in company with others.  
One important figure in this context, not just in general philosophy but also 
within legal theory, was John Dewey. Broadly speaking, one could argue that 
Dewey’s picture of human knowledge prioritises the dynamics of conduct rather than 
the properties of some static structure of abstractions (or representations). When 
considered more carefully, however, Dewey is often more balanced. Consider, for 
example, his historically and philosophically important paper, entitled ‘Logical 
Method and Law’, in which he argues that human conduct falls broadly into two 
sorts.741 ‘Sometimes’, he says, ‘human beings act with a minimum of foresight, 
without examination of what they are doing and of probable consequences. They act 
not upon deliberation, but from routine, instinct, the direct pressure of appetite, or a 
blind “hunch.”’ 742 In the other type, he said, ‘action follows upon a decision and the 
decision is the outcome of inquiry, comparison of alternatives, weighing of facts.’743  
Although Dewey influenced the legal realists, some of the latter were arguably 
less nuanced in their accounts of legal knowledge. For some legal realists, all, or 
almost all, could be explained by focusing on the first type of conduct identified by 
Dewey. In typical anti-metaphysical, anti-presentist fashion,744 Karl Olivecrona 
argues that ‘we are, at best, ‘dimly conscious of a permanent existence of the rule of 
law. We talk of them as if they were always there as real entities. But this is not exact. 
It is impossible to ascribe a permanent existence to a rule of law or to any other rule. 
                                                
741 Dewey 1924.  
742 Ibid., 560. 
743 Ibid., 560. This Deweyan distinction continues to resurface in contemporary philosophical literature 
– a recent example is Baker 2008. 
744 ‘Anti-metaphysical and anti-presentist’ is contemporary philosophical language, unavailable to 
Olivecrona, that is popular among those influenced by Derrida. See, for example, Derrida 1974.  
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A rule exists only as the content of a notion in a human being.’745 ‘The written text,’ 
says Olivecrona, ‘—in itself only figures on paper—has the function of calling up 
certain notions in the mind of the reader. That is all.’746 ‘In reality,’ he continues, ‘the 
law of a country consists of an immense mass of ideas concerning human behaviour, 
accumulated during centuries through the contributions of innumerable 
collaborators… The ideas are again and again revived in human minds, accompanied 
by the imperative expression: “This line of conduct shall be taken” or something else 
to that effect.’747 
For present purposes, however, such views are better understood as responses 
to the excesses that certain of the legal realists found in those they themselves 
characterised as overly formalistic or mechanistic in their theories of law. In other 
words, the legal realists may not provide us with the epistemological detail we need to 
develop the legal-work-as-tradition explanatory paradigm, but they may be useful 
sources for revealing some of the explanatory limitations of the law-as-discourse and 
legal-work-as-discourse conceptions. In any event, as reiterated throughout, this thesis 
seeks to avoid adopting the term ‘legal realism’, or indeed the term ‘legal formalism’ 
– such terms provide not only their way of organising jurisprudential inquiries, but 
more importantly, they mask, as Tamanaha has recently argued, much mixing of 
realist and formalist features in the work of those often unreflectively classified as 
realist or formalist in outlook.748  
My focus here, instead, is on four features we may take to be exemplary of the 
legal-work-as-tradition explanatory paradigm. These four features are: 1) the role of 
typical narrative images, as discussed by Bernard Jackson; 2) the construction of legal 
                                                
745 Olivecrona quoted in Williams 1946, 85. 
746 Olivecrona quoted Id. 
747 Olivecrona quoted Id. 
748 See, Tamanaha 2008a and 2008b.  
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facts in historical perspective, as presented by Geoffrey Samuel; 3) the importance of 
institutional contexts, as discussed in the work of John Bell, Robert Summers, and 
others; and 4) the emergence of Cognitive Legal Studies, particularly as recounted by 
Steven Winter, and other related resources. As usual, my aim is not be 
comprehensive. Further, unlike the legal-work-as-discourse conception, there is not a 
great deal of engagement with or analysis or elaboration in contemporary legal 
theoretical literature of those features identified here under the legal-work-as-tradition 
conception – though this may very well change in the forthcoming decades.   
 
 
IB2a. Typical Narrative Images 
 
Bernard Jackson’s target in a relatively recent paper, entitled ‘Literal Meaning: 
Semantics and Narrative in Biblical Law and Modern Jurisprudence’,749 is what he 
characterises as the liberal modern law model of language-based rules. In this model, 
he says, ‘people can rely ultimately on their disputes being resolved by court 
adjudication’, which ‘involves the application of linguistic rules’, where the meaning 
of those linguistic rules, in turn, ‘is normally available in advance, the assumption 
being that the “literal” meaning is that both intended by the legislator and to be 
applied by the court.’750 Jackson argues that a very different model is discernible in 
the Bible. The features of this model include a view of ‘dispute settlement as 
essentially private’ which does not ‘necessarily involve the application of linguistic 
rules’, and where, significantly for my purposes, if ‘linguistic rules are used, their 
application is not to be identified with the notion of “literal meaning”, but rather with 
their narrative, contextual sense.’751 Jackson’s dissatisfaction is with a view of 
language that suggests that words – whether in rules or otherwise – have a ‘literal’ or 
                                                
749 Jackson 2000.  
750 Ibid., 434. 
751 Ibid. 
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a ‘core’ meaning, i.e., that there are ‘situations that the words “cover”.’752 We have 
already seen evidence of this view under the legal-work-as-discourse conception, 
where the properties of legal language itself do the epistemological work for legal 
actors. Jackson urges and offers a different approach to the liberal model, namely one 
that does not ask ‘what situations do the words of this rule cover?’ but that inquires in 
the following way: ‘what typical situations do the words of this rule evoke?’753 
Formulating the question in this way, he says, signifies looking ‘to the narrative 
images – of situations within known social contexts – evoked by the words.’754 As we 
shall see, what this entails is a movement away from the explanation of legal 
knowledge at the level of a theory of meaning, and towards the socio-historical 
context in which persons come to acquire knowledge of those typical narrative 
images.  
Jackson provides some examples of passages from Biblical law where an 
approach bent on discovering the literal meaning necessarily fails: it neither captures 
the complexity of the language of the rule, nor the social context in which such rules 
were used (i.e., in largely private settlements of disputes). The role of courts in such a 
context, and within such a model of understanding the language of rules, ‘was 
restricted to cases perceived as too far distant from the typical narrative images 
evoked’ such that judges were ‘expected to deploy their intuitions of justice.’755 In 
such a context, Jackson continues, ‘communication is characterised by the availability 
of common deployment of unspoken social knowledge, knowledge of what are the 
typical narrative images deployed within the group.’756 Where that ‘social knowledge 
is sufficiently internalised within each of the members of a particular social group’ 
                                                
752 Ibid., 437. 
753 Ibid. 
754 Ibid. 
755 Ibid., 446. 
756 Ibid., 447. 
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then the rules may be said to operate as a ‘semiotic code, based on the internalisation 
of images and feelings.’757 Already, here, we see a central feature of the legal-work-
as-tradition conception: the prioritisation of socialised abilities in the explanation of 
knowledge.  
Jackson goes on to consider the applicability of this ‘semiotic’ model to 
modern law – an important task, given that that model developed in a context very 
different, at least at first blush, to the role of modern courts and tribunals. He argues 
that, contrary to positivistic models, the semiotic model can ‘inform the manner in 
which law actually works’758 in the contemporary world. In saying so, he refers to a 
feature already identified above as belonging to tradition-oriented approaches, i.e., to 
pictures that attempt to make sense of how things work. Further, Jackson argues that 
both Hart and Fuller (the latter especially) ‘unwittingly acknowledge’ that ‘narrative 
images still underlie much of our case law and jurisprudential theorising about it.’759 
He invokes Fuller’s famous example of the ‘upright sleeper’760 and argues that the 
question as to whether the upright sleeper can be found to be in violation of the rule 
against ‘sleeping in any railway station’ can be best understood not as an obvious 
instance of the rule but as a case of how close the image of the upright sleeper may be 
said to be to the typical narrative image invoked by the rule. Similarly so with 
Dworkin’s equally famous discussion of Riggs v. Palmer761: is not the initial 
classification, asks Jackson, of this case as a hard case best explained by ‘the feeling 
that the case of the grandson was so far distant from the “normal” narrative of testate 
succession that this could not be a straightforward instance of the rule, 
                                                
757 Ibid. 
758 Ibid., 450. 
759 Ibid.  
760 See, Fuller 1958, 664.  
761 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 NY 506, 22 NE 188 (1889). See, Dworkin 1986, 15-20. 
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notwithstanding the words in which the rule was expressed?’762 Even if the judgement 
records a justification using the rhetoric of a literal interpretation, what is really 
happening, according to Jackson, is that the judge is ‘appealing to the values 
internalised within the “common sense” of a particular community. The literal 
meaning of the statute is filtered through the aesthetics or values which accompany 
narrative images at the subconscious level.’763 Of particular interest here is Jackson’s 
prioritisation of communal emotions and his eagerness to locate these at a level below 
self-conscious awareness.  
In his earlier book, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence,764 Jackson urges us to 
take seriously ‘the implications of linguistic scepticism in general, and doubts about 
the place of “reference” in particular.’765 His criticism of the use of the concept of 
‘reference’ also leads him to a criticism of a correspondence theory of truth – a 
position tellingly different from that of Kelsen’s and Hart’s (as discussed in section 
IA1e above). Jackson sets out to show how the problem of reference and the 
associated correspondence theory of truth underlie an approach to legal reasoning 
dominated by the device of the syllogism – a ‘formalisation of the process of 
(deductively) applying law to facts.’766 In chapter four of Law, Fact and Narrative 
Coherence he sets out to offer an alternative. There, he argues that ‘rules are 
themselves meaningful as socially-constructed narratives, accompanied by particular 
(and increasingly institutionalised) forms of approval or disapproval.’767 ‘The fact’, he 
continues ‘that legal rules have tended to become, in Western legal systems, 
increasingly abstract and conceptualised tells us more about the pragmatics of rule-
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telling (its increasing bureaucratisation and specialisation) than about the nature of 
rules themselves.’768 Once again, what we can see here is the explanatory tendency 
towards placing forms of human conduct – in this case, institutionalised forms of 
approval or disapproval – in priority to alleged properties of the text.  
Jackson is keen to establish a divide between his approach and that of those 
whose picture of legal work (particularly in the context of the judicial application of 
law) depends on the notion of the normative syllogism. Adopting his model, he says, 
entails seeing ‘the relationship between the general rule and the particular case’ as 
‘one of inter-discursivity, not the application of a consequence to one particular 
referent, which the general rule states ought to be applied to all such referents.’769 The 
underlying form of both rule and fact are, according to Jackson, narrativised, where 
the relationship between the two is ‘one of greater or lesser proximity, in terms of 
human experience.’770 Indeed, he argues that the ‘further the form of the “rule” moves 
from the narrative model to a purely abstract, conceptual formulation, the more we are 
likely to encounter difficulties in both the application of law to fact and the 
interpretation of general rules, notwithstanding the clarity in which the rule is 
expressed.’771  
We must not mistake, Jackson says, the process and expression of justification 
for the process of ‘how legal decisions are arrived at.’772 If we do so, we make 
unwarranted distinctions between: ‘a) determination of fact, b) justification of 
determination of fact, c) determination of law, d) justification of determination of law, 
e) application of fact to law, and f) justification of application of fact to law.’773 
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Instead, laws should be ‘regarded as a particular form of narrative representation of 
human behaviour’ that is then institutionalised as a ‘sanction’ signifying the 
community’s approval or disapproval of that narrative.774 Further, there are two forms 
of narrativisation: the first relates to the semantics of the telling of stories in court 
(their content), and the second to the pragmatics of that story telling, i.e., the process 
of persuading the adjudicator of the truth of those stories.775 Jackson illustrates the 
role of the narrative model, tracking in close proximity to human experience, and thus 
also exemplifying the ‘inseparability of law, fact and application’ in the now often-
cited passage of Lord Denning’s judgement in Miller v. Jackson.776 It is instructive to 
set this passage out in full and to follow Jackson’s analysis of it. Here is the passage 
first: 
In summer time village cricket is the delight of everyone. Nearly every village 
has its own cricket field where the young men play and the old men watch. In 
the village of Lintz in County Durham they have their own ground, where they 
have played these last 70 years. They tend it well. The wicket area is well 
rolled and mown. The outfield is kept short. It has a good club house for the 
players and seats for the onlookers. The village team play there on Saturdays 
and Sundays. They belong to a league, competing with the neighbouring 
villages. On other evenings after work they practise while the light lasts. Yet 
now after these 70 years a judge of the High Court has ordered that they must 
not play there any more. He has issued an injunction to stop them. He has 
done it at the instance of a newcomer who is no lover of cricket. This 
newcomer has built, or has had built for him, a house on the edge of the 
cricket ground which four years ago was a field where cattle grazed. The 
animals did not mind the cricket. But now this adjoining field has been turned 
into a housing estate. The newcomer bought one of the houses on the edge of 
the cricket ground. No doubt the open space was a selling point. Now he 
complains that when a batsman hits a six the ball has been known to land in 
his garden or on or near his house. His wife has got so upset about it that they 
always go out at week-ends. They do not go into the garden when cricket is 
being played. They say that this is intolerable. So they asked the judge to stop 
the cricket being played. And the judge, much against his will, has felt that he 
must order the cricket to be stopped: with the consequence, I suppose, that the 
Lintz Cricket Club will disappear. The cricket ground will be turned to some 
other use. I expect for more houses or a factory. The young men will turn to 
other things instead of cricket. The whole village will be much the poorer. 
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And all this because of a newcomer who has just bought a house there next to 
the cricket ground.777  
 
The image of the intruding outsider is contrasted, negatively, with the 
overwhelmingly positive cricket-playing community, which is said to exemplify the 
very best of traditional practices. The newcomer seeks judicial disapproval of 
someone in authority who, him or herself, should he make a ruling in favour of the 
newcomer, would be interfering in a similarly disapproving manner to that of the 
newcomer. Further, such interference, causing the disappearance of traditional 
practices, is said to be likely to lead to young men turning to implicitly destructive 
forms of pleasure seeking.778 As Jackson concludes, ‘Lord Denning has clothed his 
opposition to the application of the legal rule in a vivid, narrative presentation of the 
facts’779, and one, moreover, that already includes within it modes of persuasion. Of 
course, as he acknowledges, the example is a somewhat extreme one, but, 
significantly, not because of its use of the narrative mode, but because of its 
invocation of notions (such as the delight of village cricket) that are not recognised as 
being capable of being ‘used publicly in the process of justification.’780 
Indeed, the above example sets the scene nicely for Jackson’s argument that 
the ancient forms of expression of rules, e.g., ‘If a thief is found breaking in, and is 
struck so that he dies, there shall be no blood guilt for him’781, and thus also more 
recognisably narrativised and concrete than the ‘modern, abstract legal rule’, have not 
only not completely died out (e.g., there are examples of the use of narrative 
illustrations in modern Criminal Codes), but in fact underlie and explain the 
understanding of rules expressed in that modern, abstract form. Our understanding of 
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rules expressed in such a manner is explicable on the basis of a stock of typical 
narrative images – narrativised models of behaviour – that contain within them ‘some 
tacit social evaluation: that such behaviour is good, bad, pleasing, unpleasing etc.’782 
Citing George Fletcher’s exposition of the ‘subjective criminality’ (i.e., that of 
attributing evil minds to agents when they act in certain ways) that infused the law of 
theft,783 Jackson argues that however we analyse it, our understanding of legal 
language is explicable on the basis of the ever-developing stock of ‘collective images’ 
which ‘appear to be socially-constructed narrative models of human experience.’784 
Jackson’s overall picture of legal work, then, is that it consists ‘in comparing a 
narrative constructed from the facts of the case with the underlying narrative pattern 
either explicit in or underlying the conceptualised legal rule.’785 Where, as in modern 
Western legal systems, the formulation of the rules becomes ‘increasingly abstract 
and conceptualised’,786 the more difficult is the task of adjudication.787 There is much 
to be said, he concludes, for the formulation of ‘particular rules’ that ‘build upon 
social experience of typical behaviour-patterns, accompanied by what are considered 
appropriate institutional sanctions.’788 
Of course, responding as he is to the dominance of the legal-work-as-discourse 
conception, which strives to remain at the level of a theory of meaning, Jackson is 
forced to translate some of his insights into insights about language or the nature of 
legal rules. Seeing past this manner of speaking, however, what we see in Jackson is 
the explanatory tendency towards community-located and thus socialised abilities as 
carriers of typical narrative images, with those images themselves being but 
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narrativised abstractions of ways in which human beings attempt to make sense of and 
learn from interactions with one another.  
 
 
IB2b. Historicising the Construction of Legal Facts 
 
The leap from Jackson to the work of Geoffrey Samuel, particularly in Epistemology 
and Method in Law,789 is not a great one. Like Jackson, though in different terms and 
by reference to a different set of problems and contexts, Samuel criticises the 
ignorance of the role of images (he calls them ‘facts’) in accounts of legal work. 
Unlike Jackson, who translates his insights or communicates his explanatory 
tendencies into a theory of meaning, Samuel addresses theories of legal knowledge. 
He argues that contemporary theories of legal knowledge suffer from an overdose of 
the rule-model in which legal knowledge is said to be knowledge of rules, ‘that is to 
say, normative propositions capable of being expressed in symbolic language.’790 
Instead, Samuel says, we should pay more attention to non-symbolic forms of 
knowledge: that is, of the historical life of facts and fact-construction. The importance 
of the historical dimension – to that long-term perspective favoured by tradition-
oriented explanations – shall be returned to below, with the focus at first on how 
Samuel articulates the relationship between rules and facts.  
‘In order to relate to factual situations’, says Samuel, ‘rules must contain 
within them the means by which one can move from pure norm…to the world of 
social fact.’791 Rules, he says, ‘delimit facts. They describe areas and boundaries.’792 
But acknowledging this requires us to consider what this world ‘beyond rules’ is like. 
Consider, he says, the development of the law of negligence from Donoghue v. 
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Stevenson793 to Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills.794 In the first case, as is well 
known, Mrs Donoghue was said to have suffered nervous shock on account of 
discovering a snail in her ginger beer (manufactured by the defendant). In the second, 
Mr Grant suffered acute dermatitis as a result of wearing underpants (also 
manufactured by the defendant), which contained an excess of a chemical harmful to 
human skin. There is nothing inherent – even if, and significantly so, trained lawyers 
by habit may think so – in the neighbour principle, i.e., nothing within the proposition 
itself, which may indicate that the two cases are related. Instead, there are 
relationships between images (once again, Samuel calls them ‘facts’): between the 
harm (nervous shock and acute dermatitis), the means (ginger beers and underwear) 
and the subjects (consumers and manufacturers). Where the relationships between 
them are sufficiently close, such that the latter situation can be imagined as an 
instance of the former, then the cases are sufficiently similar to warrant the use of the 
same justification for the decision (i.e., the applicability neighbour principle). The 
point, says, Samuel, is that it matters how facts themselves and the relationships 
between them are imagined.795 He offers the following illustration: 
A ship heavenly laden with a cargo of crude oil founders on a sandbank and in 
order to protect the lives of the crew the captain orders that the oil be 
discharged into the sea. The oil some time later is washed up on the beaches of 
a local holiday resort and the council spend much time, energy and money in 
clearing up the mess. Imagine that an employee of the council is looking 
through the facts of old cases to find an analogy with what has happened. The 
employee finds some old cases involving, not ships, but horse-drawn transport 
and, in the first case, he discovers a situation where the owner of a house has 
had his front wall, adjoining the roadway, severely damaged by a coach and 
horses crashing into it. In another case, he discovers that the owner of a café 
has suffered loss of business, plus increased gas light bills, as a result of a 
neighbouring transport firm having left its horses on the road outside the café, 
where they blocked the daylight, and the smell from their droppings and urine 
                                                
793 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
794 Grant  v. Australian Knitting Mills [1936] AC 85. 
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overpowered the customers. Which situation, the council employee asks 
herself, is the closer analogy to the problem of the stricken ship and dirty 
beach? Is it helpful to think in terms of ‘pollution’? What kind of image does 
pollution conjure up? Or should one be thinking more in terms of damage to 
an adjoining beach?796  
  
But it is not a mere, though, of course also, no small matter, of how one envisages 
facts and relationships between them – a matter, as Samuel calls it, of analogy or 
analogical thinking. What matters also is how one categorises facts. In the case of Mrs 
Donoghue, for example, one needs to classify the harm, the persons and the things:797 
what kind of injury or damage is nervous shock? Does it matter that Mrs Donoghue is 
an elderly woman? What kind of product is a ginger beer? The very asking of these 
questions, says Samuel, is evidence enough of the dynamic relationship between facts 
(as in the Donoghue case) and certain categories taken to be fundamental for the 
purpose of classification (e.g., persons, things, actions and damages). The explanation 
of such a cognitive process, as Samuel acknowledges, is by no means an easy feat. 
But the difficulties, at the very least, should point us to the insight that ‘the linguistic 
proposition cannot in itself ever contain information about the imagery which 
surrounds the actual application process to the facts.’798 Rules, for Samuel, are by no 
means useless: they help us, in a limited way, to orient ourselves. But what explains 
the orientation – what drives it – are the analogies persons make between sets of 
images, or the way they frame the image in the first place. Framing, for example, 
involves the scale of time with which some event is delineated as a stand-alone event. 
For instance, in the above case of the oil tanker, ‘one can look at the act of the captain 
vis-à-vis the discharged oil and the distressed ship or at the wider picture of a 
proprietor sending out his ships and cargoes.’799 Adopting the latter, for example, is 
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more likely to lead to the imposition of a normative structure that focuses on ‘the 
activity of the control of things.’800 Another feature of the work of images is the 
relatively common device of an imaginary bystander, or the reasonable person: this is 
not a device explicable solely or even persuasively by the alleged priority given to 
‘ordinary meaning.’ It is better explained as another way of constructing the facts: of 
making the images appear in a certain way, of using them to delimit the availability of 
normative structures.  
What we see from the above very brief summary of a complex argument, 
Samuel gives explanatory priority to what persons do with images: how they frame 
them, how they imagine them, how they construct them, what analogies they find 
between them, and so on. The focus, in other words, is on abilities, and not on the 
content of propositions – though not, importantly, to the extent that the textual 
materials are neglected. The texts are there, as resources used by legal workers, but 
those texts must be seen as part of a much broader, more dynamic, context where the 
activities of persons is granted explanatory priority.  
The above promised to return to the historical dimension. It will be impossible 
to do so in any detail here. What is significant to point out, however, is that Samuel is 
at pains throughout his work to point to the diachronic dimension of currently stable 
legal categories, such as family law or consumer law, tracing certain features of 
common law taxonomy to the tripartite distinction between things, persons and 
actions in the Institutions of Gaius.  
At all times, Samuel’s eye is on practices, methods, and ways of solving 
problems. This is visible, for example, in his reference six different ‘schemes’, 
developed in the philosophy of social sciences, to construct facts: the causal scheme, 
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the functional scheme, the structural scheme, the hermeneutical scheme, the actional 
scheme and the dialectical scheme. In presenting them, Samuel is not particularly 
concerned to hold on to the differences between the schemes, acknowledging that 
interrelate in complex ways, and reminding us – again in a pragmatist streak – that all 
these ought to be understood as methods that may be serving different purposes, aims, 
functions, interests, concerns, and so on.801  
Legal work, then, for Samuel is a complex instance of constructing, 
categorising and comparing factual patterns in the context of certain traditionally-
accepted terms (e.g., injury, damage, consumer, manufacturer etc.) and connectors 
(e.g., cause, intent, motive etc.), the operation (and thus also our understanding) of 
which is fundamentally inseparable from that complex process of fact construction. In 
his detailed analysis of rule-fact complexes in the common law, Samuel adds 
epistemological bite to legal-work-as-tradition conceptions.  
 
IB2c. Institutional Contexts 
One feature common to legal-work-as-tradition conceptions is the focus on the 
context, physical and material, where legal work is conducted. Those contexts are 
often referred to as institutions: law courts, law firms, barristers’ chambers, Inns of 
Law, parliaments, and others. This section is devoted to a brief account of how some 
of those institutional contexts have been imagined in contemporary legal theoretical 
literature, in ways that remind us of certain explanatory tendencies in tradition-
oriented conceptions. Again, the discussion shall be selective, and focus initially on 
two recent works: Summers’ Form and Function in a Legal System,802 and Bell’s 
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Judiciaries within Europe.803 The final part of the section shall draw some contrasts 
between more general theories of institutional contexts that reveal the differences 
between tradition- and discourse-oriented explanations. 
In Form and Function in a Legal System, Summers criticises theories of law 
that claim legal systems are ‘essentially a system of rules’,804 identifying Hart and 
Kelsen as the primary exponents of that theory. His theory of form is applied to what 
he calls the diverse functional units of a system, including institutions, legal percepts 
(rules and principles), nonperceptual species of law (such as contracts), interpretive 
and other methodology, sanctions, and remedies.805 According to Summers, one 
cannot reduce the explanation of these functional units into sets of rules. Rather, one 
must employ a form-oriented analysis that allows one to break down the various 
elements of functional legal units, which include its purposes, overall form, 
constituent features thereof, and complementary material.806 The overall form that 
comprises all these elements is represented as ‘the purposive systematic arrangement 
of the unit as a whole: its organisational essence.’807 Identifying and reflecting upon 
the components and their interrelations within a functional unit allows one, amongst 
other things, to ‘organise further the mode of operation and the instrumental capacity 
of the unit.’808  
In the case of the legislature, for instance, ‘internal committee structures and 
operational procedures within a legislature must be designed and internally 
coordinated to facilitate the study, debate, and adoption or rejection of proposed 
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statutes.’809 Not only do the various kinds of forms within functional units need to be 
considered, but so do the relationships between functional units themselves: so, 
Summers says, there are devices that ‘consist of basic operational techniques that 
integrate and coordinate institutions, precepts, methodologies, sanctions and other 
functional units’, where each of those devices is a ‘formal organisational modality of 
wide-ranging significance.’810 
Thus, unlike rule-oriented analysis, form-oriented analysis of a legal system 
does not analyse the ‘contents of those reinforcive rules that are taken to prescribe the 
facets of functional legal units generally.’811 Instead, it recognises that there ‘can be 
no legal content without form’,812 placing emphasis on the need for the rational design 
of the components of functional units in order to fulfil the purposes of those units. 
Without, for example, a well-designed floor debate, statutes are less likely to beget 
good laws.  
A proper study of Summers’ book would need to engage in the dense detail of 
analysis of the formal components of an enormous range of functional legal units. For 
present purposes, the important point is that Summers provides us with a theoretical 
framework within which the activities of making, interpreting, applying and generally 
understanding the rules of law – the textual materials used as resources by legal 
workers – cannot be understood outside and in neglect of their institutional life.  
Bell’s book, Judiciaries within Europe, though primarily involving a 
comparative study of the judiciary in France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and England, 
is significant for present purposes in its enunciation and endorsement of an 
institutionally-oriented methodology for the understanding and explanation of the 
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operation of judicial work. There are, says Bell, three possible ways of approaching 
the understanding of judicial work: first, the personal perspective, ‘looks at the way 
individuals perceive their role and career’; second, the institutional perspective, ‘looks 
at the judiciary as a collective and examines the way in which the structure of the 
career and the organisation of the judges, as well as legal processes, affect the 
judiciary as a social institution’; and third, the external perspective, which ‘looks at 
the judiciary from the perspective of its impact on the wider world.’813 Bell’s 
preference for the institutional perspective is not merely pragmatic: it is not, in other 
words, merely a matter of facilitating what he considers to be an insightful 
comparison between judicial institutions. The institutional perspective, he says, is 
fundamental because ‘it relates to the nature of law…because this is how one operates 
as a legal actor…and because it is how the law relates to the wider world.’814 Like 
Summers, Bell argues that the law ‘is something more than simply a system of rules 
or legal standards…[it] is as much about practices, what people do, as about what they 
think.’815  
Bell does retain some features we may readily identify under discourse-
oriented conceptions. Thus, making reference to his previous work on French Legal 
Cultures,816 and using the term ‘legal culture’, Bell asserts that ‘on the one hand, legal 
culture is a pattern of behaviour or an activity’ and ‘on the other hand, there is a set of 
ideas and values, which are communicated through language and signs that express 
attitudes and values towards the activity.’817 The very fact that Bell adopts a split is 
instructive, and perhaps a sign that for him explanations of judicial work cannot rely 
solely on ‘patterns of behaviour.’  
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Discourse-oriented features are also visible in Bell’s adoption of the idea of 
institutional facts, first introduced by MacCormick and Weinberger,818 though he 
appropriates this to argue that ‘law is an interpretive reality’ that is preceded and 
pervaded by institutionally-based practices within the legal community.819 Bell thus 
develops his own meaning of what ‘an institutional fact analysis’ entails. He argues 
that it allows one to focus ‘attention on the judge as an actor whose actions are 
invested with meaning by the legal community through shared understandings’, only 
‘some of which are expressed in legal norms.’820 Further, it would be artificial to 
separate out, let alone focus exclusively on, the products of legal work – the 
judgements produced by judges – from the expectations placed upon those judges in 
specific institutional contexts that they act in. To do so would be to disregard the role 
of judges as institutional actors operating within a specific community and working 
within a specific institutional culture. In providing a picture of judicial work, a 
theorist must first understand the various kinds of institutional pressures on a judge to 
‘interpret legal texts and perform legal procedures in ways that are considered 
appropriate not just by her, but by the legal community.’821 And, one must understand 
how judges come to acquire and internalise, over long periods of time, that sense of 
appropriateness, embodied in activities and practices that themselves give rise to 
‘norms and standards for why the activity should be conducted in the future.’822 As 
Bell emphasises, ‘this structure of organisational learning does not deny change, but 
seeks to understand how deeply change operates.’823 
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Both Summers and Bell provide accounts that reveal tradition-oriented 
explanatory tendencies. Both depict legal work as enmeshed in the forms of 
institutional life. Other theories of institutional contexts, however, see such contexts 
in quite a different way. Rather than allowing for, and indeed giving much 
explanatory power to, lack of awareness by persons of how deeply influenced they are 
by certain forms of institutional life, these theories see institutions as occupied by 
deliberating actors, choosing between alternatives, sometimes rationally, at other 
times not (according to the theoretician’s criteria). Thus, for example, Robert 
Goodin’s introduction to The Theory of Institutional Design824 speaks of the 
ambitions of theories of institutional design to ‘give social agents good reasons for 
shaping institutions in some ways rather than others. Insofar as they are convinced of 
those arguments and moved by those reasons, those social agents will try to act upon 
those design prescriptions. Insofar as they succeed, institutions shaped by their actions 
will end up bearing something of the mark of those theories of optimal design.’825 
‘Good reasons’ might be provided, for example, by constitutional rules, which, as 
‘nested rules’, establish ‘stable and predictable’ patterns of behaviour by functioning 
as reasons for action for rational actors.826 Similarly constrained – in a manner that 
will remind us of the problem of law’s normativity for law-as-discourse conceptions – 
is the chapter in the above-mentioned collection by Philip Pettit, entitled ‘Institutional 
Design and Rational Choice.’827  
As a contrast from general social theory, consider Selznick’s Leadership in 
Administration.828 At the outset, Selznick makes a distinction between an 
organisation, which he sees as a ‘formal system of rules and objectives’ in which 
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‘tasks, powers and procedures are set out according to some officially approved 
pattern’829 and an institution, which ‘is more nearly a natural product of social needs 
and pressures—a responsive, adaptive organism.’830 Selznick is keen to stress 
awareness of the ‘“informal structure,” which arises as the individual brings into play 
his own personality, his special problems and interests.’831 There is, of course, a 
formal structure or ‘formal relations’, but these ‘co-ordinate roles or specialised 
activities, not persons.’832 The distinction between organisation and institution also 
performs another task for Selznick. It allows him to talk of what he calls 
‘institutionalisation’, which is an ‘infusion of value’ in an organisation that occurs 
over time – thus, it is a story about the development and change of organisations into 
institutions. The proper study of institutions, for Selznick, ‘is in some ways 
comparable to the clinical study of personality. It requires a genetic and 
developmental approach, an emphasis on historical origins and growth stages. There 
is a need to see the enterprise as a whole and to see how it is transformed as new ways 
of dealing with a changing environment evolve.’833  
Treating as it does the issue of leadership in administration, Selznick’s work is 
designed to be somewhat inspirational, so that it attempts to characterise a leader as 
‘an agent of institutionalisation, offering a guiding hand to a process that would 
otherwise occur more haphazardly, more readily subject to the accidents of 
circumstance and history.’834 Nevertheless, it makes use of ideas that feel at home in 
the treatment of institutional contexts in tradition-oriented explanations. These are 
ideas, furthermore, that may also remind us of Fuller’s insistence – and Selznick has 
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many times acknowledged a debt to Fuller – that we ought to see an institution as ‘an 
active thing, projecting itself into a field of interacting forces, reshaping those forces 
in diverse ways in varying degrees.’ 835 Fuller’s remarks, however, are also warning. 
On the one hand, we cannot see ‘every social arrangement or institutional practice’ as 
‘a means to some end’836 that we ourselves can foresee and set in advance. On the 
other hand, ‘we should not conceive of an institution as a kind of conduit directing 
human energies toward some single destination’,837 as if the institution lay completely 
outside of our control. As is often the case, a balance is required.  
 
 
IB2d. Cognition, Imagination and Constraint 
 
Lingering in the back of some of the accounts about has been the idea of abstractions 
as, at best, crystallisations or partial formalisations of socially grounded and 
emotionally involved experiences. Elaborating on this feature, by reference to an 
impressively wide range of literature in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and 
other fields, is Steven L. Winter’s A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life and Mind.838 At 
over 400 pages, it is the most authoritative pronouncement, by a legal scholar and 
theorist, of what is becoming known as Cognitive Legal Studies. Winter’s principal 
aim is to bring out the implications of that strand of cognitive studies that emphasises 
the importance of conceptual metaphors for pictures of legal work. These conceptual 
metaphors are ‘part of the unconscious rules of our language-game.’839 Without them, 
Winter asserts, ‘we could not even think.’840 If we can ‘perform the operations of 
“legal reasoning”’, says Winter, ‘it is because we have assimilated the tacit 
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knowledge that makes the rules comprehensible, defines the patterns of legal 
inference, and enables the productivity of crucial legal categories.’841 
Winter sets very ambitious aims for Cognitive Legal Studies. He thinks it can 
make tacit knowledge explicit.842 He thinks it can ‘explain how we do what we do.’843 
Interestingly, and in a move pointed to throughout this thesis, Winter positions his 
theory in the middle of what he sees as two extremes, i.e., where, according to one, 
the object (the law) constrains the subject, and, according to the other, the subject 
must command the object.844 There are three broad moves that he makes that believes 
allows him to assert that his theory goes beyond ‘the assumptions of subject-object 
dualism that frame much of the current legal debate.’845 The three moves are: first, 
that human thought is irreducibly imaginative; second, that imagination is embodied, 
interactive and grounded; and third, that imagination operates in a regularly, orderly, 
and systematic fashion.846  
Winter’s contribution is important for legal-work-as-tradition conceptions. 
The first of his above moves allows him to distance himself from those theories for 
whom cognition is ‘primarily representational, propositional, or computational’, 
replacing this image of cognition with one that is ‘dynamic and adaptive’, and 
‘involves processes that are imaginative, associative, and analogical.’847 His second 
move allows him to argue that ‘imagination…is dependent on the kinds of bodies that 
we have and on the ways in which those bodies interact with our environment’, and in 
doing so, helps him to assert that there is no such thing as a higher faculty of reason 
that is separate or in some sense prior or not built on and grounded in the contingency 
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of our experiences.848 Finally, his last move – and one that may recall the anxieties of 
discourse-oriented explanations – allows Winter to allay concerns that imagination so 
conceived is not ‘structured,’ providing proof of such a structure in such 
‘mechanisms’ and ‘mental operations’ as ‘basic-level categorisation’, ‘conceptual 
metaphor’, ‘metonymy’, ‘image-schemas’, ‘idealised cognitive models’, and ‘radial 
categories.’849 These steps taken together are designed to topple the long-standing 
dominance of the ‘higher faculty of reason’ in the history of philosophy, and to 
present ‘a picture of human rationality that is bottom-up rather than top-down, 
imaginative rather than linear, flexible rather than definitional, and characterised by 
openness rather than closure.’850 
The great bulk of the ideas discussed at length by Winter fall neatly under the 
legal-work-as-tradition conception: his claim, for example, that ‘there is thought 
without language’ and that ‘this is possible because thought originates in our sense of 
spatial and kinaesthetic orientation in the world’851 is instructively at odds with those 
discourse-oriented theorists, like Williams or Pavlakos, who, as we saw above, have 
claimed that thought without language is impossible. Furthermore, his insistence that 
we understand the motivation that acts as a constraint on law-makers,852 as ‘a function 
of the existing background of sedimented cultural practice and social experience: the 
customs, conventions, roles, routines, institutions, objects and other artefacts that 
compose the repertoire of which a society is constituted’853 echoes the preceding 
section’s insights on institutional contexts. His overall definition of law as ‘the 
unmistakable product of human interactions as they are institutionalised first in social 
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practice and then as cultural and legal norms’854 may remind us of many law-as-
tradition oriented theorists, including, perhaps most obviously, Fuller. Winter does 
not, however, stress the importance of the diachronic dimension (as does Samuel) of 
the legal imagination – a dimension that is of great importance to the legal-work-as-
tradition conception.    
Much, if not all, of the ‘evidence’ in cognitive studies that Winter relies on is 
very recent and hotly disputed. Hardly any of the implications that cognitive scientists 
themselves have drawn from their empirical research have been taken seriously, or if 
taken seriously, not examined at great length, by the majority of philosophers, let 
alone legal theorists. It is telling that the only dedicated acknowledgement of Winter’s 
contribution in a law journal is by Mark Johnson, a philosopher Winter relies on 
extensively. Johnson endorses Winter’s contribution, and adds his own insights. He 
argues that legal concepts ‘grow out of our problematic, historically and culturally 
situated communal practices and institutions.’855 He reminds us that although, legal 
concepts are in this respect ‘constrained by communally embedded understandings 
and practices’, they are also ‘open-ended in important ways that make it possible for 
law to grow in response to significant changes in human history.’856 Johnson is also 
just as convinced as Winter of the truth of Cognitive Legal Studies, arguing that what 
he calls ‘legal fundamentalism’ (i.e., ‘literalist and objectivist theories of thought and 
language’) is not only ‘wrong because it depends on a seriously mistaken view of how 
the mind works’, but also ‘dangerous because it tries to force law into dichotomous 
modes of thought and absolutist models that ignore the embodied social and cultural 
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bases of human understanding and value.’857 These are strong statements and we need 
not endorse them in order to learn from the insights of Cognitive Legal Studies.  
One can see echoes of Winter’s ideas in the writings of other legal theorists. 
One obvious parallel is the concept of legal mentalité by Pierre Legrand. As Cotterrell 
neatly summarises it, the notion of a legal mentalité refers to ‘a way of life, a means 
of interpreting social relationships, a component of an entire outlook, deeply rooted in 
all kinds of experience.’858 What Winter adds, that Legrand doesn’t have, is a detailed 
conception of this notion of ‘experience’ as embodied. Whether that provides further 
fodder for Legrand’s anti-unification and anti-harmonisation stance859 remains to be 
seen.  
In his book, Winter argues that ‘the relentless rationalism of standard legal 
thought represents a futile quest to define things and pin them down in the face of a 
reality that is change and adaptation.’860 In her paper, ‘Is Practical Reason Mindless?’, 
Linda Ross Meyer is similarly critical of attempts to ‘keep the world still in order to 
measure it.’861 She uses this criticism to argue for a theory of adjudication that does 
not attempt to control what judges will do, but rather, to come to terms with the 
unavoidable ‘uncertainty and handiwork’ involved in practical reason.862 The concept 
of ‘handiwork’, taken from Martin Heidegger, is particularly important for Meyer, 
and she uses it to argue that ‘judging cannot be made entirely self-conscious or 
reflective…described by rules, or governed by rules’,863 and in an echo of Jackson 
and Samuel, she notes that to apply a rule ‘presupposes that one has already “seen” it 
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as relevant to the case.’864 Like Winter, Meyer believes that the obsession with control 
(Winter says that ‘the obsession of the law is control’)865 together with prediction and 
rationalisation, is ‘coming into vogue within areas of legal doctrine.’866 Not always 
are these criticisms altogether clear, but Meyer’s ultimate aim is a noble one: she 
hopes to make us more aware of the limitations of our pictures of judicial behaviour, 
as is evident when she says: ‘However interesting or illuminating the results of social 
science, they are always descriptions of something less than ourselves.’867  
Section IA2 above mentioned Robertson’s argument, building on Fish, that 
there is no such thing as an unconstrained legal actor.868 Like Meyer, Robertson is 
keen to leave plenty of room for uncertainty in adjudication, while also leaving room 
for non-deliberative resolutions of that uncertainty. Following Fish he asserts that that 
uncertainty is resolved by ‘enterprise-specific’ ways of ‘doing what comes 
naturally.’869 Thus Fish is quoted with approval by Robertson: ‘When I use phrases 
like “without reflection” and “immediately” and “obviously” I do not mean to 
preclude self-conscious deliberation on the part of situated agents; it is just that such 
deliberations always occur within ways of thinking that are themselves the ground of 
consciousness, not its object.’870 Like Winter, then, Robertson claims that there are 
always and already constraints, not all of which (in fact, little of which, we can be 
aware of), but unlike Winter, he does not find the source of these mainly in the 
conceptual metaphors that emerged from embodied experience, but from a ‘shared in-
place background of goals, fears, hopes, values, etc.’871 
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The above provides an occasion to clarify that the legal-work-as-tradition 
conception does not rely exclusively on their being sub-conscious or even 
unconscious biases that determine judicial decisions.872 Rather, what the legal-work-
as-tradition conception emphasises is that legal workers come to acquire certain skills, 
habits and dispositions – certain ways of constructing, framing, etc., facts, or typical 
narrative images – by involvement in and exposure to the customs, practices and other 
forms of interaction in institutional contexts. The reference to a lack of awareness or 
self-consciousness, or even intentionality, that one sometimes sees mention of in 
accounts that are oriented towards tradition, is rather a marker for the inability to act 
completely without constraints (social, embodied, affective) while nevertheless not 
being determined by them. It serves to remind us that we cannot step outside our 
mind, and control our every thought as if each one of us was a puppeteer conducting a 
puppet.   
James Boyd White, in a paper entitled ‘Legal Knowledge’, provides a version 
of the above when he says that ‘Legal knowledge is an activity of mind, a way of 
doing something with the rules and cases an other materials of law, an activity which 
is itself not reducible to a set of directions or any fixed description.’873 Himself known 
for his account of ‘legal imagination’,874 Boyd-White asks us to conceive of legal 
knowledge as a ‘competence’, which ought to enable us to resist the tendency to 
objectify, reify and even commodify legal knowledge.875 What is more likely is that 
theorists will continue to exchange visions of knowledge, and thus also legal work, 
some focusing on abilities, and others characterising those same abilities as merely 
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forewords (lurking in the background)876 to their production in the form of discourses. 
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IC. TENSIONS AND FUSIONS 
Having now completed the account of tradition- and discourse-oriented explanatory 
paradigms of law and legal work, and before considering the implications of the 
discussion, it will be instructive to show how both orientations can appear in 
individual works of legal theory. In considering the five works below, the hope is that 
something of the usefulness of the above two explanatory paradigms can be revealed. 
No doubt these works can be read and learnt from in many ways (indeed, that is one 
of the most significant points stressed by this thesis), and the argument in the five 
sections below is that the tension between discourse and tradition is one of those 
ways. The five inquiries referred to below are: first, Elizabeth Mertz’s account of 
anthropological linguistics; second, Nicola Lacey’s attempt to fuse analytical 
jurisprudence with descriptive sociology; third, Roger Cotterrell’s call for a 
sociological analysis of legal ideas; fourth, Neil MacCormick’s Institutions of Law; 
and fifth, Patrick Glenn’s Legal Traditions of the World. As we shall see, none of the 
above can be neatly packaged into either a tradition- or a discourse-friendly picture of 
law or legal work. All, however, can, be profitably read as oscillating between the 
two.  
 Before proceeding, it also ought to be noted that all theoretical pictures of law 
or legal work may contain some of the basic features of discourse and tradition 
explanatory paradigms. Indeed, as explanatory paradigms, they are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Rather, it is a matter of explanatory priorities: if a theoretical 
picture is, for example, discourse-oriented, it may contain features of both paradigms, 
while nevertheless placing explanatory priority on the basic features of the discourse 
explanatory paradigm.  
 
 217 
IC1. ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS 
 
Elizabeth Mertz locates her conception of anthropological linguistics beyond, rather 
than between, what she refers to as the reflectionist and instrumentalist views of 
language. In the case of the first, reflectionist, view, language itself is seen to be 
‘important only because it provides a window on social process; language is [here] 
understood to be a straightforward expression of its social context.’877 According to 
the second, instrumentalist, view, ‘people use language transparently to achieve social 
goals…[where] by transparent we mean that there is no distinctive effect imputed to 
language; linguistic forms operate as tools through which actors achieve certain social 
results.’878 It is a distinction that, as she recognises, harks back to Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s long-standing division between langue, that sense of language as an 
abstract system with its own dynamics, and parole, that sense of language ‘as an 
instrument effecting social ends.’879  
The kind of anthropological linguistics that Mertz has in mind is not a mere 
combination of these formal and functional, or reflectionist and instrumentalist 
approaches to language. Rather, she says, there is a third way: an integrative approach 
that provides a picture of what she calls ‘socially grounded linguistic creativity.’880 
Mertz introduces this conception with a number of preliminary remarks. 
Anthropological linguistics, she asserts, reverses ‘the usual assumption in the 
philosophy of language and other traditions that the dominant function of language is 
conveying semantic information.’881 ‘As a result’ of this assumption, she says, ‘a 
great deal of work on language structure has proceeded with a blind eye to the social 
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grounding of language.’882 What we ought to recognise, she argues, is that for 
‘language to be actually used—for the abstract system of language to be translated 
into speech—there is a necessary move to the indexical or social contextual realm.’883 
‘Conveying semantic information is but one of the things that [language] does…it can 
also express emotion, maintain social distance, etc.’884 Language functions 
indexically, she argues, and when it is, ‘semantics becomes a subset, a special case of 
pragmatics.’885  
There are three senses in which we can, says Mertz, speak of linguistic 
creativity. First, there is the capacity of language ‘to refer to and represent itself (the 
“meta” level of language)’886 – e.g., reading ‘portions of the Bill of Rights…in a 
questioning tone of voice, making questions of sentences that are written 
declaratively.’887 The second sense is brought out when we see that ‘any particular 
event of speaking functions against a backdrop of “presupposed” social knowledge 
that can be specified ahead of time.’888 The creativity here emerges not when we use 
say, an endearing term for a loved one, for the presupposed social knowledge to 
which Mertz refers already contains a norm according to which we use terms of 
endearment to those with whom we are intimate. On the contrary, creativity emerges 
precisely when we begin using endearing terms in official or other non-intimate 
contexts, at which point the use may be insulting.889 We can use the same example to 
bring out the third creative aspect. When I use a formal title with a friend – I call him, 
say, Mr President – it is not just that I am breaking a presupposed social norm; I am 
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also, Mertz insists, creating ‘a social reality that did not exist prior to the act of 
speaking.’890 Of course, to pick out such a creative use, the observer must know 
(though the observer may not be aware that she has such knowledge till after the 
creative use is noticed) something not only of the norms for the use of formal titles 
and nicknames, but also something of the previous relationship between the speakers, 
the current speech situation, and so on.891  
What all these examples suggest, for Mertz, is that ‘if we focus only on the 
content (semantics) rather than the form (pragmatics) of speech, we miss a great deal 
about the creative function of language.’892 We need to rid ourselves, says Mertz, 
quoting James Boyd White, of the ‘habit of mind…that our most important uses of 
language are fundamentally propositional in character, indeed that any meaningful 
piece of discourse asserts (or denies) that such and such is the case.’893 Rather, what 
we need, again following White, is a way of ‘imagining language not as a set of 
propositions, but as a repertoire of forms of action and of life.’894 Importantly, this is a 
conception that operates in time, and thus in the face, according to Sally Engel Merry, 
of uncertainty and contingency.895 Language use is not studied retrospectively, where 
an ‘analysis might make it seem as if a certain interpretation and concomitant result 
was inevitable’, but rather, ‘from the perspective of a person in the process of an 
ongoing linguistic exchange, [where] all manner of meanings could potentially result 
from their choices in speaking.’896 Mertz argues that such a framework of socially 
grounded linguistic creativity in the face of contingency and uncertainty ‘provides a 
compelling reason for paying attention to the language of law’, doing so in a way that 
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conveys how ‘language is structured in crucial ways by its social context, and social 
power is implication at every level of contextual influence on language (sometimes all 
the more powerfully at the subtle levels of pragmatic structuring that are not easily 
accessible to conscious awareness).’897 What is interesting for present purposes is the 
way that Mertz oscillates between the importance of discourse – she endorses, for 
example, White’s point that ‘our purposes, like our observations, have no prelingual 
reality, but are constituted in language’898 – and the importance of tradition, i.e., all 
those no doubt infinite constructions of the pragmatic context under the scrutiny of 
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IC2. ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND DESCRIPTIVE 
SOCIOLOGY  
 
Nicola Lacey eases us into her call for the analysis of the institutional conditions of 
the existence of legal rules by revealing what she takes to be the limitations of the 
work of Hart. In her earlier biography of Hart,899 Lacey had mentioned – and gave 
some personal reasons for understanding – Hart’s much-discussed claim, in The 
Concept of Law, that the book was an exercise in descriptive sociology.900 In a 
subsequent paper, entitled ‘Analytical Jurisprudence and Descriptive Sociology 
Revisited’, Lacey tackles the question more philosophically, and shows why and how 
she thinks that Hart does not fulfil his promise.901 Lacey presents the following as the 
paradox for those, like Hart, who adopted the ordinary language school of 
philosophical analysis: ‘if language speaks for itself,’ she notes, ‘it is not clear that 
philosophical analysis is either necessary or capable of being applied to linguistic 
usage without doing violence to its meaning. For philosophical analysis is itself a 
distinctive form of usage. How, then, can linguistic usage criticise the incoherence of 
the linguistic practice that it takes as its material?’902 Lacey’s question is poignant, for 
it is indeed a neat move of the ordinary language philosophers to argue that in 
studying allegedly ordinary language use they are really describing the reality of some 
social phenomenon. By providing a meaning – as it is allegedly available on a perusal 
of the way it is used in ordinary, everyday life – of the word courtesy, we can, it is 
said, understand the social phenomenon of courtesy. However, as Lacey asks, ‘when 
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we claim that our account is an account of a concept or phenomenon that has a real 
social existence, what, precisely, are the criteria of accountability involved?’903  
Lacey looks specifically at Hart’s writings on responsibility,904 and on his 
work, with Tony Honoré, on causation.905 In the case of the latter, as Lacey puts it, 
‘Hart and Honoré simply inundate us with a huge amount of actual linguistic data. 
This data is almost exclusively drawn from appellate case law.’906 In doing so, Lacey 
laments, Hart and Honoré do not provide the reader with ‘a systematic analysis of the 
institutional, practical, professional, or social context in which that legal language was 
used.’907 They offer no ‘exploration of the social practices or forms of life within 
which the causal language game is embedded.’908 They reduce, she continues, 
‘linguistic usage to a body of doctrine rather than seeing it as a social practice that 
takes place within a context, the specific nature of which requires investigation 
because it inflects the relevant concepts.’909 In both the case of causation, and in the 
case of his writings on responsibility, Hart, says Lacey, ‘never looked at the 
relationship between language and behaviour; between linguistic usage and 
context.’910 In that respect, she argues, Hart ought not to be seen as ‘having had an 
institutional or social theory of law.’911 He analyses law ‘as a body of doctrine rather 
than as a social practice, and “usage” is understood as the language that makes up the 
doctrines.’912   
Lacey proposes the following alternative – an alternative, she argues, more 
inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s approach to language, in opposition to that of J.L. 
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Austin’s: it is an approach that would explore, for example, ‘1) the institutional 
factors that restrict the extent to which judges will appeal to pragmatic or policy 
arguments, 2) their sensitivity to the need to legitimate their decisions, 3) their 
system-specific understanding of their constitutional role.’913 ‘The illumination of 
legal practices’, Lacey argues, ‘lies not merely within an analysis of doctrinal 
language; it lies equally with an attempt to locate the analysis within some general 
account of the history and social role of the institutions and the power relations within 
which that usage takes place.’914 Lacey extends her general view to that of an analysis 
of the institutional factors shaping the legal concept of responsibility.915 Finally, 
Lacey argues that her way of integrating analytical jurisprudence with descriptive 
sociology has implications for a jurisprudence that engages, as she argues the best 
kind does, in a normative and not merely descriptive analysis: 
If conceptual ideas have institutional and other conditions of existence—if, for 
example, a notion of capacity responsibility can only be realised in criminal 
law on the basis of certain institutional developments and in the context of a 
cluster of social and cultural conditions—this has clear implications for the 
pursuit of our normative project. To the extent that the ambition of special 
jurisprudence is to affirm, and not merely to delineate, certain key legal 
concepts, we must surely be interested in the conditions that facilitate—or 
hamper—their institutional realisation.916  
 
Lacey, then, seeks to provide us with a method via which we can resist the ‘radical 
separation between the analytical and the contextual’, and thus protect us against the 
occlusion of our understanding of law that, she argues, is a direct result of such a 
separation.917 Like Mertz, though in a different way, Lacey falls somewhere between 
the discourse and tradition explanatory paradigms: there are such things as legal ideas 
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IC2c. SOCIOLOGY OF LEGAL IDEAS 
 
In his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams concludes his criticism 
of the linguistic turn in moral philosophy in a manner instructive for our 
understanding of both Lacey’s and Roger Cotterrell’s integration of tradition- and 
discourse-friendly elements in legal theory: 
It is an obvious enough idea that if we are going to understand how ethical 
concepts work, and how they change, we have to have some insight into the 
forms of social organisation within which they work. The linguistic approach 
does not, at some detached level, deny this, but it does not ask any questions 
that help us gain that insight or to do anything with it in philosophy if we have 
gained it. Its concentration on questions of logical analysis have helped to 
conceal the point, and so has its pure conception of philosophy itself, which 
indeed emphasises that language is a social activity but at the same time, oddly 
enough, rejects from philosophy any concrete interest in societies. But it is at 
least potentially closer to some understanding of the social and historical 
dimensions of ethical thought than some other approaches, which see it 
entirely in terms of an autonomous and unchanging subject matter. To draw 
attention to our ethical language can at least hold out the prospect of our 
coming to think about it, and about the ethical life expressed in it, as social 
practices can change. The linguistic turn could have helped us, even if it has 
not actually done so, to recognise that ethical understanding needs a dimension 
of social explanation.918 
 
Though long, it is worth including this quote in full. Both Lacey’s and Cotterrell’s 
views can be seen as seeking to resist the criticism made by Williams, by locating the 
study of legal ideas within the forms of social organisation within which they work. 
Cotterrell is against explanations of law in terms of sociological terms alone: he 
argues that such explanations ‘make law disappear.’919 ‘A sociological understanding 
of legal ideas’, he says, ‘does not reduce them to something other than law. It 
expresses their social meaning as law in its rich complexity.’920 By ‘law’, then, 
Cotterrell clearly means to refer to a more or less coherent body of doctrine. Indeed, 
he places great emphasis on the importance of coherence: he argues, for example, that 
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it is ‘essential that understanding of law should be systematic and general, theorised 
and organised.’921 This is necessary, he says, ‘at the very least… to manage both legal 
doctrinal and social complexity.’922   
But it is important to see that Cotterrell is not wholly comfortable within the 
law-as-discourse explanatory paradigm. ‘Undoubtedly,’ he acknowledges, ‘law is 
presented professionally as a more or less unified, specialised discourse’, but it ‘is an 
intellectually vulnerable, open discourse, liable to invasion by many kinds of ideas, 
including sociological ones.’923 If there is such a thing as law’s truth, and the nature of 
that truth appears in the form of a unified, distinctive discourse, then we ought to 
recognise that that truth is ‘a contingent feature of particular social environments.’924 
‘Ultimately,’ he suggests, law ‘is given discursive coherence and unity only because 
its intellectual insecurity, its permanent cognitive openness, is stabilised by political 
fiat.’925  
However, we ought not to think that the sociological analysis of legal doctrine 
– an analysis also advocated by Durkheim, one of Cotterrell’s philosophical heroes – 
is all one way. We ought not to think, in other words, that sociology itself is not 
informed by the construction of social reality by law.926 Law, he says, ‘defines social 
relations and influences the shape of the very phenomena sociology studies’;927 it 
‘constitutes important aspects of social life by shaping or reinforcing modes of 
understanding of social reality.’928 In that sense, he argues, ‘theorising [legal] ideas is 
not a separate enterprise from theorising the nature of social life.’929 ‘Sociological 
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analysis,’ he says, needs ‘to see legal ideas as forms of organisation of the social 
world.’930 As a ‘field of experience’, he says, law ‘is to be understood as an aspect of 
social relationships in general, as wholly concerned with the coexistence of 
individuals in social groups.’931 It is because Cotterrell sees the function of legal 
discourse as concerned with social relationships and as constituting social reality, that 
he argues that the sociology of legal ideas is already the sociology of social life itself.  
But that body of legal ideas, though clearly powerful, is not to be ‘considered 
merely as disembodied doctrine.’932 Rather, ‘law appears as doctrine produced in, 
embodied in and legitimating institutional practices.’933 Like other normative systems, 
law consists, according to Cotterrell, ‘of rules, concepts, and principles and is 
distinguished from’ those other normative systems ‘in degree rather than in kind by 
the existence of an institutional structure for the development and organisation of 
doctrine.’934 Law may appear as a discourse, but it is ‘rooted in community life’; it is 
‘an ever-changing web of norms expressing and influencing the interactions of many 
different networks of community.’935 It judges the particular norms that arise in the 
community within which it thrives ‘in terms of its existing doctrine, and it represses, 
adopts, integrates, modifies or comprises with these norms.’936 Cotterrell, perhaps 
even more so than Mertz and Lacey, moves back and forward, dialectically, between 
the discourse and tradition paradigms, using one family of ideas to prop up the other, 
finding the ceaseless oscillation between the two revealing. He does not seem to go as 
far as Tamanaha937 or Schauer,938 who argue for the social construction of the concept 
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of law – as Tamanaha puts it, ‘law is whatever people identify and treat through their 
social practices as “law.”’939 He does not appear to be as concerned with what counts 
as law. A body of legal doctrine is already there for Cotterrell; he is more interested in 
how it operates. And, for him, it operates, or at least so it seems from Cotterrell’s 
language, relatively autonomously (as above, he says ‘it judges’, and ‘it constitutes 
social reality’, etc.). But, that operation itself would not be possible without a specific 
social environment, a community, a form of social organisation that both nurtures it 
and is itself created by it.  
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IC4. INSTITUTIONS OF LAW 
 
Neil MacCormick’s latest book, his magnum opus, Institutions of Law: an Essay in 
Legal Theory,940 is a work of incredible scope and ambition, covering vast areas of the 
law (including private, public, criminal, and constitutional law). The discussion below 
cannot hope to do it justice. Nevertheless, it will be instructive to consider parts of the 
first four chapters – the most generally philosophical, which set the tone for the book 
– from the perspective of the interaction of the tradition and discourse explanatory 
paradigms.  
It is noteworthy to begin with MacCormick’s invocation of the distinction 
between brute and institutional facts. It is noteworthy, in light of the aims of the 
present discussion, because the centrality of that distinction – of fundamental 
significance to MacCormick’s earlier work (with Weinberger)941 – is somewhat 
displaced by another distinction made in this work, i.e., that between norm-users and 
norm-givers. As we shall see, that latter distinction can be profitably understood under 
the rubric of the tradition and discourse explanatory paradigms. The distinction 
between brute and institutional facts is that brute facts are ‘sheer physical facts’,942 
while institutional facts are ones ‘that depend on the interpretation of things, events, 
and pieces of behaviour by reference to some normative framework.’943 The key 
move from seeing something as an institutional fact, rather than a brute one – as in the 
move from seeing a piece of colourful plastic and recognising it is a credit card – is 
enabled, indeed presupposes, a ‘body of legal or other rules’,944 including, for 
example, those concerning consumer credit. Without these rules, MacCormick says, 
‘the physical object would lack or lose its current meaning. Interpretation of the things 
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and their use in the light of the relevant rules is what makes such physical objects 
have the meaning they have.’945 Recognising institutional facts, then, is a method for 
revealing the ontology of law, and thus also, though no doubt somewhat imperfectly, 
the ‘omnipresent and inherent elements of social reality.’946 
It is interesting to pause here and consider a recent debate between Searle – 
the most well-known proponent of the idea of institutional facts – and Dreyfus. 
Searle, as is well known, finds classical theories of social reality – such as those 
offered by Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Emile Durkheim, and Alfred Schutz – 
deficient for ‘taking language for granted.’947 They ‘presuppose’, says Searle, ‘the 
existence of language and then, given language, ask about the nature of society.’948 
But this move, argues Searle, has ‘things back to front.’949 Consider the following 
passage: 
You cannot begin to understand what is special about human society, how it 
differs from primate societies and other animal societies, unless you first 
understand some special features of human language. Language is the 
presupposition of the existence of other social institutions in a way that they 
are not the presupposition of language. This point can be stated precisely.  
Institutions such as money, property, government and marriage cannot exist 
without language, but language can exist without them.950 
 
Even those sociological theorists who have taken language seriously – such as Pierre 
Bourdieu, Jürgen Habermas, and the linguistic anthropologists (such as Mertz, as 
above) – have, according to Searle, neglected to recognise the ‘constitutive role of 
language.’951 Recognising that constitutive role, in turn, allows us to see, Searle says, 
that ‘human societies have a logical structure, because human attitudes are 
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constitutive of the social reality in question and those attitudes have propositional 
contents with logical relations.’952 The challenge, as Searle sees it, for any theory of 
social reality, is ‘to expose those relations.’953 Institutional facts, such as money, a 
football game, a piece of private property, a marriage or a government, exist only 
insofar as they are represented as existing; and they are only represented as so existing 
when thoughts represent them; those thoughts, in turn, for Searle – taking us back to 
our earlier discussion of the language of thought hypothesis – are dependent on 
language. The flame of the explanatory paradigm of discourse could not burn brighter. 
It is instructive to consider Dreyfus’ critique of Searle’s approach to social 
reality. Dreyfus does so in a paper entitled ‘The Primacy of Phenomenology over 
Logical Analysis.’954 Dreyfus takes issue with Searle’s location of the determination 
of action within an intentionally formed propositional attitude. He replaces it, by 
drawing on the work Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, with what he 
calls the phenomenology of everyday absorbed coping. Within such absorbed coping, 
a person need not be aware, nor be striving for, success: rather, the person, having 
acquired a certain degree of the relevant skill in question, feels what is appropriate in 
the situation at hand. Intention may still be an important part of the explanation of the 
behaviour – but it is more like an occasion, a trigger, rather than an accompanying 
element all the way through the action. The key point is that we learn, over more or 
less long periods of time, to sense the appropriateness of certain ways of doing, 
coping, in particular environments – as we might recall, these are all central features 
of a tradition-friendly epistemology.  
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What, according to Dreyfus, follows for an account of social reality? For 
Dreyfus, adopting the perspective of everyday absorbed coping, allows us to see that 
‘social norms need not be constituted the way institutional facts are; all that is needed 
to produce a social norm is collective agreement in judgments in the Wittgensteinian 
sense, i.e., the coordination of the tensions and tension-resolutions people socialised 
into a certain culture feel in specific social situations.’955 Dreyfus provides the 
following example – one that will be useful for bringing out MacCormick’s notion of 
norm-users: 
To see how this works, we can return to the phenomenon of standing the 
appropriate distance from others. A child learns such a social norm from her 
parents without the parents even sensing they are inducting her into the 
practice. Simply, if the child stands too close or too far away, the parent feels a 
tension and corrects the impropriety by moving closer or backing away. The 
child then ends up feeling comfortable in each specific situation only when 
standing the culturally appropriate distance. Thus, from the phenomenological 
point of view, a certain type of physical distance doesn’t count as the 
appropriate distance for the person to stand; the person is just drawn to the 
comfortable and therefore appropriate place.956 
 
To put it more generally, the ‘sense of appropriateness of certain comportments is 
produced by socialisation without there needing to be any type of brute fact and 
without there needing to be any linguistically describable status assigned to it.’957 It is 
Searle, says Dreyfus, who has things back to front. It is ‘social skills that create and 
sustain norms underlie and make possible social institutions…the sense of what is 
appropriate sets up the power relations which in turn give institutions the powers 
codified as rights and obligations.’958 Institutional facts ‘evolve out of social 
norms’;959 ‘money grows out of and makes sense in terms of the practice of barter’;960 
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social norms are ‘already involved in using something as a medium of exchange’;961 
‘even in cases of highly codified institutions’, says Dreyfus, ‘such as property, the 
institution must draw on the social norms out of which it evolved if it is to make sense 
to people and so be accepted and perpetuated. Our sense of the appropriate ways of 
using things and letting others use them or excluding others from using them 
underlies our practices for dealing with property, and, in the end, underlies the laws 
spelling out property relations in terms of rights and duties. Indeed,’ says Dreyfus, ‘it 
is this underlying practical sense of the “spirit” of our institutions that allows judges 
to extend the laws codifying our practices to new cases.’962  
The oscillation here between discourse (emphasised by Searle) and tradition 
(emphasised by Dreyfus) plays itself out in MacCormick’s definition of law as 
‘institutional normative order’ – a definition that is, at its base, rooted in the notion of 
norm-users. MacCormick uses the example of forming a queue, or the practice of 
queuing, to extrapolate his notion. The practice of forming a queue, he says, ‘occurs 
very frequently in the everyday experience of contemporary human beings.’963 It is ‘a 
matter of common experience.’964 ‘To the extent that people “take their turn” in a 
queue or line, there is an orderly movement through the checkout, or on to a tramcar 
or bus.’965 Of course, queuing need not work perfectly: either because ‘there may 
always be somebody with brass neck enough to jump the queue’ or because ‘it is 
sometimes all right to go to the head of the line without waiting your turn’ (e.g., in 
cases of medical emergency).966 Nevertheless, even if it may not work perfectly, 
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‘there is some minimum threshold of compliance below which the practice would be 
unsustainable’:967  
It would be literally impossible to be the only person that ‘takes her turn’ 
because ‘turns’ require a mutually co-ordinated practice of two or more. When 
a substantial majority of potential competitors for a certain opportunity fails to 
acknowledge turn-taking, it amounts to pointless self-abnegation if one or a 
few act as though most others were ready to take their turn.968  
 
From this it follows, says MacCormick, that ‘turn-taking or queuing 
is…normative’:969  
For where there is a queue for something you want, you ought to take your 
turn in it, and people who do take their turn do so because in their opinion that 
is what one ought to do—that is, ought to do in the given context. Such action-
guiding ‘ought’ alerts us to the presence of some kind of norms, and to the 
normative character of the opinions that people hold in such a setting.970  
 
The practice of queuing, then, is normative, but it is also a kind of normative order. 
‘People’s positioning in a queue,’ says MacCormick, ‘is ordered, not random.’971 But 
this is not an order that can be studied ‘“externally” and reported statistically’; it is a 
‘“normative order” because, or to the extent that, one can account for it by reference 
to the fact that actors are guiding what they do by reference to an opinion concerning 
what they and others ought to do.’972 The ‘result’, says MacCormick, ‘is a kind of 
common action by mutually aware participants.’973  
Importantly, MacCormick, unlike Searle, does not rely on language to develop 
his account of norm-users in normative orders. ‘There can be normative order’, he 
says, ‘without explicitly formulated norms.’974 Perhaps partly due to his self-imposed 
requirement of mutual awareness – on some level of self-consciousness, rather than, 
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as Dreyfus would have it, an everyday absorbed coping, which may, at best, involve 
the exercise of motor-intentionality – MacCormick continues to explain normative 
order via implicit norms. ‘People know how to queue,’ he says ‘and can tell cases of 
queue-jumping, and protest about them, even if they have never articulated exactly 
what their governing norm is.’975 What explains this phenomenon is that ‘implicit 
norms are in fact largely observed and respected, without any other element of 
supervision, direction or enforcement than that constituted by a pressure of common 
(not necessarily either universal or identically expressed) normative opinion among 
those who interact with each other.’976   
Interestingly, then, though he posits the possibility of a stratum of social 
behaviour that need not rely on pre-articulated norms, MacCormick nevertheless feels 
tempted to explain the order as one governed by mutual awareness of an implicit 
norm. Providing such an explanation, allows for an easier transition to the articulation 
of rules of conduct for the behaviour in question. It is an easier transition because 
those rules can now be seen not as imposed from above, but as, in some sense, 
emerging from the practice of a normative order – those rules are an attempt, no doubt 
imperfect, and no doubt appearing in a formulation that not everyone might agree 
with, to make explicit the implicit norm or norms that norm-users had been following 
all along – without feeling the need for articulation. The transition doesn’t always 
occur – as MacCormick points out, ‘normative order can exist in some cultural and 
social settings on the basis simply of mutual belief and inexplicit norms with 
overlapping mutual understanding and interpretation.’977 But sometimes it does 
become necessary to avoid ‘problems of a kind apparently endemic in informal 
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orders’978 ‘by resorting to the issuance of expressly articulated norms, making explicit 
what is to be done or decided in expressly foreseen circumstances.’979   
MacCormick’s elaboration, then, of normative orders, remains wedded to the 
attraction of the explanatory power of discourse. Normativity is still best explained, 
he seems to think, by rule-following, though the element that he adds is that those 
rules need not be explicit, they need not be pre-articulated. In introducing, at the 
foundation of his theory, the primacy of norm-users – human beings are, by their 
nature, he suggests, norm-users, and they are so before they are norm-givers – 
MacCormick does edge closer to the explanatory value of tradition. But the notion of 
tradition is subordinated to that of order, and to that of normative order, which, in 
MacCormick’s view, require some element of relatively conscious rule-following: 
discourse, then, is still there, operating to explain behaviour; to restrict, if you prefer, 
the explanation of behaviour to that of mutually aware persons interacting with each 
other. But that discourse is, self-consciously in MacCormick, a kind of fiction – it is 
implicit, unarticulated. It is as if MacCormick does everything he can to resist 
conceptualising tradition without discourse – for, he seems to believe, the only 
explanation on offer by the paradigm of tradition is a normatively reductive one, i.e., 
it would reduce the explanation of behaviour to a matter of externally observing 
regularities, to reporting on behaviour statistically. To be rescued, the very concept of 
normativity for MacCormick must be action-guiding, operating ex ante, capable of 
explaining micro-actions – all the hallmarks of an explanation of social behaviour 
based on the discourse paradigm. However, at the same time, the move to make norm-
users primary recognises the explanatory limitations of discourse – at least in its 
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articulated form – for how else to explain the phenomenon of queuing, when there are 
no express rules that can be said to govern it? 
The same kind of problems – and a similar kind of oscillation between 
tradition and discourse – appears in chapter four, which deals with rules and habits. In 
light of some recent work by Soosay (who was discussed above), MacCormick opens 
his chapter with an acknowledgement that ‘there is a case for the re-evaluation of 
“habits” in life and in law.’980 His principal strategy is to incorporate the role of habits 
in his theory of law as institutional normative order by arguing that ‘institutionalised 
legal orders depend on habits about rules, that is, on habitual references in some 
contexts to special sorts of text like those in the statute book and those in law 
reports.’981 MacCormick elaborates on this as follows: 
This involves the maintenance of a standing practical attitude towards 
institutionally established rule-texts…when these are cited and brought to 
attention as relevant to some context…. The habit or practical disposition of 
personnel engaged in legal work must include a disposition to give respect to 
and seek respect for any relevant provisions found in the texts of valid statutes 
and binding precedents, read in the light of the principles and values to which 
they give expression.982 
 
Having acknowledged such a role for habits, MacCormick goes on to recognise that 
there are two kinds of gap between habits and law (conceived of as institutionalised 
normative order). The first is that knowledge of the law on the books does not capture 
the knowledge and, equally, respect of the law in practice: thus, the success of 
lawyers in practice ‘derives from a great deal more practical knowledge, know-how, 
and wisdom than could be gleaned from however voluminous a grasp of the whole 
body of statute law, whether or not supplemented with voracious reading of cases and 
precedents.’983 We have already seen this observation being made in the context of a 
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tradition-friendly picture of legal work. The second gap is the efficacy gap, namely, 
that: 
However legal professionals and legal officials negotiate their way around the 
law, it is very much an open question how much of the official law is any part 
of the working consciousness of laypersons. It is also questionable to what 
extent their sense of what is right and proper depends on, and how far it 
diverges from, what the official law enjoins either in the sense of abstract texts 
or in the mediated form filtered through professional and official practice.984  
 
We have observed this gap too – doing so, for example, above by reference to 
Giudice’s distinction between norm-subjects and norm-subjecteds (in section IA1d). 
MacCormick addresses the difficulties arising from these gaps by pointing out that 
they are not always as large as may think. ‘There is,’ he insists, ‘a large conceptual 
framework [provided by law] which is available to people to appeal to, and to which 
they do frequently appeal.’985 People generally know they have rights, he says, and 
they know there are things that are crimes, and they can generally discern their own 
belongings from those of others.986 Further, states increasingly acknowledge 
‘international standards of acceptable conduct’, and corporations ‘acknowledge legal 
conditions for recognition of corporate activity wherever they engage in trade.’987 
Finally, says MacCormick, there is such a thing as a ‘civil society’ – such that 
‘civility can obtain among persons who are relative [or complete] strangers to each 
other.’988 All these elements encourage us to ‘consider whether [our] lived experience 
is not the best evidence [we] could have that law is at work to some reasonable extent 
in the state [we] live in.’989  
The same move, then, is made in conceiving of the relationship between habits 
and rules, as is made at the level of institutionalised normative order and normative 
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order simpliciter. Habits are certainly there, but their explanatory role is limited, at 
least in legal theory, for providing an account of our capacity to follow rules. We are 
norm-users, and the concept of a norm for MacCormick is, at bottom, a rule, even if it 




IC5. LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 
 
Finally, this section considers Patrick Glenn’s Legal Traditions of the World.990 
Glenn’s book is just as, if not more, magisterial in its scope as MacCormick’s. Once 
again, given that scope, the focus is limited to the first few theoretical chapters. There 
is no discussion, therefore, of Glenn’s application of the concept of a legal tradition to 
specific legal traditions. Rather, the focus is on how Glenn defines and explains the 
concept of legal tradition itself.   
It will be useful to do so, even if only because, as Glenn notes in his response 
to a symposium on the book in the Journal of Comparative Law,991 ‘the criticism 
most frequently encountered in the symposium…is that the concept of legal tradition 
is not adequately defined, such that one cannot ascertain whether one is before the 
legal, or not.’992 Glenn confesses to finding this criticism ‘surprising, given the range 
of experience of the commentators, since each,’ he says, ‘appears to me, is reverting 
to a uniquely Western insistence on separation, here of law from all else.’993 The 
insistence on such a separation, he continues, ‘is found nowhere else in the world, or 
more precisely nowhere outside of the Western legal tradition, such that the absence 
of a clear separation between legal and other traditions may be seen not as a problem 
but as a virtue, a necessary reflection of interdependence.’994 In responding to the 
criticism, then, Glenn finds himself resorting to a metaphilosophical analysis of 
jurisprudential inquiries. He argues that the criticism emerges from the tendency, 
dominant in Western legal theory in the last two hundred years, to formulate ‘the 
concept of a legal system,’ which insists ‘on clear, or purportedly clear, identification 
                                                
990 Glenn 2007a. 
991 Glenn 2007b; the symposium is edited by Nicholas Foster – see Foster 2006.  
992 Glenn 2007b, 70. 
993 Ibid., 71. 
994 Id. 
 241 
of law.’995 The notion of a system – and, to some extent also, he suggests, the notion 
of a culture – has operated, ‘since the so-called Enlightenment,’ with ‘a certain bias 
against the idea of tradition.’996 Glenn expressed dissatisfaction with those notions of 
tradition that have sought to explain it by reference to habit or ‘the process of 
transmission of information from generation to generation.’997 These formulations, he 
suggests, represent ‘ongoing bias against the idea [of tradition], equating it with 
unreflective behaviour or a current process.’998 Indeed, we have already witnessed this 
to some extent in MacCormick’s work, whose account of normative order is 
dependent on mutual awareness of implicit or explicit rules, and one that, equally, 
reduces the explanatory paradigm of tradition to the external observance of 
regularities, reported statistically.  
Glenn presents his concept of tradition as not falling prey to this trap, to this 
ongoing bias. Tradition, he says, is ‘best thought of as normative information, the 
object of transmission rather than the process itself, or unreflective reaction to it.’999 
He argues that this conception allows us to better appreciate ‘the tradition itself, the 
process of its transmission, and contemporary reaction to it.’1000 Such a concept, he 
says, is to be contrasted with that of a legal system, which ‘allows us to understand 
nothing but contemporary momentary (Western-style) systems, whose origins are 
entirely obscured, or presumed.’1001 In doing so, it also allows us, he suggests, to 
‘contextualise the Western concept of legal system’ itself, ‘explaining it no longer as 
an ultimate and autonomous form of legal development, but as simply a tradition 
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amongst others, which must both justify itself to its adherents and explain itself to 
other traditions.’1002  
How is, as MacCormick would be tempted to ask, such a conception of 
tradition normative? Where is the normativity in Glenn’s concept of tradition? Glenn 
answers in the following way: 
Tradition is unquestionably normative. It tells us how we should act. Its 
normativity derives from the collective judgement, exercised over time, that 
the content of the tradition is of value and should be of contemporary 
application. Tradition as a general concept makes no further claim, however, 
of binding… It is simply available, as normative information. Nor does it 
claim to be complete in terms of dictating specific conduct.1003  
 
It is indicative of Glenn’s approach – as it is of others who have taken seriously the 
explanatory value of the paradigm of tradition – that he resists the sense in which any 
realm of normative information determines our actions, or is autonomous to such a 
level that it does all the work for us when we behave. Rather, as Glenn wishes to say, 
normative information is best seen as simply being there, as available, and as, 
generally, thought to be valuable.  
It is no small part of the very availability of this move for Glenn that he rejects 
any straightforward or exhaustive relationship between law and language. Legal 
traditions, he says, answering Andrew Halpin’s charge that he restricts the concept of 
tradition to a language game,1004 is ‘best thought of as a repository of normative or 
substantive thought, and not simply the language of its expression.’1005 It is precisely 
Glenn’s ability to resist the language of thought hypothesis, which also allows him to 
resist the exclusive location of normativity within the formal and abstract values of a 
system. He says, in his chapter on the civil law tradition, ‘there is ongoing challenge, 
notably in cognitive science affirming the primacy of human thought (we always still 
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have to decide what to do, in a way uncontrolled by language) and in the idea that the 
civil law is the result of a process of collective, and learned, deliberation.’1006 It is no 
coincidence that Glenn cites Christian Atias’ Epistemologie juridique1007 – a central 
reference, also, for Samuel’s Epistemology and Method in Law,1008 which was 
discussed above under the legal-work-as-tradition picture (in section IB2b). Under 
this kind of picture, legislation and its interpretation ‘are simply means of continuing 
the discussion, and not in any way means of bringing to an end or limiting is 
breadth.’1009  
It is also no coincidence that Glenn places emphasis on learning to value a 
tradition, and on doing so, furthermore, in epistemic communities. Adopting a 
perspective in which we learn to value a tradition, allows Glenn to introduce a 
cleavage between the representation of a tradition as authoritative, and it actually 
being so. The latter, under this conception, dissolves. As Glenn notes, ‘the 
information of traditions thus represents authority, but it is not necessarily 
authoritative. Absent instruments of authority, or of dominance or of repression, the 
authority of tradition is persuasive only. It does not bind, in the sense of somehow 
automatically ensuring adherence.’1010 There is, moreover, a critical ethical message 
in leaving such room for contingency – as Scott Veitch points out in a recent book, 
there is an inherent danger in a theory of law that merges the enforcement capacity of 
legal orders with their claim to correctness.1011 Adopting such a perspective, 
encourages blindness as to the capacity for law to legitimate suffering, to subsume our 
ethical awareness to adherence with the rules. Once, under this conception, some 
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behaviour can be categorised as having adhered to the formal requirements of a legal 
rule, it cannot be judged unfavourably: the merging of law’s power with its claim to 
correctness leaves no room for judgement outside the law. In this way, dwelling 
within the law, we can disavow our responsibilities. However, once we see, as Glenn 
does, that the representation of authority does not automatically translate into 
authoritativeness, we leave room for judgement – a judgement that may be informed 
by the availability of normative information, but not exhausted by it.   
Glenn’s ability to leave room for contingency – where what we ought to do is 
not exhausted by that which is generally represented as authoritative – is also a legacy 
of his engagement with the philosophy of time. Glenn resists any notion of static or 
linear time. He argues that this concept of time has been adopted by the western world 
because it allows us – in a typically self-aggrandising manner – to see human 
rationality as ‘effecting change, making a difference.’1012 We ought to see, he says, 
the very idea of the primacy of the present as a certain kind of tradition.1013 Once we 
adopt the alternative view, of a non-linear, encompassing view of time, we are 
enabled to see tradition ‘as transmitted information, an ongoing bran-tub churned by 
new generations, with no inherent elites or hierarchy’, and we are able to see to see 
how ‘the linking of tradition with stability becomes less obvious and less defensible. 
Tradition’ then ‘becomes rather a resource from which reasons for change may 
derived, a legitimating agency for ideas which, by themselves, would have no social 
resonance.’1014 
And yet, in all of this, Glenn does not retain some elements of the explanatory 
paradigm of discourse. ‘That which is brought’, he says, ‘from the past to the present, 
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in a particular social context, is information.’1015 Tradition is not in the doing, but in 
the way of doing. ‘Acts or decisions, once they take place’, he notes, ‘disappear 
forever if they are not translated into communicable information.’1016 Of course, we 
ought not to forget the essential element that we are not thereby forced to act upon 
that information (to neglect to remember this would be to neglect to remember how 
Glenn leaves room for contingency, as above), but it remains the case that, for Glenn, 
without the existence of that communicable information ‘there can be no concept of 
tradition, only a grim reality of human entropy.’1017   
What is the content of that information? That depends, says Glenn, on the 
particular tradition. It need not be rules or instructions, or indeed facts – it all depends 
on the specific tradition. Indeed, it is ‘the choice of the information to be captured by 
a tradition’ that is thus fundamental to the tradition itself.1018 Is that choice determined 
by tradition itself? No – definitely not, says Glenn: the ‘pool of information captured 
by the adherents of a particular tradition…cannot be entirely controlled by the 
tradition itself.’1019 Rather: 
Different levels of understanding, different means of interpretation of existing 
sources, different opinions, will all contribute to a variety of statements of 
current elements of a tradition, in one or other of the means of capture. The 
variety of information captured will increase as the tradition increases in size, 
each generation capturing its own understanding of, and adherence to, the 
tradition. The reporting of current cases, in law, is an example of this large, 
reflective, looping characteristic of a living tradition. Very large, ancient 
traditions will thus constitute vast repositories of information. A given 
tradition emerges as a loose conglomeration of data, organised around a basic 
theme or themes, and variously described as a ‘bundle’, a ‘tool-box’, a 
‘language’, a ‘seedbed’, a ‘rag-bag’ or ‘bran-tub’. In the language of modern 
information theory, a tradition will always include a great deal of noise, not 
essential for understanding the primary message of the tradition.1020 
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The difficulties involved in understanding Glenn’s concept of legal tradition arise 
from his willingness to leave room for contingency, and from his desire to escape the 
problems of adopting either one of the two extremes: either of a necessarily 
authoritative discourse, or of a supposedly chaotic or entropic realm of activity. The 
first is too rational, painting too determinative a picture of our behaviour, i.e., of 
behaviour as reliant solely on our adherence to rules. The second, on the other hand, is 
too much of a black-box about which, it seems, we can say nothing at all. This view 
does, however, it must be said, come perilously close to that of MacCormick’s. Glenn 
is perhaps more careful to leave room for a determination of what we ought to do that 
is not already determined by the formal properties of a discourse. But, like 
MacCormick, he focuses his attention, at least in part, on the moment or moments of 
choice – of that which is captured as normative information by tradition. Glenn holds 
on to a realm of being – the realm of information, itself relatively autonomous, 
stretching over time, beyond generations – though he subjects it and surrounds it with 
innumerable qualifications. Even though traditions are undefinable, incomplete,1021 
they are subject to a process of selection1022 – a process that Glenn refers to as that of 
‘massaging’ a tradition. We engage in such a process of massaging a tradition, says 
Glenn, ‘in order to decide on personal conduct. We must each decide on the constraint 
which traditionally eventually lays upon us.’1023 Such a process may not be evident to 
any one individual engaging in it, says Glenn, ‘but it is forever present.’1024 Some of 
us will be more readily disposed to the constraints of the tradition; others will find 
themselves amongst the ‘mot vigorous opponents to it’; the ‘massage,’ it seems, 
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‘occurs between both groups.’1025 A tradition may never reach definitive form, but, 
nevertheless there is a sense in which it ‘is…in the present, a series of interactive 
statements of information.’1026 The ‘totality of information in the tradition is 
constantly undergoing a process of review, appreciation and ongoing 
communication.’1027 That ‘totality’ is by no means one capable of being subjected to 
some formal coherence or consistency, but nevertheless, it remains the case that we 
can speak of that totality as existing at any one moment.  
Glenn here walks a fine line, a line finer, perhaps, than that walked by Mertz, 
Lacey, Cotterrell or MacCormick, but a line nonetheless. As soon as he finds himself 
on the side of discourse – of a totality of information, of a sense of presence – he 
reminds us we must not subject that totality or presence to any logical system or 
stability. Equally, as soon as he find himself edging closer to entropy, he introduces 
elements of order, of the disposition of certain groups or social contexts to respond to 
tradition in a certain way, of a process of selection, of choice, of determination (for 
example, by reference to the above-cited means of interpretation, opinions, or other 
methods of capture). To make this point is not, unlike the members of the symposium 
on the book, to criticise the coherence of Glenn’s notion of a legal tradition. Rather, it 
is to use the devices introduced above – namely, that of tradition and discourse – to 
reveal the explanatory tensions inherent in the concept as Glenn uses it. Glenn is 
careful, as are Mertz, Lacey, Cotterrell and MacCormick, to avoid the problems of 
going too far down either the discourse- or the tradition-friendly line of conceiving of 
law and legal work. But in avoiding those problems he does present a moving target. 
It may be that that is the reason for the symposium participants’ expression of 
frustration with what they saw as the lack of utility of the tool for comparative legal 
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scholarship, or its alleged conceptual imperialism; that, rather than what Glenn sees as 
the Western legal theoretical tradition of seeking to separate law from everything else 





II. TOWARDS THE INCOMPLETENESS OF 
THEORETICAL PICTURES 
 
One ever-present feature of the above discussion has been the formation of a 
theorist’s own view on the back of an avoidance of what the theorist characterises as 
two extremes in the history of the relevant inquiry. In other words, what we have seen 
throughout, is that the process of coming to understand the history of the relevant 
inquiry in a certain way is also a process during which one’s own predilections for 
certain problems, methods, and insights is formed. This does not need to be stated as a 
hypothesis to be proven: it is sufficient to point to a tendency, or perhaps a usual 
occurrence, in the advanced education of a theorist.  
Given that observation, if it is possible to show that any understanding of the 
history of a relevant inquiry is itself incomplete – that it is one out of many possible 
ways of understanding that history – then it would appear to follow that any one 
picture that emerges from that understanding will be incomplete.  
There is one obvious way to show that any understanding of the history of a 
relevant inquiry is itself incomplete. It has already been observed above that the 
theorists discussed in the above history themselves used other concepts to characterise 
that very same history. Unless there is a way to show those theorists were mistaken, 
the matter appears to stand proven: the above understanding of the history of 
jurisprudential inquiry is incomplete, in the same way that any of the other theorists’ 
divisions that were mentioned are incomplete.  
Although this seems, at first blush, like a good argument, the problem is that a 
stubborn theorist could reply: ‘your history may be incomplete, but mine is not; mine 
is a truthful, accurate, adequate history, and it is the only one that can claim such a 
status.’ What are we to say to such a claim? 
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Another obvious way to bring out the incompleteness of the first part of the 
thesis, would be to say that it is itself discursive, namely, that as a history, it is 
incomplete because it uses as its basic data other texts, and not, say, the socio-
historical contexts in which the inquiries were produced, or the biographical contexts 
of the authors, and so on. Once again, however, a stubborn theorist might say: ‘but 
that only shows that your history is incomplete, not that all such histories, or indeed 
all theoretical inquiries, are incomplete.’ Once more, then, what are we to say to such 
a claim? 
There are at least three responses to the stubborn theorist, each of which shall 
be examined below. The first response is to try to show that truth can be the aim, 
perhaps a necessary aim, of an inquiry – not only one’s own, but anyone’s – but that 
this is not incompatible with the adoption of an attitude to the results of one’s own 
theory as incomplete. The second response is to show that the results of one’s inquiry 
are never complete not for the prosaic reason that more can always be added, more 
references included, sentences refined, but for the more fundamental reason that an 
inquiry only ever appears complete to one when (and only when) one does not 
problematise its central terms – often the terms employed in the articulation of the 
insights reached by the inquiry. The third response is even more metatheoretical, and 
also somewhat more tendentious. This response appeals to the limitations of the mode 
one is in when one theorises. The theoretical life is an intensively self-reflective form 
of life. The suggestion made is that that mode itself tends to influence theorists to look 
for and attempt to locate the presence and importance of self-reflexivity. The three 
responses are divided below into three sections, respectively.   
There is a point to be made about the second and third responses. These 
responses do not set out to prove that all theoretical pictures are incomplete. If that 
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were possible, the responses would be undermining the central argument, suggesting 
that they have managed to offer a complete inquiry for the incompleteness of all 
inquiries. The aim of the second and third responses is more modest: whereas it is the 
aim of the first to show that a theorist can adopt such an attitude (that the results of 
one’s inquiry are incomplete), the second and third responses are designed to show 
the theorists some good reasons for adopting that attitude. To repeat, this is not a case 
where proof is possible; it is, at best, a matter of persuasion.  
 
IIA. TRUTH AND INQUIRY 
The central organising aim of part one of this thesis was to show that all theoretical 
pictures of law and legal work are oriented in such a way that they place explanatory 
primacy on ideas that fall either under the explanatory paradigm of discourse or the 
explanatory paradigm of tradition. Some individual works, it was argued, may contain 
elements of both, but they do not transcend those paradigms. Now, if this was the 
central organising aim, and if one accepts the argument of the above discussion, then 
one may conclude that it has already been shown that any one picture of law and legal 
work will be incomplete. What such an argument misses, however, is the very 
premise from which it begins. The premise is that the results of the above inquiry are 
an adequate, truthful and accurate account of the history of jurisprudential inquires. In 
other words, to make the argument canvassed in this paragraph would be self-
defeating.  
There is a way to reconcile this seemingly intractable dilemma. It is to say that 
it may very well be unavoidable, in the pursuit of a certain inquiry – such as to set out 
the history of the traditions of accounts of law and legal work – to be oriented by the 
aim of producing a truthful, adequate and accurate account. There is nothing to stop 
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one from having such an aim, and indeed, it may very well be one without which the 
inquiry itself would not get going. However, and critically, there is also nothing that 
can stop one, once one has reached the ‘completion’ of one’s inquiry (the matter of 
‘completion’ is returned to in the second section below), to say that what one has 
produced is incomplete. This is exactly the thought that the second part of this thesis 
seeks to encourage.  
In their lively debate, published as What’s the Use of Truth?,1028 Pascal Engel 
and Richard Rorty provide a window onto the long-standing debate in contemporary 
philosophy over the role of truth in inquiry. Engel’s contribution first characterises 
Rorty’s position and then responds to it. According to Engel, Rorty argues there is no 
distinction that can usefully be made between truth and justification – ‘truth’ is a way 
of speaking that functions as ‘a rhetorical pat on the back’ or ‘a compliment.’1029 In 
this respect, says Engel, Rorty not only disagrees with philosophers who claim that 
truth is secured by some criteria of correspondence or correctness, but also disagrees 
with those who, like C.S. Peirce, Hilary Putnam, and Crispin Wright, see truth as 
‘rational acceptability at the limit of inquiry’ or those, like Habermas, who conceive 
of truth as ‘ideal convergence within a communicational community.’1030 Thus, 
summarising Rorty’s views, Engel suggests that for him truth is ‘neither a norm nor 
an ultimate goal. It cannot be a norm in the sense of that which regulates inquiry 
because it is unknowable. And it cannot be an ultimate goal in the sense of being an 
intrinsic value (although it can have an instrumental value).’1031  
According to Engel, then, Rorty takes it that because truth cannot be a 
property of a set of propositions (say), so truth has only, and at best, an instrumental 
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value (e.g., the pursuit of democracy or solidarity, improving the quality of our 
conversations, etc.), and that, therefore, there is no sense in which we can say, or 
ought we to say, that truth is either the norm of inquiry or its aim. Engel’s strategy, in 
reply to Rorty, is to hold on to the distinctions between truth as a property, truth as a 
norm, and truth as an aim. In essence, Engel defends the idea that truth is best thought 
of as a norm (of assertions and beliefs) – he says, for example, that truth is a norm of 
belief ‘in the sense in which, for any belief whatsoever, it is an objection against this 
belief to say that it is false and that it is normal (in the sense that it is the rule) to try to 
revise it’1032 – and although he recognises that it does not follow from this that truth 
either has ‘an intrinsic value and must be respected and sought under all 
circumstances’ or that it is ‘the goal of inquiry, the supreme epistemic value’,1033 he 
nevertheless finds it difficult to repress the worry that without truth as an intrinsic 
value and supreme epistemic value, not only would our striving for democracy and 
solidarity (say) suffer, so would the virtues of sincerity and accuracy in the practice of 
inquiry.  
Engel’s tripartite distinction between truth as a property, norm and aim is 
useful, but nevertheless skirts over two important distinctions. The first distinction is 
the difference between a first person and a third person account of the function of 
truth-as-a-norm. As above, Engel refers exclusively to the third person perspective in 
bringing out the notion of truth-as-norm. One can see this in the quotes above, but 
also in Engel’s challenge to Rorty to ‘deny that the notion of truth plays a central role 
in the overall system that allows us to express our beliefs through linguistic 
communication and to conceive of our beliefs as rational.’1034 The judgement of 
another that our belief is false ought to make us revise our belief, and normally does 
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so. When it does not, we are either insincere or deluded.1035 What this misses is the 
possibility of the first person perspective, i.e., of a norm as an attitude one adopts to 
oneself.  
The importance of the second distinction comes out in Engel’s criticism of 
Rorty’s argument that it follows from the proposition that truth is not a property of 
any one set of propositions, assertions, beliefs or the results of certain inquiries that 
truth cannot be a norm, and that it should not be the aim, of inquiry. What this 
distinction skirts over is the ex ante and post factum distinction. Both norm and aim, 
as used by Engel, are essentially ex ante: truth-as-norm dictates that when someone 
tells us (in keeping with the third person perspective) that our belief (or assertion, etc.) 
is false (i.e., does not contain the property of truth) we revise that belief (i.e., we use 
that judgement to change what we will believe in the future) for that very reason (and 
no other reason); truth-as-aim, on the other hand, is ex ante by definition.  
Put together, what these important distinctions, skirted over by Engel, yield, is 
another perspective on the debate of the role of truth in inquiry, namely, the first 
person post factum perspective. It is exactly this position that is emphasised in the 
second part of this thesis. What this perspective raises is the question of the attitude 
that I, myself, as a theorist, can and ought to take to the results of my inquiry. This 
question is quite separate from whether, either as a theorist (generally, or as someone 
engaged in a theoretical inquiry concerning the concept of truth), I can, must or 
should accept that truth is a norm that regulates inquiry, that truth is the aim of inquiry 
or that the results of the inquiries of others are capable of truth.  
Although these are the major distinctions, there is a further distinction that 
ought to be mentioned. In some points in Engel’s discussion, Engel presents the ideas 
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of truth-as-aim-of-inquiry and truth-as-value (or epistemic value, or supreme 
epistemic value) as equivalent. This is liable to lead to confusion. The concept of an 
aim and a value are quite different concepts. The concept of an aim may be purely 
descriptive: the argument could be that a theorist cannot help but be oriented, in the 
process of inquiry (or perhaps, more generally, a person producing beliefs or making 
assertions), to truth, i.e., to the way things really are or what is the case. The concept 
of truth-as-a-value, however, can either suggest that it is worthwhile for us to have the 
aim of truth as the aim of inquiry (i.e., that the process would be invaluable without 
that aim), or that it is valuable that truth is a property of our inquiries either because 
our inquiries would not be valuable if they could not attain the property of truth, or 
that only those inquiries that do not attain the property of truth are valuable.  
The position taken here, as amongst all these, insofar as this is relevant for the 
present discussion, is as follows. One does not have to come to a stance on the debate 
over whether or not truth is a property of the inquiries of others, including 
jurisprudential inquiries, in order to adopt an attitude, in accordance with the first 
person post factum perspective, thanks to which one can acknowledge that the results 
of one’s own inquiries are incomplete.  
It may very well be the case, though nothing discussed here rests on the 
viability of this argument, that we cannot help, as theorists in pursuit of an inquiry, 
but to pursue the truth, i.e., we cannot help but to try to describe the way things are or 
what is the case, or, if we are prescribing, we cannot but help assume certain things 
about the way things or what is the case. It does not follow from this belief, even if it 
were somehow possible to prove, that truth ought to be the standard of evaluation of 
inquiries or that we ought to think recourse to that standard accounts well for how 
communities of inquirers regulate themselves. This second part of the thesis does not 
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mean to impose any way of speaking about inquiries or to impose a standard thanks to 
which we can evaluate or justify them. The interest of this part is much more modest: 
it is to encourage the adoption of the attitude to our own inquiries in which we 
acknowledge the incompleteness of that which our own efforts produce.  
The other half of the debate, mentioned in the above book, is the contribution 
made by Rorty. However, Rorty’s own position is better expressed, at least for my 
purposes here, in an article entitled ‘Philosophy as a Transitional Genre.’1036 Most 
probably written after the debate, referred to above, between Engel and Rorty held in 
the Sorbonne in 2002, Rorty acknowledges Engel’s argument, though not without 
some disparagement. He says, ‘One of the principal achievements of recent analytical 
philosophy is to have shown that the ability to wield the concept of “true belief” is a 
necessary condition for being a user of language, and thus for being a rational 
agent.’1037 That acknowledgement, however, does not change his view of ‘Truth’ and 
how we ought to treat it. On the contrary, he prefers to stick to the ‘old Nietzschean 
story about how “Truth” took the place of “God” in a secular culture, and why we 
should get rid of this God-surrogate in order to become more self-reliant.’1038 More 
clearly and more relevantly for my purposes here, Rorty argues that ‘the question “Do 
you believe that truth exists” is shorthand for something like “Do you think that there 
is a natural terminus to inquiry, a way things really are, and that understanding what 
that way is will tell us what to do with ourselves?”.’1039 The view that answers ‘yes’ 
to this question is what he calls the search for ‘redemptive truth.’ The following 
passage will illustrate this nicely: 
I shall use redemptive truth for a set of beliefs that would end, once and for all, 
the process of reflection on what to do with ourselves. Redemptive truth 
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would not consist in theories about how things interact causally, but instead 
would fulfil the need that religion and philosophy have attempted to satisfy. 
This is the need to fit everything – every thing, person, event, idea and poem – 
into a single context, a context that will somehow reveal itself as natural, 
destined, and unique. It would be the only context that would matter for 
purposes of shaping our lives, because it would be the only one in which those 
lives appear as they truly are. To believe in redemptive truth is to believe that 
there is something that stands to human life as elementary physical particles 
stand to the four elements – something that is the reality behind the 
appearance, the one true description of what is going on, the final secret.1040  
 
Rorty’s argument is partly historical – he says, for example, that ‘Intellectuals of the 
West have, since the Renaissance, hoped for redemption first from God, then from 
philosophy, and now from literature’;1041 partly a thesis about philosophy – i.e., he 
argues that ‘The premise of philosophy is that there is a way things really are – a way 
humanity and the rest of the universe are and always will be, independent of any 
merely contingent human needs and interests’;1042 and partly a warning and a 
prescription: 
To give up the idea that there is an intrinsic nature of reality to be discovered 
either by the priests, or the philosophers, or the scientists, is to disjoin the need 
for redemption from the search for universal agreement. It is to give up the 
search for an accurate account of human nature, and thus for a recipe for 
leading the good life for man.1043  
 
The above quotes serve as good source material for the clarification of the view 
presented here. It could be claimed, on the back of the argument for incompleteness 
and in a way that may seem to echo Rorty’s thinking, that insofar as theorists hope to 
make a contribution to questions concerning how we ought to lead our lives and 
govern each other, they ought to give up the idea of there being an accurate, genuine, 
sincere, and true picture of human nature, one that needs no revision, and thus one 
that one can use confidently, and continuing using confidently, in pronouncing public 
policy. However, the resemblance with Rorty’s view here is mistaken. Rorty argues 
                                                
1040 Ibid., 7. 
1041 Ibid., 8. 
1042 Ibid., 11. 
1043 Ibid., 24. 
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that we both ought to give up the possibility of an accurate picture that needs no 
revision and that we ought to give up the search for such a picture. As has already 
been suggested with respect to Engel’s views, however, neither argument needs to be 
accepted in order to support the argument being conveyed here, namely, that we can 
and ought to take such an attitude to the results of our own inquiries that 
acknowledges their incompleteness. Similarly, adopting such an attitude does not 
force us to accept Rorty’s arguments that there is no such thing as truth, or that we 
ought to give up the search for it.  
The above does not pretend to be making a contribution to the complex and 
long treatment of the concept of truth in philosophy of the sciences or social sciences, 
or in metaphilosophy. Such treatments have often been waged at the level of whether 
or not inquiries in science and social sciences can produce truths, or whether they can 
produce objective truths, and whether any of the truths or objective truths it produces 
are endangered by the ‘involvement’ of the theorist – and of course, ceaseless debate 
about how we should characterise that ‘involvement’ and the implications of 
characterising it in such-and-such a manner. What one could state, though this is not 
defended here, is that debates over the status of the insights produced by scientific and 
social scientific inquiry are, at bottom, debates about what attitudes we ought to adopt 
to the examined life and its yield. Views, such as Karl Popper’s, for example in 
Conjectures and Refutations,1044 that ‘there are all kinds of sources of our knowledge; 
but none has authority’,1045 and that ‘the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is 
its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability’,1046 but that, nevertheless, ‘science is 
capable of real discoveries’,1047 are consumed with the difficulties and nuances with 
                                                
1044 Popper 2002.  
1045 Ibid., 32. 
1046 Ibid., 48. 
1047 Ibid., 157; original emphasis. 
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just how much we can expect from scientific and social scientific inquiry and how 
should we approach doing it, using it and reflecting upon it. What the present 
discussion hopes to achieve is to suggest that one can (and perhaps one inevitably 
does) pursue an inquiry with the belief that one can (and thereby also be motivated in 
accordance with the belief that one can) produce a ‘real discovery’, but that this is 
compatible with a post factum attitude one can take to one’s efforts that acknowledges 
the product of those efforts being incomplete.  
We have come to the point of the discussion where it is necessary to show a 
good argument for adopting the attitude that the results of one’s own inquiry are 
incomplete. Before going on to do so, however, one further point needs to be made. 
This thesis does not engage with the arguments made as part of the contemporary 
debate concerning the methodology of jurisprudence. This is not, however, an 
oversight. Although it is reasonable to believe – and this belief has indeed been 
expressed in the first part of this thesis – that any one theoretical picture of law and 
legal work is not capable of locating, for all times and all places, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of, or an adequate explanation of, or even a 
paradigmatic or central case of, law or legal work – because, on the basis of the first 
part, all such pictures place explanatory emphasis in different places, and are oriented 
to give priority to certain problems, methods or modes of explanation – the basic 
thesis defended here does not depend on the success of that argument.  
In other words, this thesis does not need to make an argument as to whether it 
is possible to identify necessarily true features of law or adequate explanations of its 
nature,1048 or whether we ought to use the standard of truth to evaluate the results of 
                                                
1048 For a useful overview of this literature, see Priel 2007.  
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jurisprudential inquiries.1049 All that is needed is to show is that it is possible and 
reasonable for one to adopt an attitude to the results of one’s inquiry as being 
incomplete. Similarly, the argument of this thesis does not depend on the success of 
the idea that there is irreducible plurality or diversity among theories of law and legal 
work. At the same, this thesis is not in any way a challenge to the different ways in 
which various other theorists have characterised the pluralism of jurisprudential 
inquiries.1050 The point, in short, in all of this, is that the second part of this thesis 
suggests that it matters what attitude one adopts to the results of one’s own inquiry. If 
anything, the acknowledgement that the results of one’s inquiry are incomplete is an 
attitude that can and ought to lead one to be more careful, more circumspect, about 
evaluating the results of the inquiries of others.  
 
  
IIB. MEANING IN USE 
 
What good reasons might one have for adopting an attitude that acknowledges the 
incompleteness of the results of one’s own inquiries? This section and the next 
attempt to offer two sketchy responses to that question. The argument made in this 
section is as follows. The terms and phrases one uses in one’s inquiry acquire their 
meaning in use, i.e., they are meaningful insofar as one does not problematise them. 
When such terms and phrases are meaningful they are capable of producing the 
illusion, for one, that the results of one’s inquiry are complete. However, when one 
begins to problematise the terms and phrases one uses – particularly the ones used in 
one’s conclusions or in one’s central insights – then one sees that the terms and 
phrases themselves require potentially endless demands for further explanation. The 
argument of meaning-in-use, then, suggests that the only way in which one’s 
                                                
1049 See, Dickson 2001.  
1050 See, Priel 2008 and Giudice 2005.  
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theoretical picture – the results of one’s own inquiry – can seem complete to one, is 
when one does not problematise the terms and phrases one uses, and therefore does 
not subject one’s theoretical picture to explanatory regress. Given that explanatory 
regress is always possible – if one problematises one’s terms and phrases, and then 
problematises the explanations that are designed to face the first round of 
problematisation, etc. – then it follows that one has good reason to think that the 
results of one’s theoretical inquiries are incomplete.  
The above argument, may, at first blush, resemble Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
argument in The Philosophical Investigations,1051 supported by the so-called sceptical 
reading offered by Saul Kripke,1052 namely, ‘that there was an end to justifications, 
that at various points we run into the fact that “this is the way we go on”.’1053 
Williams has the point that ‘it makes a great difference who “we” are supposed to be, 
and it may mean different groups in different philosophical connections.’1054 The 
point, with respect, is a bit clumsy. What matters is not who the ‘we’ are supposed to 
be, but rather, by whom to whom and when is the ‘running into how to go on’ 
realisation made. Indeed, to call it a ‘realisation’ is already to miss the point. 
Although the discussion here shall not attempt here to enter into Wittgenstenian 
exegetics, the point in making the argument is to say that, with respect to inquiries 
conducted in language – with the use of language as a tool of expression (rather than, 
say, diagrams or images) – one goes on as one does insofar, and only insofar, as, and 
thanks to, the non-problematisation of certain terms and phrases. The meaning of 
these terms and phrases is not, as some interpretations of Wittgenstein assert, fixed or 
determined by use, for to assert that is to think that we can provide sufficiently robust 
                                                
1051 Wittgenstein 2001 (1953). 
1052 Kripke 1982.  
1053 Williams 2006b, 196. 
1054 Id. 
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and complex criteria of use (what is today called ‘pragmatics’) that can help us 
identify the meaning of terms and phrases. Rather, the meaning of terms and phrases 
is constituted in use to such an extent that when the dynamics disappear, and we begin 
to attempt to make sense of the individual term or phrases, to isolate it and question it, 
to analyse it into its alleged components, and so on, the bottom of the terms and 
phrases (so to speak) falls out, their meaning dissolves before our very eyes.    
The above argument will now be illustrated by reference to a reading of 
G.E.M. Anscombe’s famous paper, ‘On Brute Facts.’1055 After performing such a 
reading, this general argument will be briefly applied to show how I can give myself a 
good reason to adopt an attitude thanks to which I can acknowledge the 
incompleteness of the results of my inquiry in the first part of this thesis.  
Anscombe begins her paper by revealing the normative indeterminacy of the 
invocation of fact descriptions: it does not follow from the description of any facts 
(e.g., that the grocer supplied me with potatoes) that I am obliged to do something 
(i.e., following the example, that I should pay the grocer his bill). For it may always 
be the case that the description does not describe all the facts that it would be relevant 
to know: e.g., it may be the case that the grocer supplied me with potatoes as part of 
an amateur film production.1056 Further, it does not help to say that the supply in 
question occurred within a certain institutional context – e.g., one in which the 
supplying of potatoes and the rendering of bills is made possible – because ‘the fact 
that something is done in a society with certain institutions, in the context of which it 
ordinarily amounts to such-and-such a transaction, is not absolute proof that such-and-
                                                
1055 Anscombe 1958. This reading of Anscombe is not necessarily the most popular reading of this 
paper, which has been used, for example, by Searle (e.g., Searle 1995) to help establish his account of 
social ontology. 
1056 Ibid., 69. 
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such a transaction has taken place.’1057 There is, in other words, no set of descriptions 
about the facts of any one specific instantiation of that description that would provide 
us with an absolute proof that the consequences that may be ordinarily said to follow 
from that instantiation should follow in this instance. The always-existing potential 
for some ‘special context’1058 can always displace the finding that ‘what ordinarily 
amounts to such-and-such a transaction is such-and-such a transaction.’1059 And the 
set of descriptions in which some normative consequence ordinarily follows does not 
of itself provide us with the resources to know when such a ‘special context’ exists, 
even if it may provide some guidance as to what makes it ‘special.’ It is not, then, 
‘theoretically possible to make provision in advance for the exception of 
extraordinary cases; for one can theoretically always suppose a further special context 
for each special context, which puts it in a new light.’1060  
Having established the theoretical possibility and significance of special 
contexts, Anscombe takes up the question of the nature and structure of descriptions. 
She asks whether her owing the grocer upon the supply of potatoes to her by him is 
simply a matter of the facts (in the set of descriptions) holding in the ordinary case, or 
whether ‘to say I owe the grocer adds something non-factual to the statement that 
some such facts hold.’ 1061 Very quickly, she arrives at the following difficulty:  
The grocer supplies me with a quarter of potatoes: that is to say, he 1) brings 
that amount of potatoes to my house and 2) leaves them there. But not any 
action of taking a lot of potatoes to my house and leaving them there would be 
supplying me with them. If for example, by the grocer’s own arrangement, 
someone else, who had nothing to do with me, came and took them away soon 
afterwards, the grocer could not be said to have supplied me.1062  
 
                                                
1057 Ibid., 70. 
1058 Id. 
1059 Id. 
1060 Id; original emphasis. 
1061 Id. 
1062 Ibid., 70-1; original emphasis. 
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Anscombe concludes that ‘There can be no such thing as an exhaustive description of 
all the circumstances which theoretically could impair the description of an action of 
leaving a quarter of potatoes in my house “as supplying me with a quarter of 
potatoes”.’1063 Thus, not only is it the case that the theoretical possibility of special 
contexts means that we can never be sure that the set of descriptions really obtains, 
but it is also the case that we cannot describe all the circumstances in which some 
sequence of actions would indicate that the set of descriptions does not really hold.  
‘Every description,’ then, ‘presupposes a context of normal procedure, but that 
context is not even implicitly described by the description.’1064 It is that set of 
descriptions that constitute the ‘normal procedure’ that Anscombe refers to as ‘brute 
facts.’ In other words, in order to make a finding that some description – e.g., the 
supplying of potatoes – obtains (that the specific case before one is an instantiation of 
that description), some further set of descriptions must be functioning as ‘brute facts’: 
As compared with supplying me with a quarter of potatoes we might call 
carting a quarter of potatoes to my house and leaving them there a ‘brute fact.’ 
But as compared with the fact that I owe the grocer such-and-such a sum of 
money, that he supplied me with a quarter of potatoes is itself a brute fact. In 
relation to many descriptions or states of affairs which are asserted to hold, we 
can ask what the ‘brute facts’ were; and this will mean the facts which held, 
and in virtue of which, in a proper context, such-and-such a description is true 
or false, and which are more ‘brute’ than the alleged fact answering to the 
description.1065  
 
Of course, this account of how findings of descriptions holding are dependent on the 
functioning of some further set of descriptions as brute facts (which account for the 
proper context in which that initial finding, leading to a normative consequence, is 
ordinarily valid) does not mean that the theoretical possibility of special contexts is 
defeated. What Anscombe offers us is a theory of descriptions: there are relations 
between descriptions, and those relations can be explained by virtue of the functions 
                                                




they play as between each other. Further, there are no set of descriptions, however 
elaborate, that can guarantee that some normative consequence should follow: 
descriptions are not the sort of thing that can give us that guarantee. Finally, 
Anscombe should not be taken to be arguing for the reality of brute facts – instead, 
some descriptions, in a family of descriptions, function as descriptions of brute facts, 
thus also enabling other kinds of descriptions to function in different ways.   
To paraphrase Anscombe’s own conclusions:1066 some set of descriptions xyz, 
functioning as descriptions of brute facts, can indicate – but only roughly, and never 
by way of a guarantee – the ‘normal circumstances’ in which some description, A, 
(e.g., the supply of potatoes) obtains. Those ‘normal circumstances’ also presuppose 
the existence of certain institutional contexts, though the set of institutional contexts 
presupposed by A need not be the same as that presupposed by xyz: e.g., ‘the 
institution of buying and selling is presupposed to the description “sending a bill,” as 
it is to “being owed for foods received,” but not to the description “supplying 
potatoes”.’1067 Sometimes, the finding that A obtains entails that some further 
description, say B, also obtains. Thus, ordinarily, the description of supplying me with 
potatoes (A) entails the description that potatoes come into my possession (B), but the 
description that someone carted the potatoes to my house and left them there (say, G), 
does not entail that the potatoes came into my possession (B), for description G is not 
of the kind that can entail description B.  But, one cannot mention all the things that 
cannot be the case such that the ordinary circumstances (or proper context, absence of 
special context) for the entailment from A to B is guaranteed.   
Anscombe’s argument, at least in the above interpretation, is useful for present 
purposes. It is possible to generalise it to the terms and phrases used in theoretical 
                                                
1066 Ibid., 72. 
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inquiries in the following way. In each theoretical picture there will be terms and 
phrases that function as brute facts – their meaning depends on the presupposition of 
and reliance on ‘normal contexts.’ Those ‘normal contexts’ can never themselves be 
exhaustively described. They cannot, for example, be exhaustively identified by 
setting out to describe all the ‘special contexts’ in which those terms and phrases 
would not obtain. They cannot because any further description of the ‘normal 
contexts’ or the ‘special contexts’ would themselves use terms and phrases, which 
presuppose and rely on other ‘normal contexts.’ An explanation of the meaning of 
terms and phrases used in a theoretical inquiry would only have itself be explanatory 
to the extent that the terms used in that explanation are not themselves problematised. 
The moment they are, they require an explanation, and so on, potentially ad infinitum.   
But, of course, we do not proceed ad infinitum. Even if at a rate often less than 
we would wish, or that our departments would wish, we do nevertheless produce 
theoretical pictures. If we consider carefully what stops us from finishing a particular 
inquiry, we may find lots of quite banal causes (though these are, in fact, far from 
banal), such as the norm that articles in journals be no longer than a certain amount of 
words and the requirement of contemporary scholarship that demands we publish at 
least one or two such articles a year. Even where we could go on with a paper, we 
‘round it off’ in order to have it published.  
What the above argument attempts to explain is how that ‘rounding off’ works 
– how that illusion of completion is produced – at least at the level of the meaning of 
terms and phrases. In other words, the above offers a theorist a good reason to think 
that the only reason why his or her own inquiry might seem complete to him or her is 
because he or she has not gone on to problematise certain terms and phrases, 
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especially important terms and phrases often used in conclusions or in articulating 
central insights.  
Consider, as an example, the above inquiry, ‘completed’ in part one of this 
thesis, as to the orientation of theoretical pictures of law and legal work to either 
discourse or tradition explanatory paradigms. There is one glaring presupposition 
made and relied on in constructing the history above, namely, the assumption that the 
distinction between ‘law’ and ‘legal work’ makes sense, that we really can divide 
explanations into either ontological or epistemological levels. As we saw, the 
discussion sometimes found itself suggesting that under certain orientations, e.g., the 
tradition one, the ontological ambition disappears into the epistemological one (or 
vice versa in the case of the discourse orientation). This was already a sign that the 
entire history was being shaken at its foundations.  
Further, each of the four chapters of the first part (i.e., law-as-discourse, legal-
work-as-discourse, law-as-tradition, and legal-work-as-tradition) endeavoured to 
‘identify’ or ‘reveal’ ‘central’ features or ideas of each of the four explanatory 
orientations. It was argued, for example, that in the case of the law-as-discourse 
orientation, it was common to answer the problem of law’s normativity by prioritising 
normative requirements to explain human conduct, thereby allowing a theorist to 
focus on evaluating the reasonableness of legal rules (i.e., the problem of the 
normativity of law was another way of phrasing the question as to when law’s reasons 
should be authoritative). In other words, the prioritisation of that form of explanation 
of human conduct (as rule-following, as acting for reasons), allowed theorists to 
provide criteria under which laws ought to function as reasons for action. There are, 
however, numerous ways of picking at this ‘central feature or idea’, that does not 
involve challenging the logic of the argument, but that problematises certain and 
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terms and phrases presumed in it. Thus, the very notions of a ‘reason for action’ or ‘a 
reason’ function here as brute facts. They are presumed to be unproblematic. They 
allow the explanation to proceed only insofar as they are not problematised. Of 
course, they may very well be problematic for another reader – e.g., that reader may 
have just finished reading Kieran Setiya’s Reasons Without Rationalism1068 – and then 
the explanation will appear not only incomplete to that reader, but possibly also 
mistaken, or at best, simply not insightful for lack of ‘accuracy.’ What this shows is 
just how easy it is for one to become blind to the limitations of one’s own theoretical 
picture. In other words, the very fact that one finds certain explanations persuasive 
(accurate, adequate etc.) is also what secures its incompleteness. 
Other examples could be offered here, but the general point is made. Of 
course, this does not prove the incompleteness of theoretical pictures. After all, the 
above is an argument made in language, and it no doubt uses terms and phrases that 
themselves can be problematised, possibly to the extent that the argument would 
dissolve (e.g., what ‘really’ is a ‘brute fact’, what ‘really’ is meant by a 
‘presupposition’?). Once again, all that is suggested here is one reason, hopefully a 
persuasive one, for a theorist to adopt an attitude thanks to which he or she 
acknowledges the incompleteness of the results of his or her inquiry.   
 
IIC. PHILOSOPHY AND THE EXAMINED LIFE  
The above two responses to the question asked at the outset by the ‘stubborn theorist’ 
– the one who resists taking up the attitude being encouraged here – are the principal 
responses, though out of those, it is the first (the discussion on truth) that is presented 
here as more important. Nevertheless, a third response was promised. It will not be 
                                                
1068 Setiyah 2007; for an alternative, see Baker 2008.  
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dwelt on at length here. Rather, it is offered as just one modest further reason for 
adoption of the attitude. 
No matter how creative an approach one takes to the history of philosophy, 
one is loathe to doubt the importance of the Greeks. Socrates’ question, as Williams 
put it in his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, is not a trivial one: ‘what we are 
talking about is how one should live.’1069 Plato, like Socrates, ‘hoped that one could 
direct one’s life, if necessary redirect it, through an understanding that was 
distinctively philosophical – that is to say, general and abstract, rationally reflective, 
and concerned with what can be known through different kinds of inquiry.’1070 In 
short, ‘Plato thought that philosophy could answer the question.’1071   
Nevertheless, despite the fact that Greeks thought that the examined life, the 
philosophical life was the best form of inquiry designed to answer the question put by 
Socrates, they were, according to Williams, ‘less determined’ than ‘modern 
philosophy’ to ‘impose rationality through reductive theory.’1072 Williams argues that 
modern philosophy – he means in particular modern moral philosophy – with its 
alleged obsession with the ‘administrative ideas of rationality’,1073 is not well 
prepared, and most certainly of limited capacity to provide guidance for, the problems 
of the modern world. It is, he says, ‘too far removed, as Hegel first said it was, from 
social and historical reality and from any concrete sense of a particular ethical 
life.’1074  
What is of interest here, for present purposes, is the manner in which Williams 
characterises the examined life, the philosophical life. The life of a philosopher, he 
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asserts, ever since the Greeks, has been one of intense self-reflection. ‘Know thyself!’ 
is the war-cry heard within the walls of the Academy.  
Interestingly, Williams also says ‘I must deliberate from what I am.’1075 The 
‘must’ here operates as a prescription, following on from a warning that ‘We must 
reject any model of personal practical thought according to which all my projects, 
purposes, and needs should be made, discursively and at once, considerations from 
me.’1076 However, read either as a prescription or a description of the examined life, it 
is useful for present purposes. 
For the great majority of the past few years I, like presumably many, if not 
most or even all, other theorists, have lived a more or less intensely self-reflective life. 
If I am to ‘deliberate from what I am’, whether as a description of what I cannot help 
but doing since I am a theorist, or a prescription coming from a prominent 
philosopher (such as Williams), what I am likely to want to find is room for the kind 
of life I lead – for meaning in and significance of the kind of life I have lead and am 
likely to go on leading.  
Emerging from such a background is the tendency to place great emphasis on 
the location of self-reflective deliberation, on self-conscious intentionality, and, more 
generally, on human freedom, on the human being as intervener in the causal structure 
of the world, on the rational animal as self-mover, and, moreover, on the ethical 
import of such a life – consider, for example, Hannah Arendt’s argument that the 
problem with Eichmann was his ‘thoughtlessness.’1077 The history of philosophy – of 
all kinds, though more clearly moral, political, legal (in short, practical) philosophy – 
could be profitably be written from this perspective.  
                                                
1075 Ibid., 200. 
1076 Id. 
1077 See, Arendt 1964.  
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Notice how easily this applies to the present thesis. By virtue of being an 
investigation into the history of a discipline that identified the kind of theorist I was 
seeking to become (a legal theorist), the first part of the thesis is a clear demonstration 
of intense self-reflection. What emerges from the discussion is a prescription – the 
thesis of this thesis – that one ought to adopt the attitude that the results of one’s 
inquiry are incomplete. Deliberating from who I am (in my image of who I am), I 
come to stress the importance of self-reflectivity – to find meaning in exactly the sort 
of life I am leading or at least take myself to be leading. The snake bites its own tail, 
and, so I hope, what emerges is a good reason to adopt the attitude of 
acknowledgement of the incompleteness of the results of one’s own theoretical 
endeavours. Perhaps, as a theorist, leading a theoretical life, I speak mainly, if not 
only, to myself, speaking of matters I am not (because my pictures of myself are 






The aim of thesis has been to offer an alternative history of theoretical pictures of law 
and legal work, and to suggest that the notion of explanatory paradigms, as well as 
some other phenomena explored in the second part (i.e., explanatory regress and the 
intensely self-reflective mode of the examined life), can encourage the adoption of an 
attitude that the results of one’s inquiries are incomplete.  
 Such historical philosophising, both in itself and in combination with the 
related acknowledgement of the incompleteness of theoretical pictures, may have 
some value for the robustness of a discipline and the wellbeing of a community of 
scholars. If we learn to walk the line between the canonisation of the history of a 
discipline and the ignorance of past works, we also open up the fertility of the past. In 
doing so, arguably, we enable ourselves to learn more from those works, but not such 
as to stifle our own creativity, or, indeed, our own responsibility as theorists to 
confront the current and potential problems of the world we live in.  
 Further, if we learn from this process of creatively engaging with the past, and, 
as has been suggested in the second part of this thesis, come to acknowledge the 
incompleteness of the results of our own inquiry, it is possible that we will avoid the 
dangers of ascribing too much importance to the results of any one inquiry. All of us, 
both in our theoretical as in our everyday life, can come to dwell in the grips of a 
particular picture. We can all too easily come to be persuaded by the existence, truth, 
adequacy and accuracy of a particular pattern. We can also find great pleasure in 
recognising and repeating that pattern. Finally, and most disastrously, we can respond 
with great violence to that which we perceive as a threat to that way of seeing and 
doing, i.e., to that which we have come to take for granted or that which we have 
come to find familiar. Being locked into the grip of a picture places in jeopardy the 
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openness to others that we need in order to live peacefully and respectfully in a world 
composed of different ways of seeing and doing.  
 Ascribing too much importance to the results of any one inquiry may also 
have implications for the value of theoretical pictures in the public sphere. The 
domination of any one theoretical picture might mean that some policies, which 
depend on a combination of insights from different theoretical pictures, will be 
thwarted. It also might mean that where a certain form of justice (distributive, 
corrective or otherwise) is based on any one theoretical picture, it may lead us to be 
complacent about those forms of vulnerability and suffering it conceals or 
marginalises. In doing so, it may blind us to the injustices that such a policy 
perpetuates. Unfortunately, we do not need to look far into our common history to see 
how certain views as to what amounts to human nature (e.g., views that have 
suggested that human beings are, paradigmatically or typically, white, male, 
heterosexual, landowning and rational) have played in their part in creating and 
perpetuating the misery and death of so many human beings.  
 Much more, however, would need to be said to make the above claims 
persuasive and viable. Although it is outside the scope of this thesis to do so, it is 
hoped that the first and second parts of this thesis have at least contributed to the 
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